Sync gentoo patches with new Kconfig structure

12 files changed, 31 insertions, 1000 deletions

diff --git a/2.6.32/0000_README b/2.6.32/0000_README
index 2011830..a0df600 100644
--- a/2.6.32/0000_README
+++ b/2.6.32/0000_README
@@ -48,27 +48,11 @@ Patch:	4440_grsec-remove-protected-paths.patch
 From:	Anthony G. Basile <blueness@gentoo.org>
 Desc:	Removes chmod statements from grsecurity/Makefile
 
-Patch:	4445_grsec-pax-without-grsec.patch
-From:	Gordon Malm <gengor@gentoo.org>
-Desc:	Allows PaX features to be selected without enabling GRKERNSEC
-
 Patch:	4450_grsec-kconfig-default-gids.patch
 From:	Kerin Millar <kerframil@gmail.com>
 Desc:	Sets sane(r) default GIDs on various grsecurity group-dependent
 	features
 
-Patch:	4455_grsec-kconfig-gentoo.patch
-From:	Gordon Malm <gengor@gentoo.org>
-	Kerin Millar <kerframil@gmail.com>
-	Anthony G. Basile <blueness@gentoo.org>
-Desc:	Adds Hardened Gentoo [server/workstation/virtualization] security
-	levels, sets Hardened Gentoo [workstation] as default
-
-Patch:	4460-grsec-kconfig-proc-user.patch
-From:	Anthony G. Basile <blueness@gentoo.org>
-Desc:	Make GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER, and GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP mutually
-	exclusive to avoid bug #366019.
-
 Patch:	4465_selinux-avc_audit-log-curr_ip.patch
 From:	Gordon Malm <gengor@gentoo.org>
 	Anthony G. Basile <blueness@gentoo.org>
diff --git a/2.6.32/4445_grsec-pax-without-grsec.patch b/2.6.32/4445_grsec-pax-without-grsec.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index f07b2df..0000000
--- a/2.6.32/4445_grsec-pax-without-grsec.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,91 +0,0 @@
-From: Anthony G. Basile <blueness@gentoo.org>
-
-With grsecurity-2.2.2-2.6.32.38-201104171745, the functions pax_report_leak_to_user and
-pax_report_overflow_from_user in fs/exec.c were consolidated into pax_report_usercopy.
-This patch has been updated to reflect that change.
-
-With grsecurity-2.9-2.6.32.58-201203131839, NORET_TYPE has been replaced by __noreturn.
-This patch has been updated to reflect that change.
---
-From: Jory Pratt <anarchy@gentoo.org>
-Updated patch for kernel 2.6.32
-
-The credits/description from the original version of this patch remain accurate
-and are included below.
---
-From: Gordon Malm <gengor@gentoo.org>
-
-Allow PaX options to be selected without first selecting CONFIG_GRKERNSEC.
-
-This patch has been updated to keep current with newer kernel versions.
-The original version of this patch contained no credits/description.
-
-diff -Naur a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
---- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c	2011-04-17 18:15:54.000000000 -0400
-+++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c	2011-04-17 18:28:11.000000000 -0400
-@@ -662,10 +662,12 @@
- 
- #ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
- 	if (init_mm.start_code <= address && address < init_mm.end_code) {
-+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
- 		if (current->signal->curr_ip)
- 			printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: From %pI4: %s:%d, uid/euid: %u/%u, attempted to modify kernel code\n",
- 					 &current->signal->curr_ip, current->comm, task_pid_nr(current), current_uid(), current_euid());
- 		else
-+#endif
- 			printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: %s:%d, uid/euid: %u/%u, attempted to modify kernel code\n",
- 					 current->comm, task_pid_nr(current), current_uid(), current_euid());
- 	}
-diff -Naur a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
---- a/fs/exec.c	2011-04-17 18:15:55.000000000 -0400
-+++ b/fs/exec.c	2011-04-17 18:29:40.000000000 -0400
-@@ -1849,9 +1849,11 @@
- 		}
- 		up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
- 	}
-+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
- 	if (tsk->signal->curr_ip)
- 		printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: From %pI4: execution attempt in: %s, %08lx-%08lx %08lx\n", &tsk->signal->curr_ip, path_fault, start, end, offset);
- 	else
-+#endif
- 		printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: execution attempt in: %s, %08lx-%08lx %08lx\n", path_fault, start, end, offset);
- 	printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: terminating task: %s(%s):%d, uid/euid: %u/%u, "
- 			"PC: %p, SP: %p\n", path_exec, tsk->comm, task_pid_nr(tsk),
-@@ -1866,10 +1868,12 @@
- #ifdef CONFIG_PAX_REFCOUNT
- void pax_report_refcount_overflow(struct pt_regs *regs)
- {
-+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
- 	if (current->signal->curr_ip)
- 		printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: From %pI4: refcount overflow detected in: %s:%d, uid/euid: %u/%u\n",
- 				 &current->signal->curr_ip, current->comm, task_pid_nr(current), current_uid(), current_euid());
- 	else
-+#endif
- 		printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: refcount overflow detected in: %s:%d, uid/euid: %u/%u\n",
- 				 current->comm, task_pid_nr(current), current_uid(), current_euid());
- 	print_symbol(KERN_ERR "PAX: refcount overflow occured at: %s\n", instruction_pointer(regs));
-@@ -1928,10 +1932,12 @@
- 
- __noreturn void pax_report_usercopy(const void *ptr, unsigned long len, bool to, const char *type)
- {
-+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
- 	if (current->signal->curr_ip)
- 		printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: From %pI4: kernel memory %s attempt detected %s %p (%s) (%lu bytes)\n",
- 			&current->signal->curr_ip, to ? "leak" : "overwrite", to ? "from" : "to", ptr, type ? : "unknown", len);
- 	else
-+#endif
- 		printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: kernel memory %s attempt detected %s %p (%s) (%lu bytes)\n",
- 			to ? "leak" : "overwrite", to ? "from" : "to", ptr, type ? : "unknown", len);
- 
-diff -Naur a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
---- a/security/Kconfig	2011-04-17 18:15:55.000000000 -0400
-+++ b/security/Kconfig	2011-04-17 18:28:11.000000000 -0400
-@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
- 	
- config PAX
- 	bool "Enable various PaX features"
--	depends on GRKERNSEC && (ALPHA || ARM || AVR32 || IA64 || MIPS || PARISC || PPC || SPARC || X86)
-+	depends on (ALPHA || ARM || AVR32 || IA64 || MIPS || PARISC || PPC || SPARC || X86)
- 	help
- 	  This allows you to enable various PaX features.  PaX adds
- 	  intrusion prevention mechanisms to the kernel that reduce
diff --git a/2.6.32/4450_grsec-kconfig-default-gids.patch b/2.6.32/4450_grsec-kconfig-default-gids.patch
index 8c6f609..038bb2e 100644
--- a/2.6.32/4450_grsec-kconfig-default-gids.patch
+++ b/2.6.32/4450_grsec-kconfig-default-gids.patch
@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+From: Anthony G. Basile <blueness@gentoo.org>
+Updated patch for the new Kconfig system for >=3.4.4
+
+---
 From: Kerin Millar <kerframil@gmail.com>
 
 grsecurity contains a number of options which allow certain protections
@@ -9,19 +13,10 @@ attention to the finer points of kernel configuration, it is probably
 wise to specify some reasonable defaults so as to stop careless users
 from shooting themselves in the foot.
 
-diff -Naur a/grsecurity/Kconfig b/grsecurity/Kconfig
---- a/grsecurity/Kconfig	2011-12-12 15:11:47.000000000 -0500
-+++ b/grsecurity/Kconfig	2011-12-12 15:13:17.000000000 -0500
-@@ -442,7 +442,7 @@
- config GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID
- 	int "GID for special group"
- 	depends on GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
--	default 1001
-+	default 10
- 
- config GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
- 	bool "Additional restrictions"
-@@ -670,7 +670,7 @@
+diff -Nuar a/grsecurity/Kconfig b/Kconfig
+--- a/grsecurity/Kconfig	2012-07-01 12:54:58.000000000 -0400
++++ b/grsecurity/Kconfig	2012-07-01 13:00:04.000000000 -0400
+@@ -519,7 +519,7 @@
  config GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GID
  	int "GID for auditing"
  	depends on GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GROUP
@@ -30,7 +25,7 @@ diff -Naur a/grsecurity/Kconfig b/grsecurity/Kconfig
  
  config GRKERNSEC_EXECLOG
  	bool "Exec logging"
-@@ -874,7 +874,7 @@
+@@ -734,7 +734,7 @@
  config GRKERNSEC_TPE_GID
  	int "GID for untrusted users"
  	depends on GRKERNSEC_TPE && !GRKERNSEC_TPE_INVERT
@@ -39,7 +34,7 @@ diff -Naur a/grsecurity/Kconfig b/grsecurity/Kconfig
  	help
  	  Setting this GID determines what group TPE restrictions will be
  	  *enabled* for.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
-@@ -883,7 +883,7 @@
+@@ -743,7 +743,7 @@
  config GRKERNSEC_TPE_GID
  	int "GID for trusted users"
  	depends on GRKERNSEC_TPE && GRKERNSEC_TPE_INVERT
@@ -48,7 +43,7 @@ diff -Naur a/grsecurity/Kconfig b/grsecurity/Kconfig
  	help
  	  Setting this GID determines what group TPE restrictions will be
  	  *disabled* for.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
-@@ -956,7 +956,7 @@
+@@ -818,7 +818,7 @@
  config GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL_GID
  	int "GID to deny all sockets for"
  	depends on GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL
@@ -57,7 +52,7 @@ diff -Naur a/grsecurity/Kconfig b/grsecurity/Kconfig
  	help
  	  Here you can choose the GID to disable socket access for. Remember to
  	  add the users you want socket access disabled for to the GID
-@@ -977,7 +977,7 @@
+@@ -839,7 +839,7 @@
  config GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT_GID
  	int "GID to deny client sockets for"
  	depends on GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT
@@ -66,7 +61,7 @@ diff -Naur a/grsecurity/Kconfig b/grsecurity/Kconfig
  	help
  	  Here you can choose the GID to disable client socket access for.
  	  Remember to add the users you want client socket access disabled for to
-@@ -995,7 +995,7 @@
+@@ -857,7 +857,7 @@
  config GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER_GID
  	int "GID to deny server sockets for"
  	depends on GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER
@@ -75,3 +70,15 @@ diff -Naur a/grsecurity/Kconfig b/grsecurity/Kconfig
  	help
  	  Here you can choose the GID to disable server socket access for.
  	  Remember to add the users you want server socket access disabled for to
+diff -Nuar a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
+--- a/security/Kconfig	2012-07-01 12:51:41.000000000 -0400
++++ b/security/Kconfig	2012-07-01 13:00:23.000000000 -0400
+@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@
+ 
+ config GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID
+ 	int "GID exempted from /proc restrictions"
+-	default 1001
++	default 10
+ 	help
+ 	  Setting this GID determines which group will be exempted from
+ 	  grsecurity's /proc restrictions, allowing users of the specified
diff --git a/2.6.32/4455_grsec-kconfig-gentoo.patch b/2.6.32/4455_grsec-kconfig-gentoo.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index e18ba0b..0000000
--- a/2.6.32/4455_grsec-kconfig-gentoo.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,357 +0,0 @@
-From: Anthony G. Basile <blueness@gentoo.org>
-From: Gordon Malm <gengor@gentoo.org>
-From: Jory A. Pratt <anarchy@gentoo.org>
-From: Kerin Millar <kerframil@gmail.com>
-
-Add Hardened Gentoo [server/workstation] predefined grsecurity
-levels. They're designed to provide a comparitively high level of
-security while remaining generally suitable for as great a majority
-of the userbase as possible (particularly new users).
-
-Make Hardened Gentoo [workstation] predefined grsecurity level the
-default. The Hardened Gentoo [server] level is more restrictive
-and conflicts with some software and thus would be less suitable.
-
-The original version of this patch was conceived and created by:
-Ned Ludd <solar@gentoo.org>
-
-diff -Naur a/grsecurity/Kconfig b/grsecurity/Kconfig
---- a/grsecurity/Kconfig	2011-12-26 10:56:24.000000000 -0500
-+++ b/grsecurity/Kconfig	2011-12-26 12:20:25.000000000 -0500
-@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
- choice
- 	prompt "Security Level"
- 	depends on GRKERNSEC
--	default GRKERNSEC_CUSTOM
-+	default GRKERNSEC_HARDENED_WORKSTATION
- 
- config GRKERNSEC_LOW
- 	bool "Low"
-@@ -192,6 +192,262 @@
- 	  - Restricted sysfs/debugfs
- 	  - Active kernel exploit response
- 
-+config GRKERNSEC_HARDENED_SERVER
-+	bool "Hardened Gentoo [server]"
-+	select GRKERNSEC_LINK
-+	select GRKERNSEC_FIFO
-+	select GRKERNSEC_DMESG
-+	select GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL
-+	select GRKERNSEC_TIME
-+	select GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SHMAT
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FINDTASK
-+	select GRKERNSEC_SYSFS_RESTRICT
-+	select GRKERNSEC_PROC
-+	select GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP if (PAX_NOEXEC || PAX_ASLR)
-+	select GRKERNSEC_HIDESYM
-+	select GRKERNSEC_BRUTE
-+	select GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
-+	select GRKERNSEC_KMEM
-+	select GRKERNSEC_RESLOG
-+	select GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_PTRACE
-+	select GRKERNSEC_RANDNET
-+	select GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHMOD
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE
-+	select GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT
-+	select GRKERNSEC_MODHARDEN if (MODULES)
-+	select GRKERNSEC_HARDEN_PTRACE
-+	select GRKERNSEC_PTRACE_READEXEC
-+	select GRKERNSEC_SETXID
-+	select GRKERNSEC_VM86 if (X86_32)
-+	select GRKERNSEC_IO
-+	select GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR
-+	select GRKERNSEC_RWXMAP_LOG
-+	select GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL
-+	select GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL_ON
-+	select PAX
-+	select PAX_ASLR
-+	select PAX_RANDKSTACK if (X86_TSC && X86)
-+	select PAX_RANDUSTACK
-+	select PAX_RANDMMAP
-+	select PAX_NOEXEC
-+	select PAX_MPROTECT
-+	select PAX_EI_PAX
-+	select PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS
-+	select PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS
-+	select PAX_KERNEXEC if ((PPC || X86) && (!X86_32 || X86_WP_WORKS_OK) && !XEN)
-+	select PAX_MEMORY_UDEREF if (X86 && !XEN)
-+	select PAX_SEGMEXEC if (X86_32)
-+	select PAX_PAGEEXEC
-+	select PAX_EMUPLT if (ALPHA || PARISC || SPARC)
-+	select PAX_EMUTRAMP if (PARISC)
-+	select PAX_EMUSIGRT if (PARISC)
-+	select PAX_REFCOUNT if (X86 || SPARC64)
-+	select PAX_USERCOPY if ((X86 || PPC || SPARC || ARM) && (SLAB || SLUB || SLOB))
-+	select PAX_MEMORY_SANITIZE
-+	select PAX_MEMORY_STACKLEAK if (!XEN)
-+	help
-+	  If you say Y here, a configuration for grsecurity/PaX features
-+	  will be used that is endorsed by the Hardened Gentoo project.
-+	  These pre-defined security levels are designed to provide a high
-+	  level of security while minimizing incompatibilities with a majority
-+	  of Gentoo's available software.
-+
-+	  This "Hardened Gentoo [server]" level is identical to the
-+	  "Hardened Gentoo [workstation]" level, but with GRKERNSEC_IO,
-+	  and GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD enabled.  Accordingly, this is the preferred
-+	  security level if the system will not be utilizing software incompatible
-+	  with these features.
-+
-+	  When this level is selected, some security features will be forced on,
-+	  while others will default to their suggested values of off or on.  The
-+	  later can be tweaked at the user's discretion, but may cause problems
-+	  in some situations.  You can fully customize all grsecurity/PaX features
-+	  by choosing "Custom" in the Security Level menu.  It may be helpful to
-+	  inherit the options selected by this security level as a starting point.
-+	  To accomplish this, select this security level, then exit the menuconfig
-+	  interface, saving changes when prompted.  Run make menuconfig again and
-+	  select the "Custom" level.
-+
-+config GRKERNSEC_HARDENED_WORKSTATION
-+	bool "Hardened Gentoo [workstation]"
-+	select GRKERNSEC_LINK
-+	select GRKERNSEC_FIFO
-+	select GRKERNSEC_DMESG
-+	select GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL
-+	select GRKERNSEC_TIME
-+	select GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SHMAT
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FINDTASK
-+	select GRKERNSEC_PROC
-+	select GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP if (PAX_NOEXEC || PAX_ASLR)
-+	select GRKERNSEC_HIDESYM
-+	select GRKERNSEC_BRUTE
-+	select GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
-+	select GRKERNSEC_KMEM
-+	select GRKERNSEC_RESLOG
-+	select GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_PTRACE
-+	select GRKERNSEC_RANDNET
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHMOD
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE
-+	select GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT
-+	select GRKERNSEC_MODHARDEN if (MODULES)
-+	select GRKERNSEC_HARDEN_PTRACE
-+       select GRKERNSEC_PTRACE_READEXEC
-+	select GRKERNSEC_SETXID
-+	select GRKERNSEC_VM86 if (X86_32)
-+	select GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR
-+	select GRKERNSEC_RWXMAP_LOG
-+	select GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL
-+	select GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL_ON
-+	select PAX
-+	select PAX_ASLR
-+	select PAX_RANDKSTACK if (X86_TSC && X86)
-+	select PAX_RANDUSTACK
-+	select PAX_RANDMMAP
-+	select PAX_NOEXEC
-+	select PAX_MPROTECT
-+	select PAX_EI_PAX
-+	select PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS
-+	select PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS
-+	select PAX_KERNEXEC if ((PPC || X86) && (!X86_32 || X86_WP_WORKS_OK) && !XEN)
-+	select PAX_MEMORY_UDEREF if (X86 && !XEN)
-+	select PAX_SEGMEXEC if (X86_32)
-+	select PAX_PAGEEXEC
-+	select PAX_EMUPLT if (ALPHA || PARISC || SPARC)
-+	select PAX_EMUTRAMP if (PARISC)
-+	select PAX_EMUSIGRT if (PARISC)
-+	select PAX_REFCOUNT if (X86 || SPARC64)
-+	select PAX_USERCOPY if ((X86 || PPC || SPARC || ARM) && (SLAB || SLUB || SLOB))
-+	select PAX_MEMORY_SANITIZE
-+	select PAX_MEMORY_STACKLEAK if (!XEN)
-+	help
-+	  If you say Y here, a configuration for grsecurity/PaX features
-+	  will be used that is endorsed by the Hardened Gentoo project.
-+	  These pre-defined security levels are designed to provide a high
-+	  level of security while minimizing incompatibilities with a majority
-+	  of Gentoo's available software.
-+
-+	  This "Hardened Gentoo [workstation]" level is identical to the
-+	  "Hardened Gentoo [server]" level, but with GRKERNSEC_IO and
-+	  GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD disabled.  Accordingly, this is the preferred
-+	  security level if the system will be utilizing software incompatible
-+	  with these features.
-+
-+	  When this level is selected, some security features will be forced on,
-+	  while others will default to their suggested values of off or on.  The
-+	  later can be tweaked at the user's discretion, but may cause problems
-+	  in some situations.  You can fully customize all grsecurity/PaX features
-+	  by choosing "Custom" in the Security Level menu.  It may be helpful to
-+	  inherit the options selected by this security level as a starting point.
-+	  To accomplish this, select this security level, then exit the menuconfig
-+	  interface, saving changes when prompted.  Run make menuconfig again and
-+	  select the "Custom" level.
-+
-+config GRKERNSEC_HARDENED_VIRTUALIZATION
-+	bool "Hardened Gentoo [virtualization]"
-+	select GRKERNSEC_LINK
-+	select GRKERNSEC_FIFO
-+	select GRKERNSEC_DMESG
-+	select GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL
-+	select GRKERNSEC_TIME
-+	select GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SHMAT
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FINDTASK
-+	select GRKERNSEC_PROC
-+	select GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP if (PAX_NOEXEC || PAX_ASLR)
-+	select GRKERNSEC_HIDESYM
-+	select GRKERNSEC_BRUTE
-+	select GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
-+	select GRKERNSEC_KMEM
-+	select GRKERNSEC_RESLOG
-+	select GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_PTRACE
-+	select GRKERNSEC_RANDNET
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHMOD
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE
-+	select GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT
-+	select GRKERNSEC_MODHARDEN if (MODULES)
-+	select GRKERNSEC_HARDEN_PTRACE
-+       select GRKERNSEC_PTRACE_READEXEC
-+	select GRKERNSEC_SETXID
-+	select GRKERNSEC_VM86 if (X86_32)
-+	select GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR
-+	select GRKERNSEC_RWXMAP_LOG
-+	select GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL
-+	select GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL_ON
-+	select PAX
-+	select PAX_ASLR
-+	select PAX_RANDKSTACK if (X86_TSC && X86)
-+	select PAX_RANDUSTACK
-+	select PAX_RANDMMAP
-+	select PAX_NOEXEC
-+	select PAX_MPROTECT
-+	select PAX_EI_PAX
-+	select PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS
-+	select PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS
-+	select PAX_SEGMEXEC if (X86_32)
-+	select PAX_PAGEEXEC
-+	select PAX_EMUPLT if (ALPHA || PARISC || SPARC)
-+	select PAX_EMUTRAMP if (PARISC)
-+	select PAX_EMUSIGRT if (PARISC)
-+	select PAX_REFCOUNT if (X86 || SPARC64)
-+	select PAX_USERCOPY if ((X86 || PPC || SPARC || ARM) && (SLAB || SLUB || SLOB))
-+	select PAX_MEMORY_SANITIZE
-+	select PAX_MEMORY_STACKLEAK if (!XEN)
-+	help
-+	  If you say Y here, a configuration for grsecurity/PaX features
-+	  will be used that is endorsed by the Hardened Gentoo project.
-+	  These pre-defined security levels are designed to provide a high
-+	  level of security while minimizing incompatibilities with a majority
-+	  of Gentoo's available software.
-+
-+	  This "Hardened Gentoo [virtualization]" level is identical to the
-+	  "Hardened Gentoo [workstation]" level, but with the PAX_KERNEXEC and
-+	  PAX_MEMORY_UDEREF defaulting to off.  Accordingly, this is the preferred
-+	  security level if the system will be utilizing virtualization software
-+	  incompatible with these features, like VirtualBox or kvm.
-+
-+	  When this level is selected, some security features will be forced on,
-+	  while others will default to their suggested values of off or on.  The
-+	  later can be tweaked at the user's discretion, but may cause problems
-+	  in some situations.  You can fully customize all grsecurity/PaX features
-+	  by choosing "Custom" in the Security Level menu.  It may be helpful to
-+	  inherit the options selected by this security level as a starting point.
-+	  To accomplish this, select this security level, then exit the menuconfig
-+	  interface, saving changes when prompted.  Run make menuconfig again and
-+	  select the "Custom" level.
-+
- config GRKERNSEC_CUSTOM
- 	bool "Custom"
- 	help
-diff -Naur a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
---- a/security/Kconfig	2011-12-26 12:23:44.000000000 -0500
-+++ b/security/Kconfig	2011-12-26 11:14:27.000000000 -0500
-@@ -360,9 +360,10 @@
- 
- config PAX_KERNEXEC
- 	bool "Enforce non-executable kernel pages"
--	depends on (PPC || X86) && (!X86_32 || X86_WP_WORKS_OK) && !XEN
-+	depends on (PPC || X86) && (!X86_32 || X86_WP_WORKS_OK) && !XEN && !GRKERNSEC_HARDENED_VIRTUALIZATION
- 	select PAX_PER_CPU_PGD if X86_64 || (X86_32 && X86_PAE)
- 	select PAX_KERNEXEC_PLUGIN if X86_64
-+	default y if GRKERNSEC_HARDENED_WORKSTATION
- 	help
- 	  This is the kernel land equivalent of PAGEEXEC and MPROTECT,
- 	  that is, enabling this option will make it harder to inject
-@@ -373,30 +374,30 @@
- 
- choice
- 	prompt "Return Address Instrumentation Method"
--	default PAX_KERNEXEC_PLUGIN_METHOD_BTS
-+	default PAX_KERNEXEC_PLUGIN_METHOD_OR
- 	depends on PAX_KERNEXEC_PLUGIN
- 	help
- 	  Select the method used to instrument function pointer dereferences.
- 	  Note that binary modules cannot be instrumented by this approach.
- 
--	config PAX_KERNEXEC_PLUGIN_METHOD_BTS
--		bool "bts"
--		help
--		  This method is compatible with binary only modules but has
--		  a higher runtime overhead.
--
- 	config PAX_KERNEXEC_PLUGIN_METHOD_OR
- 		bool "or"
- 		depends on !PARAVIRT
- 		help
- 		  This method is incompatible with binary only modules but has
- 		  a lower runtime overhead.
-+
-+	config PAX_KERNEXEC_PLUGIN_METHOD_BTS
-+		bool "bts"
-+		help
-+		  This method is compatible with binary only modules but has
-+		  a higher runtime overhead.
- endchoice
- 
- config PAX_KERNEXEC_PLUGIN_METHOD
- 	string
--	default "bts" if PAX_KERNEXEC_PLUGIN_METHOD_BTS
- 	default "or" if PAX_KERNEXEC_PLUGIN_METHOD_OR
-+	default "bts" if PAX_KERNEXEC_PLUGIN_METHOD_BTS
- 	default ""
- 
- config PAX_KERNEXEC_MODULE_TEXT
-@@ -553,8 +554,9 @@
- 
- config PAX_MEMORY_UDEREF
- 	bool "Prevent invalid userland pointer dereference"
--	depends on X86 && !UML_X86 && !XEN
-+	depends on X86 && !UML_X86 && !XEN && !GRKERNSEC_HARDENED_VIRTUALIZATION
- 	select PAX_PER_CPU_PGD if X86_64
-+	default y if GRKERNSEC_HARDENED_WORKSTATION
- 	help
- 	  By saying Y here the kernel will be prevented from dereferencing
- 	  userland pointers in contexts where the kernel expects only kernel
diff --git a/2.6.32/4460-grsec-kconfig-proc-user.patch b/2.6.32/4460-grsec-kconfig-proc-user.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 8409e87..0000000
--- a/2.6.32/4460-grsec-kconfig-proc-user.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-From: Anthony G. Basile <blueness@gentoo.org>
-
-Address the mutually exclusive options GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER and GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
-in a different way to avoid bug #366019.  This patch should eventually go upstream.
-
-diff -Naur a/grsecurity/Kconfig b/grsecurity/Kconfig
---- a/grsecurity/Kconfig	2011-06-29 07:46:02.000000000 -0400
-+++ b/grsecurity/Kconfig	2011-06-29 07:47:20.000000000 -0400
-@@ -679,7 +679,7 @@
- 
- config GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
- 	bool "Restrict /proc to user only"
--	depends on GRKERNSEC_PROC
-+	depends on GRKERNSEC_PROC && !GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
- 	help
- 	  If you say Y here, non-root users will only be able to view their own
- 	  processes, and restricts them from viewing network-related information,
-@@ -687,7 +687,7 @@
- 
- config GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
- 	bool "Allow special group"
--	depends on GRKERNSEC_PROC && !GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
-+	depends on GRKERNSEC_PROC
- 	help
- 	  If you say Y here, you will be able to select a group that will be
- 	  able to view all processes and network-related information.  If you've
diff --git a/2.6.32/4465_selinux-avc_audit-log-curr_ip.patch b/2.6.32/4465_selinux-avc_audit-log-curr_ip.patch
index 43147a7..67d09ef 100644
--- a/2.6.32/4465_selinux-avc_audit-log-curr_ip.patch
+++ b/2.6.32/4465_selinux-avc_audit-log-curr_ip.patch
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Hernandez Garcia-Hierro <lorenzo@gnu.org>
 diff -Naur a/grsecurity/Kconfig b/grsecurity/Kconfig
 --- a/grsecurity/Kconfig	2011-04-17 18:47:02.000000000 -0400
 +++ b/grsecurity/Kconfig	2011-04-17 18:51:15.000000000 -0400
-@@ -1308,6 +1308,27 @@
+@@ -916,6 +916,27 @@
  menu "Logging Options"
  depends on GRKERNSEC
  
diff --git a/2.6.32/4470_disable-compat_vdso.patch b/2.6.32/4470_disable-compat_vdso.patch
index c8e1aeb..a54092e 100644
--- a/2.6.32/4470_disable-compat_vdso.patch
+++ b/2.6.32/4470_disable-compat_vdso.patch
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ Closes bug: http://bugs.gentoo.org/show_bug.cgi?id=210138
 diff -urp a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig	2009-07-31 01:36:57.323857684 +0100
 +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig	2009-07-31 01:51:39.395749681 +0100
-@@ -1616,17 +1616,8 @@
+@@ -1625,17 +1625,8 @@
  
  config COMPAT_VDSO
  	def_bool n
diff --git a/3.2.22/0000_README b/3.2.22/0000_README
index b314927..ccfefdd 100644
--- a/3.2.22/0000_README
+++ b/3.2.22/0000_README
@@ -20,27 +20,11 @@ Patch:	4440_grsec-remove-protected-paths.patch
 From:	Anthony G. Basile <blueness@gentoo.org>
 Desc:	Removes chmod statements from grsecurity/Makefile
 
-Patch:	4445_grsec-pax-without-grsec.patch
-From:	Gordon Malm <gengor@gentoo.org>
-Desc:	Allows PaX features to be selected without enabling GRKERNSEC
-
 Patch:	4450_grsec-kconfig-default-gids.patch
 From:	Kerin Millar <kerframil@gmail.com>
 Desc:	Sets sane(r) default GIDs on various grsecurity group-dependent
 	features
 
-Patch:	4455_grsec-kconfig-gentoo.patch
-From:	Gordon Malm <gengor@gentoo.org>
-	Kerin Millar <kerframil@gmail.com>
-	Anthony G. Basile <blueness@gentoo.org>
-Desc:	Adds Hardened Gentoo [server/workstation/virtualization] security levels,
-	sets Hardened Gentoo [workstation] as default
-
-Patch:	4460-grsec-kconfig-proc-user.patch
-From:	Anthony G. Basile <blueness@gentoo.org>
-Desc:	Make GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER, and GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP mutually
-	exclusive to avoid bug #366019.
-
 Patch:	4465_selinux-avc_audit-log-curr_ip.patch
 From:	Gordon Malm <gengor@gentoo.org>
 	Anthony G. Basile <blueness@gentoo.org>
diff --git a/3.2.22/4445_grsec-pax-without-grsec.patch b/3.2.22/4445_grsec-pax-without-grsec.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 58301c0..0000000
--- a/3.2.22/4445_grsec-pax-without-grsec.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,91 +0,0 @@
-From: Anthony G. Basile <blueness@gentoo.org>
-
-With grsecurity-2.2.2-2.6.32.38-201104171745, the functions pax_report_leak_to_user and
-pax_report_overflow_from_user in fs/exec.c were consolidated into pax_report_usercopy.
-This patch has been updated to reflect that change.
-
-With grsecurity-2.9-2.6.32.58-201203131839, NORET_TYPE has been replaced by __noreturn.
-This patch has been updated to reflect that change.
---
-From: Jory Pratt <anarchy@gentoo.org>
-Updated patch for kernel 2.6.32
-
-The credits/description from the original version of this patch remain accurate
-and are included below.
---
-From: Gordon Malm <gengor@gentoo.org>
-
-Allow PaX options to be selected without first selecting CONFIG_GRKERNSEC.
-
-This patch has been updated to keep current with newer kernel versions.
-The original version of this patch contained no credits/description.
-
-diff -Naur a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
---- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c	2011-04-17 19:05:03.000000000 -0400
-+++ a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c	2011-04-17 19:20:30.000000000 -0400
-@@ -657,10 +657,12 @@
- 
- #ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
- 	if (init_mm.start_code <= address && address < init_mm.end_code) {
-+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
- 		if (current->signal->curr_ip)
- 			printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: From %pI4: %s:%d, uid/euid: %u/%u, attempted to modify kernel code\n",
- 					 &current->signal->curr_ip, current->comm, task_pid_nr(current), current_uid(), current_euid());
- 		else
-+#endif
- 			printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: %s:%d, uid/euid: %u/%u, attempted to modify kernel code\n",
- 					 current->comm, task_pid_nr(current), current_uid(), current_euid());
- 	}
-diff -Naur a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
---- a/fs/exec.c	2011-04-17 19:05:03.000000000 -0400
-+++ b/fs/exec.c	2011-04-17 19:20:30.000000000 -0400
-@@ -2048,9 +2048,11 @@
- 		}
- 		up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
- 	}
-+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
- 	if (tsk->signal->curr_ip)
- 		printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: From %pI4: execution attempt in: %s, %08lx-%08lx %08lx\n", &tsk->signal->curr_ip, path_fault, start, end, offset);
- 	else
-+#endif
- 		printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: execution attempt in: %s, %08lx-%08lx %08lx\n", path_fault, start, end, offset);
- 	printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: terminating task: %s(%s):%d, uid/euid: %u/%u, "
- 			"PC: %p, SP: %p\n", path_exec, tsk->comm, task_pid_nr(tsk),
-@@ -2065,10 +2067,12 @@
- #ifdef CONFIG_PAX_REFCOUNT
- void pax_report_refcount_overflow(struct pt_regs *regs)
- {
-+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
- 	if (current->signal->curr_ip)
- 		printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: From %pI4: refcount overflow detected in: %s:%d, uid/euid: %u/%u\n",
- 				 &current->signal->curr_ip, current->comm, task_pid_nr(current), current_uid(), current_euid());
- 	else
-+#endif
- 		printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: refcount overflow detected in: %s:%d, uid/euid: %u/%u\n",
- 				 current->comm, task_pid_nr(current), current_uid(), current_euid());
- 	print_symbol(KERN_ERR "PAX: refcount overflow occured at: %s\n", instruction_pointer(regs));
-@@ -2127,10 +2131,12 @@
- 
- __noreturn void pax_report_usercopy(const void *ptr, unsigned long len, bool to, const char *type)
- {
-+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
- 	if (current->signal->curr_ip)
- 		printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: From %pI4: kernel memory %s attempt detected %s %p (%s) (%lu bytes)\n",
- 			&current->signal->curr_ip, to ? "leak" : "overwrite", to ? "from" : "to", ptr, type ? : "unknown", len);
- 	else
-+#endif
- 		printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: kernel memory %s attempt detected %s %p (%s) (%lu bytes)\n",
- 			to ? "leak" : "overwrite", to ? "from" : "to", ptr, type ? : "unknown", len);
- 	dump_stack();
-diff -Naur a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
---- a/security/Kconfig	2011-04-17 19:05:03.000000000 -0400
-+++ b/security/Kconfig	2011-04-17 19:20:30.000000000 -0400
-@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
- 	
- config PAX
- 	bool "Enable various PaX features"
--	depends on GRKERNSEC && (ALPHA || ARM || AVR32 || IA64 || MIPS || PARISC || PPC || SPARC || X86)
-+	depends on (ALPHA || ARM || AVR32 || IA64 || MIPS || PARISC || PPC || SPARC || X86)
- 	help
- 	  This allows you to enable various PaX features.  PaX adds
- 	  intrusion prevention mechanisms to the kernel that reduce
diff --git a/3.2.22/4455_grsec-kconfig-gentoo.patch b/3.2.22/4455_grsec-kconfig-gentoo.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 87b5454..0000000
--- a/3.2.22/4455_grsec-kconfig-gentoo.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,357 +0,0 @@
-From: Anthony G. Basile <blueness@gentoo.org>
-From: Gordon Malm <gengor@gentoo.org>
-From: Jory A. Pratt <anarchy@gentoo.org>
-From: Kerin Millar <kerframil@gmail.com>
-
-Add Hardened Gentoo [server/workstation] predefined grsecurity
-levels. They're designed to provide a comparitively high level of
-security while remaining generally suitable for as great a majority
-of the userbase as possible (particularly new users).
-
-Make Hardened Gentoo [workstation] predefined grsecurity level the
-default. The Hardened Gentoo [server] level is more restrictive
-and conflicts with some software and thus would be less suitable.
-
-The original version of this patch was conceived and created by:
-Ned Ludd <solar@gentoo.org>
-
-diff -Naur a/grsecurity/Kconfig b/grsecurity/Kconfig
---- a/grsecurity/Kconfig	2011-12-26 10:56:24.000000000 -0500
-+++ b/grsecurity/Kconfig	2011-12-26 12:20:25.000000000 -0500
-@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
- choice
- 	prompt "Security Level"
- 	depends on GRKERNSEC
--	default GRKERNSEC_CUSTOM
-+	default GRKERNSEC_HARDENED_WORKSTATION
- 
- config GRKERNSEC_LOW
- 	bool "Low"
-@@ -192,6 +192,262 @@
- 	  - Restricted sysfs/debugfs
- 	  - Active kernel exploit response
- 
-+config GRKERNSEC_HARDENED_SERVER
-+	bool "Hardened Gentoo [server]"
-+	select GRKERNSEC_LINK
-+	select GRKERNSEC_FIFO
-+	select GRKERNSEC_DMESG
-+	select GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL
-+	select GRKERNSEC_TIME
-+	select GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SHMAT
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FINDTASK
-+	select GRKERNSEC_SYSFS_RESTRICT
-+	select GRKERNSEC_PROC
-+	select GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP if (PAX_NOEXEC || PAX_ASLR)
-+	select GRKERNSEC_HIDESYM
-+	select GRKERNSEC_BRUTE
-+	select GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
-+	select GRKERNSEC_KMEM
-+	select GRKERNSEC_RESLOG
-+	select GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_PTRACE
-+	select GRKERNSEC_RANDNET
-+	select GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHMOD
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE
-+	select GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT
-+	select GRKERNSEC_MODHARDEN if (MODULES)
-+	select GRKERNSEC_HARDEN_PTRACE
-+	select GRKERNSEC_PTRACE_READEXEC
-+	select GRKERNSEC_SETXID
-+	select GRKERNSEC_VM86 if (X86_32)
-+	select GRKERNSEC_IO
-+	select GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR
-+	select GRKERNSEC_RWXMAP_LOG
-+	select GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL
-+	select GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL_ON
-+	select PAX
-+	select PAX_ASLR
-+	select PAX_RANDKSTACK if (X86_TSC && X86)
-+	select PAX_RANDUSTACK
-+	select PAX_RANDMMAP
-+	select PAX_NOEXEC
-+	select PAX_MPROTECT
-+	select PAX_EI_PAX
-+	select PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS
-+	select PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS
-+	select PAX_KERNEXEC if ((PPC || X86) && (!X86_32 || X86_WP_WORKS_OK) && !XEN)
-+	select PAX_MEMORY_UDEREF if (X86 && !XEN)
-+	select PAX_SEGMEXEC if (X86_32)
-+	select PAX_PAGEEXEC
-+	select PAX_EMUPLT if (ALPHA || PARISC || SPARC)
-+	select PAX_EMUTRAMP if (PARISC)
-+	select PAX_EMUSIGRT if (PARISC)
-+	select PAX_REFCOUNT if (X86 || SPARC64)
-+	select PAX_USERCOPY if ((X86 || PPC || SPARC || ARM) && (SLAB || SLUB || SLOB))
-+	select PAX_MEMORY_SANITIZE
-+	select PAX_MEMORY_STACKLEAK if (!XEN)
-+	help
-+	  If you say Y here, a configuration for grsecurity/PaX features
-+	  will be used that is endorsed by the Hardened Gentoo project.
-+	  These pre-defined security levels are designed to provide a high
-+	  level of security while minimizing incompatibilities with a majority
-+	  of Gentoo's available software.
-+
-+	  This "Hardened Gentoo [server]" level is identical to the
-+	  "Hardened Gentoo [workstation]" level, but with GRKERNSEC_IO,
-+	  and GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD enabled.  Accordingly, this is the preferred
-+	  security level if the system will not be utilizing software incompatible
-+	  with these features.
-+
-+	  When this level is selected, some security features will be forced on,
-+	  while others will default to their suggested values of off or on.  The
-+	  later can be tweaked at the user's discretion, but may cause problems
-+	  in some situations.  You can fully customize all grsecurity/PaX features
-+	  by choosing "Custom" in the Security Level menu.  It may be helpful to
-+	  inherit the options selected by this security level as a starting point.
-+	  To accomplish this, select this security level, then exit the menuconfig
-+	  interface, saving changes when prompted.  Run make menuconfig again and
-+	  select the "Custom" level.
-+
-+config GRKERNSEC_HARDENED_WORKSTATION
-+	bool "Hardened Gentoo [workstation]"
-+	select GRKERNSEC_LINK
-+	select GRKERNSEC_FIFO
-+	select GRKERNSEC_DMESG
-+	select GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL
-+	select GRKERNSEC_TIME
-+	select GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SHMAT
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FINDTASK
-+	select GRKERNSEC_PROC
-+	select GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP if (PAX_NOEXEC || PAX_ASLR)
-+	select GRKERNSEC_HIDESYM
-+	select GRKERNSEC_BRUTE
-+	select GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
-+	select GRKERNSEC_KMEM
-+	select GRKERNSEC_RESLOG
-+	select GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_PTRACE
-+	select GRKERNSEC_RANDNET
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHMOD
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE
-+	select GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT
-+	select GRKERNSEC_MODHARDEN if (MODULES)
-+	select GRKERNSEC_HARDEN_PTRACE
-+       select GRKERNSEC_PTRACE_READEXEC
-+	select GRKERNSEC_SETXID
-+	select GRKERNSEC_VM86 if (X86_32)
-+	select GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR
-+	select GRKERNSEC_RWXMAP_LOG
-+	select GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL
-+	select GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL_ON
-+	select PAX
-+	select PAX_ASLR
-+	select PAX_RANDKSTACK if (X86_TSC && X86)
-+	select PAX_RANDUSTACK
-+	select PAX_RANDMMAP
-+	select PAX_NOEXEC
-+	select PAX_MPROTECT
-+	select PAX_EI_PAX
-+	select PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS
-+	select PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS
-+	select PAX_KERNEXEC if ((PPC || X86) && (!X86_32 || X86_WP_WORKS_OK) && !XEN)
-+	select PAX_MEMORY_UDEREF if (X86 && !XEN)
-+	select PAX_SEGMEXEC if (X86_32)
-+	select PAX_PAGEEXEC
-+	select PAX_EMUPLT if (ALPHA || PARISC || SPARC)
-+	select PAX_EMUTRAMP if (PARISC)
-+	select PAX_EMUSIGRT if (PARISC)
-+	select PAX_REFCOUNT if (X86 || SPARC64)
-+	select PAX_USERCOPY if ((X86 || PPC || SPARC || ARM) && (SLAB || SLUB || SLOB))
-+	select PAX_MEMORY_SANITIZE
-+	select PAX_MEMORY_STACKLEAK if (!XEN)
-+	help
-+	  If you say Y here, a configuration for grsecurity/PaX features
-+	  will be used that is endorsed by the Hardened Gentoo project.
-+	  These pre-defined security levels are designed to provide a high
-+	  level of security while minimizing incompatibilities with a majority
-+	  of Gentoo's available software.
-+
-+	  This "Hardened Gentoo [workstation]" level is identical to the
-+	  "Hardened Gentoo [server]" level, but with GRKERNSEC_IO and
-+	  GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD disabled.  Accordingly, this is the preferred
-+	  security level if the system will be utilizing software incompatible
-+	  with these features.
-+
-+	  When this level is selected, some security features will be forced on,
-+	  while others will default to their suggested values of off or on.  The
-+	  later can be tweaked at the user's discretion, but may cause problems
-+	  in some situations.  You can fully customize all grsecurity/PaX features
-+	  by choosing "Custom" in the Security Level menu.  It may be helpful to
-+	  inherit the options selected by this security level as a starting point.
-+	  To accomplish this, select this security level, then exit the menuconfig
-+	  interface, saving changes when prompted.  Run make menuconfig again and
-+	  select the "Custom" level.
-+
-+config GRKERNSEC_HARDENED_VIRTUALIZATION
-+	bool "Hardened Gentoo [virtualization]"
-+	select GRKERNSEC_LINK
-+	select GRKERNSEC_FIFO
-+	select GRKERNSEC_DMESG
-+	select GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL
-+	select GRKERNSEC_TIME
-+	select GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SHMAT
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FINDTASK
-+	select GRKERNSEC_PROC
-+	select GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP if (PAX_NOEXEC || PAX_ASLR)
-+	select GRKERNSEC_HIDESYM
-+	select GRKERNSEC_BRUTE
-+	select GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
-+	select GRKERNSEC_KMEM
-+	select GRKERNSEC_RESLOG
-+	select GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_PTRACE
-+	select GRKERNSEC_RANDNET
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHMOD
-+	select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE
-+	select GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT
-+	select GRKERNSEC_MODHARDEN if (MODULES)
-+	select GRKERNSEC_HARDEN_PTRACE
-+       select GRKERNSEC_PTRACE_READEXEC
-+	select GRKERNSEC_SETXID
-+	select GRKERNSEC_VM86 if (X86_32)
-+	select GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR
-+	select GRKERNSEC_RWXMAP_LOG
-+	select GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL
-+	select GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL_ON
-+	select PAX
-+	select PAX_ASLR
-+	select PAX_RANDKSTACK if (X86_TSC && X86)
-+	select PAX_RANDUSTACK
-+	select PAX_RANDMMAP
-+	select PAX_NOEXEC
-+	select PAX_MPROTECT
-+	select PAX_EI_PAX
-+	select PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS
-+	select PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS
-+	select PAX_SEGMEXEC if (X86_32)
-+	select PAX_PAGEEXEC
-+	select PAX_EMUPLT if (ALPHA || PARISC || SPARC)
-+	select PAX_EMUTRAMP if (PARISC)
-+	select PAX_EMUSIGRT if (PARISC)
-+	select PAX_REFCOUNT if (X86 || SPARC64)
-+	select PAX_USERCOPY if ((X86 || PPC || SPARC || ARM) && (SLAB || SLUB || SLOB))
-+	select PAX_MEMORY_SANITIZE
-+	select PAX_MEMORY_STACKLEAK if (!XEN)
-+	help
-+	  If you say Y here, a configuration for grsecurity/PaX features
-+	  will be used that is endorsed by the Hardened Gentoo project.
-+	  These pre-defined security levels are designed to provide a high
-+	  level of security while minimizing incompatibilities with a majority
-+	  of Gentoo's available software.
-+
-+	  This "Hardened Gentoo [virtualization]" level is identical to the
-+	  "Hardened Gentoo [workstation]" level, but with the PAX_KERNEXEC and
-+	  PAX_MEMORY_UDEREF defaulting to off.  Accordingly, this is the preferred
-+	  security level if the system will be utilizing virtualization software
-+	  incompatible with these features, like VirtualBox or kvm.
-+
-+	  When this level is selected, some security features will be forced on,
-+	  while others will default to their suggested values of off or on.  The
-+	  later can be tweaked at the user's discretion, but may cause problems
-+	  in some situations.  You can fully customize all grsecurity/PaX features
-+	  by choosing "Custom" in the Security Level menu.  It may be helpful to
-+	  inherit the options selected by this security level as a starting point.
-+	  To accomplish this, select this security level, then exit the menuconfig
-+	  interface, saving changes when prompted.  Run make menuconfig again and
-+	  select the "Custom" level.
-+
- config GRKERNSEC_CUSTOM
- 	bool "Custom"
- 	help
-diff -Naur a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
---- a/security/Kconfig	2011-12-26 12:23:44.000000000 -0500
-+++ b/security/Kconfig	2011-12-26 11:14:27.000000000 -0500
-@@ -362,9 +362,10 @@
- 
- config PAX_KERNEXEC
- 	bool "Enforce non-executable kernel pages"
--	depends on (PPC || X86) && (!X86_32 || X86_WP_WORKS_OK) && !XEN
-+	depends on (PPC || X86) && (!X86_32 || X86_WP_WORKS_OK) && !XEN && !GRKERNSEC_HARDENED_VIRTUALIZATION
- 	select PAX_PER_CPU_PGD if X86_64 || (X86_32 && X86_PAE)
- 	select PAX_KERNEXEC_PLUGIN if X86_64
-+	default y if GRKERNSEC_HARDENED_WORKSTATION
- 	help
- 	  This is the kernel land equivalent of PAGEEXEC and MPROTECT,
- 	  that is, enabling this option will make it harder to inject
-@@ -375,30 +376,30 @@
- 
- choice
- 	prompt "Return Address Instrumentation Method"
--	default PAX_KERNEXEC_PLUGIN_METHOD_BTS
-+	default PAX_KERNEXEC_PLUGIN_METHOD_OR
- 	depends on PAX_KERNEXEC_PLUGIN
- 	help
- 	  Select the method used to instrument function pointer dereferences.
- 	  Note that binary modules cannot be instrumented by this approach.
- 
--	config PAX_KERNEXEC_PLUGIN_METHOD_BTS
--		bool "bts"
--		help
--		  This method is compatible with binary only modules but has
--		  a higher runtime overhead.
--
- 	config PAX_KERNEXEC_PLUGIN_METHOD_OR
- 		bool "or"
- 		depends on !PARAVIRT
- 		help
- 		  This method is incompatible with binary only modules but has
- 		  a lower runtime overhead.
-+
-+	config PAX_KERNEXEC_PLUGIN_METHOD_BTS
-+		bool "bts"
-+		help
-+		  This method is compatible with binary only modules but has
-+		  a higher runtime overhead.
- endchoice
- 
- config PAX_KERNEXEC_PLUGIN_METHOD
- 	string
--	default "bts" if PAX_KERNEXEC_PLUGIN_METHOD_BTS
- 	default "or" if PAX_KERNEXEC_PLUGIN_METHOD_OR
-+	default "bts" if PAX_KERNEXEC_PLUGIN_METHOD_BTS
- 	default ""
- 
- config PAX_KERNEXEC_MODULE_TEXT
-@@ -555,8 +556,9 @@
- 
- config PAX_MEMORY_UDEREF
- 	bool "Prevent invalid userland pointer dereference"
--	depends on X86 && !UML_X86 && !XEN
-+	depends on X86 && !UML_X86 && !XEN && !GRKERNSEC_HARDENED_VIRTUALIZATION
- 	select PAX_PER_CPU_PGD if X86_64
-+	default y if GRKERNSEC_HARDENED_WORKSTATION
- 	help
- 	  By saying Y here the kernel will be prevented from dereferencing
- 	  userland pointers in contexts where the kernel expects only kernel
diff --git a/3.2.22/4460-grsec-kconfig-proc-user.patch b/3.2.22/4460-grsec-kconfig-proc-user.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index b2b3188..0000000
--- a/3.2.22/4460-grsec-kconfig-proc-user.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-From: Anthony G. Basile <blueness@gentoo.org>
-
-Address the mutually exclusive options GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER and GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
-in a different way to avoid bug #366019.  This patch should eventually go upstream.
-
-diff -Naur a/grsecurity/Kconfig b/grsecurity/Kconfig
---- a/grsecurity/Kconfig	2011-06-29 10:02:56.000000000 -0400
-+++ b/grsecurity/Kconfig	2011-06-29 10:08:07.000000000 -0400
-@@ -680,7 +680,7 @@
- 
- config GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
- 	bool "Restrict /proc to user only"
--	depends on GRKERNSEC_PROC
-+	depends on GRKERNSEC_PROC && !GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
- 	help
- 	  If you say Y here, non-root users will only be able to view their own
- 	  processes, and restricts them from viewing network-related information,
-@@ -688,7 +688,7 @@
- 
- config GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
- 	bool "Allow special group"
--	depends on GRKERNSEC_PROC && !GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
-+	depends on GRKERNSEC_PROC
- 	help
- 	  If you say Y here, you will be able to select a group that will be
-           able to view all processes and network-related information.  If you've
diff --git a/3.4.4/0000_README b/3.4.4/0000_README
index be72568..6e60159 100644
--- a/3.4.4/0000_README
+++ b/3.4.4/0000_README
@@ -2,6 +2,10 @@ README
 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Individual Patch Descriptions:
 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+Patch:	2600_FW_MIPS_FILE_06_regression.patch
+From:	Anthony G. Basile <blueness@gentoo.org>
+Desc:	Fix regressions against bnx2 firmware
+
 Patch:	4420_grsecurity-2.9.1-3.4.4-201207080925.patch
 From:	http://www.grsecurity.net
 Desc:	hardened-sources base patch from upstream grsecurity