--- GLEP: 74 Title: Full-tree verification using Manifest files Author: Michał Górny , Robin Hugh Johnson , Ulrich Müller Type: Standards Track Status: Draft Version: 1 Created: 2017-10-21 Last-Modified: 2017-10-30 Post-History: 2017-10-26 Content-Type: text/x-rst Requires: 59, 61 Replaces: 44, 58, 60 --- Abstract ======== This GLEP extends the Manifest file format to cover full-tree file integrity and authenticity checks.The format aims to be future-proof, efficient and provide means of backwards compatibility. Motivation ========== The Manifest files as defined by GLEP 44 [#GLEP44]_ provide the current means of verifying the integrity of distfiles and package files in Gentoo. Combined with OpenPGP signatures, they provide means to ensure the authenticity of the covered files. However, as noted in GLEP 57 [#GLEP57]_ they lack the ability to provide full-tree authenticity verification as they do not cover any files outside the package directory. In particular, they provide multiple ways for a third party to inject malicious code into the ebuild environment. Historically, the topic of providing authenticity coverage for the whole repository has been mentioned multiple times. The most noteworthy effort are GLEPs 58 [#GLEP58]_ and 60 [#GLEP60]_ by Robin H. Johnson from 2008. They were accepted by the Council in 2010 but have never been implemented. When potential implementation work started in 2017, a new discussion about the specification arose. It prompted the creation of a competing GLEP that would provide a redesigned alternative to the old GLEPs. This specification is designed with the following goals in mind: 1. It should provide means to ensure the authenticity of the complete repository, including preventing the injection of additional files. 2. Like the original Manifest2, the files should be split into two groups — files whose authenticity is critical, and those whose mismatch may be accepted in non-strict mode. The same classification should apply both to files listed in Manifests, and to stray files present only in the repository. 3. The format should be universal enough to work both for the Gentoo repository and third-party repositories of different characteristics. 4. The Manifest files should be verifiable stand-alone, that is without knowing any details about the underlying repository format. Specification ============= Manifest file format -------------------- This specification reuses and extends the Manifest file format defined in GLEP 44 [#GLEP44]_. For the purpose of it, the *file type* field is repurposed as a generic *tag* that could also indicate additional (non-checksum) metadata. Appropriately, those tags can be followed by other space-separated values. Unless specified otherwise, the paths used in the Manifest files are relative to the directory containing the Manifest file. The paths must not reference the parent directory (``..``). Manifest file locations and nesting ----------------------------------- The ``Manifest`` file located in the root directory of the repository is called top-level Manifest, and it is used to perform the full-tree verification. In order to verify the authenticity, it must be signed using OpenPGP, using the armored cleartext format. The top-level Manifest may reference sub-Manifests contained in subdirectories of the repository. The sub-Manifests are traditionally named ``Manifest``; however, the implementation must support arbitrary names, including the possibility of multiple (split) Manifests for a single directory. The sub-Manifest can only cover the files inside the directory tree where it resides. The sub-Manifest can also be signed using OpenPGP armored cleartext format. However, the signature verification can be omitted if it is covered by a signed top-level Manifest. Directory tree coverage ----------------------- The Manifest files can also specify ``IGNORE`` entries to skip Manifest verification of subdirectories and/or files. The package manager can support injecting ignore paths to account for additional files created, modified or removed by user's processes that would not be ignored by existing rules. Files and directories starting with a dot are always implicitly ignored. All files that are not ignored must be covered by at least one of the Manifests. A single file may be matched by multiple identical or equivalent Manifest entries, if and only if the entries have the same semantics, specify the same size and the checksums common to both entries match. It is an error for a single file to be matched by multiple entries of different semantics, file size or checksum values. It is an error to specify another entry for a file matching ``IGNORE``, or one of its subdirectories. The file entries (except for ``IGNORE``) can be specified for regular files only. Symbolic links are followed when opening files. It is an error to specify an entry for a different file type. All the local (non-``DIST``) files covered by a Manifest tree must reside on the same filesystem. It is an error to specify entries applying to files on another filesystem. If subdirectories of the Manifest tree reside on a different filesystem, they must be explicitly excluded via ``IGNORE``. File verification ----------------- When verifying a file against the Manifest, the following rules are used: 1. If the file is covered directly or indirectly by an entry of the ``IGNORE`` type, the verification always succeeds. 2. If the file is covered by an entry of the ``MANIFEST``, ``DATA``, ``MISC``, ``EBUILD`` or ``AUX`` type: a. if the file is not present, then the verification fails, b. if the file is present but has a different size or one of the checksums does not match, the verification fails, c. otherwise, the verification succeeds. 3. If the file is covered by an entry of the ``OPTIONAL`` type: a. if the file is present, then the verification fails, b. otherwise, the verification succeeds. 4. If the file is present but not listed in Manifest, the verification fails. Unless specified otherwise, the package manager must not allow using any files for which the verification failed. The package manager may reject any package or even the whole repository if it may refer to files for which the verification failed. New Manifest tags ----------------- The Manifest files can specify the following tags: ``TIMESTAMP `` Specifies a timestamp of when the Manifest file was last updated. The timestamp must be a valid second-precision ISO8601 extended format combined date and time in UTC timezone, i.e. using the following ``strftime()`` format string: ``%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ``. Optionally used in the top-level Manifest file. The package manager can use it to detect an outdated repository checkout as described in `Timestamp verification`_. ``MANIFEST …`` Specifies a sub-Manifest. The sub-Manifest must be verified like a regular file. If the verification succeeds, the entries from the sub-Manifest are included for verification as described in `Manifest file locations and nesting`_. ``IGNORE `` Ignores a subdirectory or file from Manifest checks. If the specified path is present, it and its contents are omitted from the Manifest verification (always pass). ``DATA …`` Specifies a file subject to obligatory Manifest verification. The file is required to pass verification. Used for all files directly affecting package manager operation (ebuilds, eclasses, profiles). ``MISC …`` Specifies a file subject to non-obligatory Manifest verification. The package manager may ignore a verification failure if operating in non-strict mode. Used for files that do not affect the installed packages (``metadata.xml``, ``use.desc``). ``OPTIONAL `` Specifies a file that would be subject to non-obligatory Manifest verification if it existed. The package may ignore a stray file matching this entry if operating in non-strict mode. Used for paths that would match ``MISC`` if they existed. ``DIST …`` Specifies a distfile entry used to verify files fetched as part of ``SRC_URI``. The filename must match the filename used to store the fetched file as specified in the PMS [#PMS-FETCH]_. The package manager must reject the fetched file if it fails verification. ``DIST`` entries apply to all packages below the Manifest file specifying them. Deprecated Manifest tags ------------------------ For backwards compatibility, the following tags are additionally allowed at the package directory level: ``EBUILD …`` Equivalent to the ``DATA`` type. ``AUX …`` Equivalent to the ``DATA`` type, except that the filename is relative to ``files/`` subdirectory. Timestamp verification ---------------------- The Manifest file can contain a ``TIMESTAMP`` entry to account for attacks against tree update distribution. If such an entry is present, it should be updated every time at least one of the Manifests changes. Every unique timestamp value must correspond to a single tree state. During the verification process, the client should compare the timestamp against the update time obtained from a local clock or a trusted time source. If the comparison result indicates that the Manifest at the time of receiving was already significantly outdated, the client should either fail the verification or require manual confirmation from user. Furthermore, the Manifest provider may employ additional methods of distributing the timestamps of recently generated Manifests using a secure channel from a trusted source for exact comparison. The exact details of such a solution are outside the scope of this specification. Algorithm for full-tree verification ------------------------------------ In order to perform full-tree verification, the following algorithm can be used: 1. Collect all files present in the repository into *present* set. 2. Start at the top-level Manifest file. Verify its OpenPGP signature. Optionally verify the ``TIMESTAMP`` entry if present as specified in `timestamp verification`. Remove the top-level Manifest from the *present* set. 3. Process all ``MANIFEST`` entries, recursively. Verify the Manifest files according to `file verification`_ section, and include their entries in the current Manifest entry list (using paths relative to directories containing the Manifests). 4. Process all ``IGNORE`` entries. Remove any paths matching them from the *present* set. 5. Collect all files covered by ``DATA``, ``MISC``, ``OPTIONAL``, ``EBUILD`` and ``AUX`` entries into the *covered* set. 6. Verify the entries in *covered* set for incompatible duplicates and collisions with ignored files as explained in `Manifest file locations and nesting`_. 7. Verify all the files in the union of the *present* and *covered* sets, according to `file verification`_ section. Algorithm for finding parent Manifests -------------------------------------- In order to find the top-level Manifest from the current directory the following algorithm can be used: 1. Store the current directory as *original* and the device ID of the containing filesystem (``st_dev``) as *startdev*, 2. If the device ID of the containing filesystem (``st_dev``) of the current directory is different than *startdev*, stop. 3. If the current directory contains a ``Manifest`` file: a. If a ``IGNORE`` entry in the ``Manifest`` file covers the *original* directory (or one of the parent directories), stop. b. Otherwise, store the current directory as *last_found*. 4. If the current directory is the root system directory (``/``), stop. 5. Otherwise, enter the parent directory and jump to step 2. Once the algorithm stops, *last_found* will contain the relevant top-level Manifest. If *last_found* is null, then the directory tree does not contain any valid top-level Manifest candidates and one should be created in the *original* directory. Once the top-level Manifest is found, its ``MANIFEST`` entries should be used to find any sub-Manifests below the top-level Manifest, up to and including the *original* directory. Note that those sub-Manifests can use different filenames than ``Manifest``. Checksum algorithms ------------------- This section is informational only. Specifying the exact set of supported algorithms is outside the scope of this specification. The algorithm names reserved at the time of writing are: - ``MD5`` [#MD5]_, - ``RMD160`` — RIPEMD-160 [#RIPEMD160]_, - ``SHA1`` [#SHS]_, - ``SHA256`` and ``SHA512`` — SHA-2 family of hashes [#SHS]_, - ``WHIRLPOOL`` [#WHIRLPOOL]_, - ``BLAKE2B`` and ``BLAKE2S`` — BLAKE2 family of hashes [#BLAKE2]_, - ``SHA3_256`` and ``SHA3_512`` — SHA-3 family of hashes [#SHA3]_, - ``STREEBOG256`` and ``STREEBOG512`` — Streebog family of hashes [#STREEBOG]_. The method of introducing new hashes is defined by GLEP 59 [#GLEP59]_. It is recommended that any new hashes are named after the Python ``hashlib`` module algorithm names, transformed into uppercase. Manifest compression -------------------- The topic of Manifest file compression is covered by GLEP 61 [#GLEP61]_. This section merely addresses interoperability issues between Manifest compression and this specification. The compressed Manifest files are required to be suffixed for their compression algorithm. This suffix should be used to recognize the compression and decompress Manifests transparently. The exact list of algorithms and their corresponding suffixes are outside the scope of this specification. Whenever this specification refers to top-level Manifest file, the implementation should account for compressed variants of this file with appropriate suffixes (e.g. ``Manifest.gz``). Whenever this specification refers to sub-Manifests, they can use any names but are also required to use a specific compression suffix. The ``MANIFEST`` entries are required to specify the full name including compression suffix, and the verification is performed on the compressed file. The specification permits uncompressed Manifests to exist alongside their compressed counterparts, and multiple compressed formats to coexist. If that is the case, the files must have the same uncompressed content and the specification is free to choose either of the files using the same base name. Rationale ========= Stand-alone format ------------------ The first question that needed to be asked before proceeding with the design was whether the Manifest file format was supposed to be stand-alone, or tightly bound to the repository format. The stand-alone format has been selected because of its three advantages: 1. It is more future-proof. If an incompatible change to the repository format is introduced, only developers need to be upgrade the tools they use to generate the Manifests. The tools used to verify the updated Manifests will continue to work. 2. It is more flexible and universal. With a dedicated tool, the Manifest files can be used to sign and verify arbitrary file sets. 3. It keeps the verification tool simpler. In particular, we can easily write an independent verification tool that could work on any distribution without needing to depend on a package manager implementation or rewrite parts of it. Designing a stand-alone format requires that the Manifest carries enough information to perform the verification following all the rules specific to the Gentoo repository. Tree design ----------- The second important point of the design was determining whether the Manifest files should be structured hierarchically, or independent. Both options have their advantages. In the hierarchical model, each sub-Manifest file is covered by a higher level Manifest. As a result, only the top-level Manifest has to be OpenPGP-signed, and subsequent Manifests need to be only verified by checksum stored in the parent Manifest. This has the following implications: - Verifying any set of files in the repository requires using checksums from the most relevant Manifests and the parent Manifests. - The OpenPGP signature of the top-level Manifest needs to be verified only once per process. - Altering any set of files requires updating the relevant Manifests, and their parent Manifests up to the top-level Manifest, and signing the last one. - As a result, the top-level Manifest changes on every commit, and various middle-level Manifests change (and need to be transferred) frequently. In the independent model, each sub-Manifest file is independent of the parent Manifests. As a result, each of them needs to be signed and verified independently. However, the parent Manifests still need to list sub-Manifests (albeit without verification data) in order to detect removal or replacement of subdirectories. This has the following implications: - Verifying any set of files in the repository requires using checksums and verifying signatures of the most relevant Manifest files. - Altering any set of files requires updating the relevant Manifests and signing them again. - Parent Manifests are updated only when Manifests are added or removed from subdirectories. As a result, they change infrequently. While both models have their advantages, the hierarchical model was selected because it reduces the number of OpenPGP operations which are comparatively costly to the minimum. Tree layout restrictions ------------------------ The algorithm is meant to work primarily with ebuild repositories which normally contain only files and directories. Directories provide no useful metadata for verification, and specifying special entries for additional file types is purposeless. Therefore, the specification is restricted to dealing with regular files. The Gentoo repository does not use symbolic links. Some Gentoo repositories do, however. To provide a simple solution for dealing with symlinks without having to take care to implement special handling for them, the common behavior of implicitly resolving them is used. Therefore, symbolic links to files are stored as if they were regular files, and symbolic links to directories are followed as if they were regular directories. Dotfiles are implicitly ignored as that is a common notion used in software written for POSIX systems. All other filenames require explicit ``IGNORE`` lines. The algorithm is restricted to work on a single filesystem. This is mostly relevant when scanning for top-level Manifest — we do not want to cross filesystem boundaries then. However, to ensure consistent bidirectional behavior we need to also ban them when operating downwards the tree. The directories and files on different filesystems needs to be ignored explicitly as implicitly skipping them would cause confusion. In particular, tools might then claim that a file does not exist when it clearly does because it was skipped due to filesystem boundaries. File verification model ----------------------- The verification model aims to provide full coverage against different forms of attack. In particular, three different kinds of manipulation are considered: 1. Alteration of the file content. 2. Removal of a file. 3. Addition of a new file. In order to prevent against all three, the system requires that all files in the repository are listed in Manifests and verified against them. As a special case, ignores are allowed to account for directories that are not part of the repository but were traditionally placed inside it. Those directories were ``distfiles``, ``local`` and ``packages``. It could be also used to ignore VCS directories such as ``CVS``. Non-obligatory Manifest verification ------------------------------------ While this specification recommends all tools to use strict verification by default, it allows declaring some files as non-obligatory like the original Manifest2 format did. This could be used on files that do not affect the normal package manager operation. It aims to account for two use cases: 1. Stripping down files that are not strictly required to install packages from repository checkouts. 2. Accounting for automatically generated files that might be updated by standard tooling. The traditional ``MISC`` type is amended with a complementary ``OPTIONAL`` tag to account for files that are not provided in the specific repository. It aims to ensure that the same path would be non-fatal when provided by the repository but fatal when created by the user tooling. Timestamp field --------------- The top-level Manifests optionally allows using a ``TIMESTAMP`` tag to include a generation timestamp in the Manifest. A similar feature was originally proposed in GLEP 58 [#GLEP58]_. A malicious third-party may use the principles of exclusion or replay [#C08]_ to deny an update to clients, while at the same time recording the identity of clients to attack. The timestamp field can be used to detect that. In order to provide a more complete protection, the Gentoo Infrastructure should provide an ability to obtain the timestamps of all Manifests from a recent timeframe over a secure channel from a trusted source for comparison. Strictly speaking, this information is already provided by the various ``metadata/timestamp*`` files that are already present. However, including the value in the Manifest itself has a little cost and provides the ability to perform the verification stand-alone. Furthermore, some of the timestamp files are added very late in the distribution process, past the Manifest generation phase. Those files will most likely receive ``IGNORE`` entries and therefore be not suitable to safe use. New vs deprecated tags ---------------------- Out of the four types defined by Manifest2, two are reused and two are marked deprecated. The ``DIST`` and ``MISC`` tags are reused since they can be relatively clearly marked into the new concept. The ``EBUILD`` tag could potentially be reused for generic file verification data. However, it would be confusing if all the different data files were marked as ``EBUILD``. Therefore, an equivalent ``DATA`` type was introduced as a replacement. The ``AUX`` tag is deprecated as it is redundant to ``DATA``, and has the limiting property of implicit ``files/`` path prefix. Finding top-level Manifest -------------------------- The development of a reference implementation for this GLEP has brought the following problem: how to find all the relevant Manifests when the Manifest tool is run inside a subdirectory of the repository? One of the options would be to provide a bi-directional linking of Manifests via a ``PARENT`` tag. However, that would not solve the problem when a new Manifest file is being created. Instead, an algorithm for iterating over parent directories is proposed. Since there is no obligatory explicit indicator for the top-level Manifest, the algorithm assumes that the top-level Manifest is the highest ``Manifest`` in the directory hierarchy that can cover the current directory. This generally makes sense since the Manifest files are required to provide coverage for all subdirectories, so all Manifests starting from that one need to be updated. If independent Manifest trees are nested in the directory structure, then an ``IGNORE`` entry needs to be used to separate them. Since sub-Manifests can use any filenames, the Manifest finding algorithm must not short-cut the procedure by storing all ``Manifest`` files along the parent directories. Instead, it needs to retrace the relevant sub-Manifest files along ``MANIFEST`` entries in the top-level Manifest. Injecting ChangeLogs into the checkout -------------------------------------- One of the problems considered in the new Manifest format was that of injecting historical and autogenerated ChangeLog into the repository. Normally we are not including those files to reduce the checkout size. However, some users have shown interest in them and Infra is working on providing them via an additional rsync module. If such files were injected into the repository, they would cause strict verification failures of Manifests. To account for this, Infra could provide either ``OPTIONAL`` entries for the Manifest files to allow them in non-strict verification mode, or ``IGNORE`` entries to allow them in the strict mode. Splitting distfile checksums from file checksums ------------------------------------------------ Another problem with the current Manifest format is that the checksums for fetched files are combined with checksums for local files in a single file inside the package directory. It has been specifically pointed out that: - since distfiles are sometimes reused across different packages, the repeating checksums are redundant, - mirror admins were interested in the possibility of verifying all the distfiles with a single tool. This specification does not provide a clean solution to this problem. It technically permits moving ``DIST`` entries to higher-level Manifests but the usefulness of such a solution is doubtful. However, for the second problem we will probably deliver a dedicated tool working with this Manifest format. Hash algorithms --------------- While maintaining a consistent supported hash set is important for interoperability, it is no good fit for the generic layout of this GLEP. Furthermore, it would require updating the GLEP in the future every time the used algorithms change. Instead, the specification focuses on listing the currently used algorithm names for interoperability, and sets a recommendation for consistent naming of algorithms in the future. The Python ``hashlib`` module is used as a reference since it is used as the provider of hash functions for most of the Python software, including Portage and PkgCore. The basic rules for changing hash algorithms are defined in GLEP 59 [#GLEP59]_. The implementations can focus only on those algorithms that are actually used or planned on being used. It may be feasible to devise a new GLEP that specifies the currently used hashes (or update GLEP 59 accordingly). Manifest compression -------------------- The support for Manifest compression is introduced with minimal changes to the file format. The ``MANIFEST`` entries are required to provide the real (compressed) file path for compatibility with other file entries and to avoid confusion. The existence of additional entries for uncompressed Manifest checksums was debated. However, plain entries for the uncompressed file would be confusing if only compressed file existed, and conflicting if both uncompressed and compressed variants existed. Furthermore, it has been pointed out that ``DIST`` entries do not have uncompressed variant either. Performance considerations -------------------------- Performing a full-tree verification on every sync raises some performance concerns for end-user systems. The initial testing has shown that a cold-cache verification on a btrfs file system can take up around 4 minutes, with the process being mostly I/O bound. On the other hand, it can be expected that the verification will be performed directly after syncing, taking advantage of warm filesystem cache. To improve speed on I/O and/or CPU-restrained systems even further, the algorithms can be easily extended to perform incremental verification. Given that rsync does not preserve mtimes by default, the tool can take advantage of mtime and Manifest comparisons to recheck only the parts of the repository that have changed. Furthermore, the package manager implementations can restrict checking only to the parts of the repository that are actually being used. Backwards Compatibility ======================= This GLEP provides optional means of preserving backwards compatibility. To preserve the backwards compatibility, the following needs to be ensured: - all files within the package directory must be covered by ``Manifest`` file inside that package directory, - all distfiles used by the package must be covered by ``Manifest`` file inside the package directory, - all files inside the ``files/`` subdirectory of a package directory need to be use the deprecated ``AUX`` tag (rather than ``DATA``), - all ``.ebuild`` files inside the package directory need to use the deprecated ``EBUILD`` tag (rather than ``DATA``), - the Manifest files inside the package directory can be signed to provide authenticity verification, - an uncompressed Manifest file must exist in the package directory, and a compressed Manifest of identical content may be present. Once the backwards compatibility is no longer a concern, the above no longer needs to hold and the deprecated tags can be removed. Reference Implementation ======================== The reference implementation for this GLEP is being developed as the gemato project [#GEMATO]_. Credits ======= Thanks to all the people whose contributions were invaluable to the creation of this GLEP. This includes but is not limited to: - Robin Hugh Johnson, - Ulrich Müller. Additionally, thanks to Robin Hugh Johnson for the original MataManifest GLEP series which served both as inspiration and source of many concepts used in this GLEP. Recursively, also thanks to all the people who contributed to the original GLEPs. References ========== .. [#GLEP44] GLEP 44: Manifest2 format (https://www.gentoo.org/glep/glep-0044.html) .. [#GLEP57] GLEP 57: Security of distribution of Gentoo software - Overview (https://www.gentoo.org/glep/glep-0057.html) .. [#GLEP58] GLEP 58: Security of distribution of Gentoo software - Infrastructure to User distribution - MetaManifest (https://www.gentoo.org/glep/glep-0058.html) .. [#GLEP59] GLEP 59: Manifest2 hash policies and security implications (https://www.gentoo.org/glep/glep-0059.html) .. [#GLEP60] GLEP 60: Manifest2 filetypes (https://www.gentoo.org/glep/glep-0060.html) .. [#GLEP61] GLEP 61: Manifest2 compression (https://www.gentoo.org/glep/glep-0061.html) .. [#PMS-FETCH] Package Manager Specification: Dependency Specification Format - SRC_URI (https://projects.gentoo.org/pms/6/pms.html#x1-940008.2.10) .. [#MD5] RFC1321: The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm (https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1321.txt) .. [#RIPEMD160] The hash function RIPEMD-160 (https://homes.esat.kuleuven.be/~bosselae/ripemd160.html) .. [#SHS] FIPS PUB 180-4: Secure Hash Standard (SHS) (http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf) .. [#WHIRLPOOL] The WHIRLPOOL Hash Function (http://www.larc.usp.br/~pbarreto/WhirlpoolPage.html) .. [#BLAKE2] BLAKE2 — fast secure hashing (https://blake2.net/) .. [#SHA3] FIPS PUB 202: SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions (http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.202.pdf) .. [#STREEBOG] GOST R 34.11-2012: Streebog Hash Function (https://www.streebog.net/) .. [#C08] Cappos, J et al. (2008). "Attacks on Package Managers" (https://www2.cs.arizona.edu/stork/packagemanagersecurity/attacks-on-package-managers.html) .. [#GEMATO] gemato: Gentoo Manifest Tool (https://github.com/mgorny/gemato/) Copyright ========= This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported License. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/.