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author | Alex Legler <alex@a3li.li> | 2015-03-08 22:02:38 +0100 |
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committer | Alex Legler <alex@a3li.li> | 2015-03-08 22:02:38 +0100 |
commit | a24567fbc43f221b14e805f9bc0b7c6d16911c46 (patch) | |
tree | 910a04fe6ee560ac0eebac55f3cd2781c3519760 /glsa-200602-10.xml | |
download | glsa-a24567fbc43f221b14e805f9bc0b7c6d16911c46.tar.gz glsa-a24567fbc43f221b14e805f9bc0b7c6d16911c46.tar.bz2 glsa-a24567fbc43f221b14e805f9bc0b7c6d16911c46.zip |
Import existing advisories
Diffstat (limited to 'glsa-200602-10.xml')
-rw-r--r-- | glsa-200602-10.xml | 71 |
1 files changed, 71 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/glsa-200602-10.xml b/glsa-200602-10.xml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..796aac90 --- /dev/null +++ b/glsa-200602-10.xml @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> +<?xml-stylesheet href="/xsl/glsa.xsl" type="text/xsl"?> +<?xml-stylesheet href="/xsl/guide.xsl" type="text/xsl"?> +<!DOCTYPE glsa SYSTEM "http://www.gentoo.org/dtd/glsa.dtd"> + +<glsa id="200602-10"> + <title>GnuPG: Incorrect signature verification</title> + <synopsis> + Applications relying on GnuPG to authenticate digital signatures may + incorrectly believe a signature has been verified. + </synopsis> + <product type="ebuild">gnupg</product> + <announced>February 18, 2006</announced> + <revised>February 18, 2006: 01</revised> + <bug>122721</bug> + <access>remote</access> + <affected> + <package name="app-crypt/gnupg" auto="yes" arch="*"> + <unaffected range="ge">1.4.2.1</unaffected> + <vulnerable range="lt">1.4.2.1</vulnerable> + </package> + </affected> + <background> + <p> + GnuPG (The GNU Privacy Guard) is a free replacement for PGP + (Pretty Good Privacy). As GnuPG does not rely on any patented + algorithms, it can be used without any restrictions. gpgv is the + OpenPGP signature verification tool provided by the GnuPG system. + </p> + </background> + <description> + <p> + Tavis Ormandy of the Gentoo Linux Security Auditing Team + discovered that automated systems relying on the return code of GnuPG + or gpgv to authenticate digital signatures may be misled by malformed + signatures. GnuPG documentation states that a return code of zero (0) + indicates success, however gpg and gpgv may also return zero if no + signature data was found in a detached signature file. + </p> + </description> + <impact type="normal"> + <p> + An attacker may be able to bypass authentication in automated + systems relying on the return code of gpg or gpgv to authenticate + digital signatures. + </p> + </impact> + <workaround> + <p> + There is no known workaround at this time. + </p> + </workaround> + <resolution> + <p> + All GnuPG users should upgrade to the latest version: + </p> + <code> + # emerge --sync + # emerge --ask --oneshot --verbose ">=app-crypt/gnupg-1.4.2.1"</code> + </resolution> + <references> + <uri link="http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-announce/2006q1/000211.html">GnuPG Security Announcement</uri> + <uri link="http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2006-0455">CVE-2006-0455</uri> + </references> + <metadata tag="submitter" timestamp="Wed, 15 Feb 2006 16:05:31 +0000"> + taviso + </metadata> + <metadata tag="bugReady" timestamp="Sat, 18 Feb 2006 12:22:36 +0000"> + koon + </metadata> +</glsa> |