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author | 2018-11-12 19:26:35 +0100 | |
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committer | 2018-11-12 19:36:46 +0100 | |
commit | 596a07e9526a752f67478eeae44c7d31c4d40932 (patch) | |
tree | b827609d76b2abccf470f3483256982693ea238e /dev-libs/openssl/files | |
parent | dev-libs/openssl: add patch for CVE-2018-0734 (diff) | |
download | gentoo-596a07e9526a752f67478eeae44c7d31c4d40932.tar.gz gentoo-596a07e9526a752f67478eeae44c7d31c4d40932.tar.bz2 gentoo-596a07e9526a752f67478eeae44c7d31c4d40932.zip |
dev-libs/openssl: add patch for CVE-2018-0734
Package-Manager: Portage-2.3.51, Repoman-2.3.12
Signed-off-by: Thomas Deutschmann <whissi@gentoo.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'dev-libs/openssl/files')
-rw-r--r-- | dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.1.1-CVE-2018-0734.patch | 131 |
1 files changed, 131 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.1.1-CVE-2018-0734.patch b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.1.1-CVE-2018-0734.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..dbc379c80d43 --- /dev/null +++ b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.1.1-CVE-2018-0734.patch @@ -0,0 +1,131 @@ +CVE-2018-0734 +https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/f1b12b8713a739f27d74e6911580b2e70aea2fa4 +https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/8abfe72e8c1de1b95f50aa0d9134803b4d00070f + +--- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c ++++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c +@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ + + #include <stdio.h> + #include "internal/cryptlib.h" ++#include "internal/bn_int.h" + #include <openssl/bn.h> + #include <openssl/sha.h> + #include "dsa_locl.h" +@@ -23,6 +24,8 @@ static int dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, + DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa); + static int dsa_init(DSA *dsa); + static int dsa_finish(DSA *dsa); ++static BIGNUM *dsa_mod_inverse_fermat(const BIGNUM *k, const BIGNUM *q, ++ BN_CTX *ctx); + + static DSA_METHOD openssl_dsa_meth = { + "OpenSSL DSA method", +@@ -178,9 +181,9 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, + { + BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; + BIGNUM *k, *kinv = NULL, *r = *rp; +- BIGNUM *l, *m; ++ BIGNUM *l; + int ret = 0; +- int q_bits; ++ int q_bits, q_words; + + if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) { + DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS); +@@ -189,8 +192,7 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, + + k = BN_new(); + l = BN_new(); +- m = BN_new(); +- if (k == NULL || l == NULL || m == NULL) ++ if (k == NULL || l == NULL) + goto err; + + if (ctx_in == NULL) { +@@ -201,9 +203,9 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, + + /* Preallocate space */ + q_bits = BN_num_bits(dsa->q); +- if (!BN_set_bit(k, q_bits) +- || !BN_set_bit(l, q_bits) +- || !BN_set_bit(m, q_bits)) ++ q_words = bn_get_top(dsa->q); ++ if (!bn_wexpand(k, q_words + 2) ++ || !bn_wexpand(l, q_words + 2)) + goto err; + + /* Get random k */ +@@ -238,14 +240,17 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, + * small timing information leakage. We then choose the sum that is + * one bit longer than the modulus. + * +- * TODO: revisit the BN_copy aiming for a memory access agnostic +- * conditional copy. ++ * There are some concerns about the efficacy of doing this. More ++ * specificly refer to the discussion starting with: ++ * https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7486#discussion_r228323705 ++ * The fix is to rework BN so these gymnastics aren't required. + */ + if (!BN_add(l, k, dsa->q) +- || !BN_add(m, l, dsa->q) +- || !BN_copy(k, BN_num_bits(l) > q_bits ? l : m)) ++ || !BN_add(k, l, dsa->q)) + goto err; + ++ BN_consttime_swap(BN_is_bit_set(l, q_bits), k, l, q_words + 2); ++ + if ((dsa)->meth->bn_mod_exp != NULL) { + if (!dsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(dsa, r, dsa->g, k, dsa->p, ctx, + dsa->method_mont_p)) +@@ -258,8 +263,8 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, + if (!BN_mod(r, r, dsa->q, ctx)) + goto err; + +- /* Compute part of 's = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q' */ +- if ((kinv = BN_mod_inverse(NULL, k, dsa->q, ctx)) == NULL) ++ /* Compute part of 's = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q' */ ++ if ((kinv = dsa_mod_inverse_fermat(k, dsa->q, ctx)) == NULL) + goto err; + + BN_clear_free(*kinvp); +@@ -273,7 +278,6 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, + BN_CTX_free(ctx); + BN_clear_free(k); + BN_clear_free(l); +- BN_clear_free(m); + return ret; + } + +@@ -393,3 +397,31 @@ static int dsa_finish(DSA *dsa) + BN_MONT_CTX_free(dsa->method_mont_p); + return 1; + } ++ ++/* ++ * Compute the inverse of k modulo q. ++ * Since q is prime, Fermat's Little Theorem applies, which reduces this to ++ * mod-exp operation. Both the exponent and modulus are public information ++ * so a mod-exp that doesn't leak the base is sufficient. A newly allocated ++ * BIGNUM is returned which the caller must free. ++ */ ++static BIGNUM *dsa_mod_inverse_fermat(const BIGNUM *k, const BIGNUM *q, ++ BN_CTX *ctx) ++{ ++ BIGNUM *res = NULL; ++ BIGNUM *r, *e; ++ ++ if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL) ++ return NULL; ++ ++ BN_CTX_start(ctx); ++ if ((e = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) != NULL ++ && BN_set_word(r, 2) ++ && BN_sub(e, q, r) ++ && BN_mod_exp_mont(r, k, e, q, ctx, NULL)) ++ res = r; ++ else ++ BN_free(r); ++ BN_CTX_end(ctx); ++ return res; ++} |