From 0626e86d2e1d0be63a56918371a15d98cfad19d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: mancha Date: Tue, 9 Jul 2013 Subject: Handle NULL returns from glibc 2.17+ crypt(). Starting with glibc 2.17 (eglibc 2.17), crypt() fails with EINVAL (w/ NULL return) if the salt violates specifications. Additionally, on FIPS-140 enabled Linux systems, DES/MD5-encrypted passwords passed to crypt() fail with EPERM (w/ NULL return). When using glibc's crypt(), check return value to avoid a possible NULL pointer dereference. --- pwcheck/pwcheck_getpwnam.c | 3 ++- pwcheck/pwcheck_getspnam.c | 3 ++- saslauthd/auth_getpwent.c | 3 ++- saslauthd/auth_shadow.c | 7 ++----- 4 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) --- a/pwcheck/pwcheck_getpwnam.c +++ b/pwcheck/pwcheck_getpwnam.c @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ extern char *crypt(); char *password; { char* r; + char* crpt_passwd; struct passwd *pwd; pwd = getpwnam(userid); @@ -41,7 +42,7 @@ char *password; else if (pwd->pw_passwd[0] == '*') { r = "Account disabled"; } - else if (strcmp(pwd->pw_passwd, crypt(password, pwd->pw_passwd)) != 0) { + else if (!(crpt_passwd = crypt(password, pwd->pw_passwd)) || strcmp(pwd->pw_passwd, (const char *)crpt_passwd) != 0) { r = "Incorrect password"; } else { --- a/saslauthd/auth_getpwent.c +++ b/saslauthd/auth_getpwent.c @@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ auth_getpwent ( { /* VARIABLES */ struct passwd *pw; /* pointer to passwd file entry */ + char *crpt_passwd; /* encrypted password */ /* END VARIABLES */ pw = getpwnam(login); @@ -79,7 +80,7 @@ auth_getpwent ( RETURN("NO"); } - if (strcmp(pw->pw_passwd, (const char *)crypt(password, pw->pw_passwd))) { + if (!(crpt_passwd = crypt(password, pw->pw_passwd)) || strcmp(pw->pw_passwd, (const char *)crpt_passwd)) { RETURN("NO"); } --- a/saslauthd/auth_shadow.c +++ b/saslauthd/auth_shadow.c @@ -180,16 +180,13 @@ auth_shadow ( * not returning any information about a login until we have validated * the password. */ - cpw = strdup((const char *)crypt(password, sp->sp_pwdp)); - if (strcmp(sp->sp_pwdp, cpw)) { + if (!(cpw = crypt(password, sp->sp_pwdp)) || strcmp(sp->sp_pwdp, (const char *)cpw)) { if (flags & VERBOSE) { syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "DEBUG: auth_shadow: pw mismatch: '%s' != '%s'", sp->sp_pwdp, cpw); } - free(cpw); RETURN("NO"); } - free(cpw); /* * The following fields will be set to -1 if: @@ -251,7 +250,7 @@ auth_shadow ( RETURN("NO"); } - if (strcmp(upw->upw_passwd, crypt(password, upw->upw_passwd)) != 0) { + if (!(cpw = crypt(password, upw->upw_passwd)) || (strcmp(upw->upw_passwd, (const char *)cpw) != 0)) { if (flags & VERBOSE) { syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "auth_shadow: pw mismatch: %s != %s", password, upw->upw_passwd); --- a/pwcheck/pwcheck_getspnam.c 2013-07-14 08:05:00.000000000 +0000 +++ b/pwcheck/pwcheck_getspnam.c 2013-07-14 08:06:10.958815179 +0000 @@ -32,13 +33,14 @@ char *password; { struct spwd *pwd; + char *crpt_passwd; pwd = getspnam(userid); if (!pwd) { return "Userid not found"; } - if (strcmp(pwd->sp_pwdp, crypt(password, pwd->sp_pwdp)) != 0) { + if (!(crpt_passwd = crypt(password, pwd->sp_pwdp)) || strcmp(pwd->sp_pwdp, (const char *)crpt_passwd) != 0) { return "Incorrect password"; } else {