dev-libs/openssl: rev bumped to add some cherry-picked patches

Package-Manager: Portage-2.3.53, Repoman-2.3.12
Signed-off-by: Thomas Deutschmann <whissi@gentoo.org>

8 files changed, 802 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.1.1a-fix-a-minor-nit-in-hkdflabel-size.patch b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.1.1a-fix-a-minor-nit-in-hkdflabel-size.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..8014be130ab7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.1.1a-fix-a-minor-nit-in-hkdflabel-size.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+From 3be71a31a1dda204bb95462a92cf7f247e64b939 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
+Date: Sun, 16 Dec 2018 12:43:59 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix a minor nit in the hkdflabel size
+
+Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
+Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7913)
+
+(cherry picked from commit 0b4233f5a4a181a6dcb7c511cd2663e500e659a4)
+---
+ ssl/tls13_enc.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssl/tls13_enc.c b/ssl/tls13_enc.c
+index c3021d18aa9..e36b7d3a066 100644
+--- a/ssl/tls13_enc.c
++++ b/ssl/tls13_enc.c
+@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ int tls13_hkdf_expand(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *secret,
+      * + bytes for the hash itself
+      */
+     unsigned char hkdflabel[sizeof(uint16_t) + sizeof(uint8_t) +
+-                            + sizeof(label_prefix) + TLS13_MAX_LABEL_LEN
++                            + (sizeof(label_prefix) - 1) + TLS13_MAX_LABEL_LEN
+                             + 1 + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+     WPACKET pkt;
+ 
diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.1.1a-fix-cert-with-rsa-instead-of-rsaEncryption.patch b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.1.1a-fix-cert-with-rsa-instead-of-rsaEncryption.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..8f249e22a1d2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.1.1a-fix-cert-with-rsa-instead-of-rsaEncryption.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+From c25ae0fff78cb3cb784ef79167329d5cd55b62de Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
+Date: Thu, 27 Dec 2018 22:18:21 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix cert with rsa instead of rsaEncryption as public key
+ algorithm
+
+Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7962)
+
+(cherry picked from commit 1f483a69bce11c940309edc437eee6e32294d5f2)
+---
+ crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c        |  9 ++++++---
+ test/certs/root-cert-rsa2.pem | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
+ test/recipes/25-test_verify.t |  4 +++-
+ 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 test/certs/root-cert-rsa2.pem
+
+diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
+index a6595aec054..75debb3e0a9 100644
+--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
++++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
+@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ static int rsa_param_encode(const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+ 
+     *pstr = NULL;
+     /* If RSA it's just NULL type */
+-    if (pkey->ameth->pkey_id == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
++    if (pkey->ameth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
+         *pstrtype = V_ASN1_NULL;
+         return 1;
+     }
+@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ static int rsa_param_decode(RSA *rsa, const X509_ALGOR *alg)
+     int algptype;
+ 
+     X509_ALGOR_get0(&algoid, &algptype, &algp, alg);
+-    if (OBJ_obj2nid(algoid) == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
++    if (OBJ_obj2nid(algoid) != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
+         return 1;
+     if (algptype == V_ASN1_UNDEF)
+         return 1;
+@@ -109,7 +109,10 @@ static int rsa_pub_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509_PUBKEY *pubkey)
+         RSA_free(rsa);
+         return 0;
+     }
+-    EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, pkey->ameth->pkey_id, rsa);
++    if (!EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, pkey->ameth->pkey_id, rsa)) {
++        RSA_free(rsa);
++        return 0;
++    }
+     return 1;
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/test/certs/root-cert-rsa2.pem b/test/certs/root-cert-rsa2.pem
+new file mode 100644
+index 00000000000..b817fdf3e5d
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/test/certs/root-cert-rsa2.pem
+@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
++-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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++-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+diff --git a/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t b/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t
+index 6c3deab7c67..b80a1cde3ed 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t
++++ b/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t
+@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ sub verify {
+     run(app([@args]));
+ }
+ 
+-plan tests => 134;
++plan tests => 135;
+ 
+ # Canonical success
+ ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"]),
+@@ -361,6 +361,8 @@ ok(verify("some-names2", "sslserver", ["many-constraints"], ["many-constraints"]
+     "Not too many names and constraints to check (2)");
+ ok(verify("some-names2", "sslserver", ["many-constraints"], ["many-constraints"], ),
+     "Not too many names and constraints to check (3)");
++ok(verify("root-cert-rsa2", "sslserver", ["root-cert-rsa2"], [], "-check_ss_sig"),
++    "Public Key Algorithm rsa instead of rsaEncryption");
+ 
+ SKIP: {
+     skip "Ed25519 is not supported by this OpenSSL build", 1
diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.1.1a-fix-some-SSL_export_keying_material-issues.patch b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.1.1a-fix-some-SSL_export_keying_material-issues.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2db64d83e45c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.1.1a-fix-some-SSL_export_keying_material-issues.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,420 @@
+From 0fb2815b873304d145ed00283454fc9f3bd35e6b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Tue, 4 Dec 2018 08:37:04 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix some SSL_export_keying_material() issues
+
+Fix some issues in tls13_hkdf_expand() which impact the above function
+for TLSv1.3. In particular test that we can use the maximum label length
+in TLSv1.3.
+
+Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7755)
+---
+ doc/man3/SSL_export_keying_material.pod |  3 +-
+ ssl/ssl_locl.h                          |  2 +-
+ ssl/statem/extensions.c                 |  2 +-
+ ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c                |  2 +-
+ ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c                |  2 +-
+ ssl/tls13_enc.c                         | 73 +++++++++++++++++--------
+ test/sslapitest.c                       | 48 ++++++++++++----
+ test/tls13secretstest.c                 |  2 +-
+ 8 files changed, 92 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_export_keying_material.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_export_keying_material.pod
+index abebf911fc3..4c81a60ffbb 100644
+--- a/doc/man3/SSL_export_keying_material.pod
++++ b/doc/man3/SSL_export_keying_material.pod
+@@ -59,7 +59,8 @@ B<label> and should be B<llen> bytes long. Typically this will be a value from
+ the IANA Exporter Label Registry
+ (L<https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml#exporter-labels>).
+ Alternatively labels beginning with "EXPERIMENTAL" are permitted by the standard
+-to be used without registration.
++to be used without registration. TLSv1.3 imposes a maximum label length of
++249 bytes.
+ 
+ Note that this function is only defined for TLSv1.0 and above, and DTLSv1.0 and
+ above. Attempting to use it in SSLv3 will result in an error.
+diff --git a/ssl/ssl_locl.h b/ssl/ssl_locl.h
+index 70e5a1740f9..307131de93a 100644
+--- a/ssl/ssl_locl.h
++++ b/ssl/ssl_locl.h
+@@ -2461,7 +2461,7 @@ __owur int tls13_hkdf_expand(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md,
+                              const unsigned char *secret,
+                              const unsigned char *label, size_t labellen,
+                              const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
+-                             unsigned char *out, size_t outlen);
++                             unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, int fatal);
+ __owur int tls13_derive_key(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md,
+                             const unsigned char *secret, unsigned char *key,
+                             size_t keylen);
+diff --git a/ssl/statem/extensions.c b/ssl/statem/extensions.c
+index 63e61c6184a..716d6d23e08 100644
+--- a/ssl/statem/extensions.c
++++ b/ssl/statem/extensions.c
+@@ -1506,7 +1506,7 @@ int tls_psk_do_binder(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *msgstart,
+ 
+     /* Generate the binder key */
+     if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, early_secret, label, labelsize, hash,
+-                           hashsize, binderkey, hashsize)) {
++                           hashsize, binderkey, hashsize, 1)) {
+         /* SSLfatal() already called */
+         goto err;
+     }
+diff --git a/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c b/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c
+index 5a8f1163dfa..a0e495d8e83 100644
+--- a/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c
++++ b/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c
+@@ -2740,7 +2740,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+                                PACKET_data(&nonce),
+                                PACKET_remaining(&nonce),
+                                s->session->master_key,
+-                               hashlen)) {
++                               hashlen, 1)) {
+             /* SSLfatal() already called */
+             goto err;
+         }
+diff --git a/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c b/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c
+index e7c11c4bea4..a8e862ced55 100644
+--- a/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c
++++ b/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c
+@@ -4099,7 +4099,7 @@ int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+                                tick_nonce,
+                                TICKET_NONCE_SIZE,
+                                s->session->master_key,
+-                               hashlen)) {
++                               hashlen, 1)) {
+             /* SSLfatal() already called */
+             goto err;
+         }
+diff --git a/ssl/tls13_enc.c b/ssl/tls13_enc.c
+index f7ab0fa4704..c3021d18aa9 100644
+--- a/ssl/tls13_enc.c
++++ b/ssl/tls13_enc.c
+@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/kdf.h>
+ 
+-#define TLS13_MAX_LABEL_LEN     246
++#define TLS13_MAX_LABEL_LEN     249
+ 
+ /* Always filled with zeros */
+ static const unsigned char default_zeros[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+@@ -22,30 +22,47 @@ static const unsigned char default_zeros[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+  * Given a |secret|; a |label| of length |labellen|; and |data| of length
+  * |datalen| (e.g. typically a hash of the handshake messages), derive a new
+  * secret |outlen| bytes long and store it in the location pointed to be |out|.
+- * The |data| value may be zero length. Returns 1 on success  0 on failure.
++ * The |data| value may be zero length. Any errors will be treated as fatal if
++ * |fatal| is set. Returns 1 on success  0 on failure.
+  */
+ int tls13_hkdf_expand(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *secret,
+                              const unsigned char *label, size_t labellen,
+                              const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
+-                             unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
++                             unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, int fatal)
+ {
+-    const unsigned char label_prefix[] = "tls13 ";
++    static const unsigned char label_prefix[] = "tls13 ";
+     EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_HKDF, NULL);
+     int ret;
+     size_t hkdflabellen;
+     size_t hashlen;
+     /*
+-     * 2 bytes for length of whole HkdfLabel + 1 byte for length of combined
+-     * prefix and label + bytes for the label itself + bytes for the hash
++     * 2 bytes for length of derived secret + 1 byte for length of combined
++     * prefix and label + bytes for the label itself + 1 byte length of hash
++     * + bytes for the hash itself
+      */
+     unsigned char hkdflabel[sizeof(uint16_t) + sizeof(uint8_t) +
+                             + sizeof(label_prefix) + TLS13_MAX_LABEL_LEN
+-                            + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
++                            + 1 + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+     WPACKET pkt;
+ 
+     if (pctx == NULL)
+         return 0;
+ 
++    if (labellen > TLS13_MAX_LABEL_LEN) {
++        if (fatal) {
++            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_HKDF_EXPAND,
++                     ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++        } else {
++            /*
++             * Probably we have been called from SSL_export_keying_material(),
++             * or SSL_export_keying_material_early().
++             */
++            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_HKDF_EXPAND, SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL);
++        }
++        EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
++        return 0;
++    }
++
+     hashlen = EVP_MD_size(md);
+ 
+     if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt, hkdflabel, sizeof(hkdflabel), 0)
+@@ -59,8 +76,11 @@ int tls13_hkdf_expand(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *secret,
+             || !WPACKET_finish(&pkt)) {
+         EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+         WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt);
+-        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_HKDF_EXPAND,
+-                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++        if (fatal)
++            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_HKDF_EXPAND,
++                     ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++        else
++            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_HKDF_EXPAND, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+         return 0;
+     }
+ 
+@@ -74,9 +94,13 @@ int tls13_hkdf_expand(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *secret,
+ 
+     EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+ 
+-    if (ret != 0)
+-        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_HKDF_EXPAND,
+-                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++    if (ret != 0) {
++        if (fatal)
++            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_HKDF_EXPAND,
++                     ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++        else
++            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_HKDF_EXPAND, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++    }
+ 
+     return ret == 0;
+ }
+@@ -91,7 +115,7 @@ int tls13_derive_key(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *secret,
+     static const unsigned char keylabel[] = "key";
+ 
+     return tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, secret, keylabel, sizeof(keylabel) - 1,
+-                             NULL, 0, key, keylen);
++                             NULL, 0, key, keylen, 1);
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -104,7 +128,7 @@ int tls13_derive_iv(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *secret,
+     static const unsigned char ivlabel[] = "iv";
+ 
+     return tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, secret, ivlabel, sizeof(ivlabel) - 1,
+-                             NULL, 0, iv, ivlen);
++                             NULL, 0, iv, ivlen, 1);
+ }
+ 
+ int tls13_derive_finishedkey(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md,
+@@ -114,7 +138,7 @@ int tls13_derive_finishedkey(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md,
+     static const unsigned char finishedlabel[] = "finished";
+ 
+     return tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, secret, finishedlabel,
+-                             sizeof(finishedlabel) - 1, NULL, 0, fin, finlen);
++                             sizeof(finishedlabel) - 1, NULL, 0, fin, finlen, 1);
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -177,7 +201,7 @@ int tls13_generate_secret(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md,
+         if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, prevsecret,
+                                (unsigned char *)derived_secret_label,
+                                sizeof(derived_secret_label) - 1, hash, mdlen,
+-                               preextractsec, mdlen)) {
++                               preextractsec, mdlen, 1)) {
+             /* SSLfatal() already called */
+             EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+             return 0;
+@@ -337,7 +361,7 @@ static int derive_secret_key_and_iv(SSL *s, int sending, const EVP_MD *md,
+     hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
+ 
+     if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, insecret, label, labellen, hash, hashlen,
+-                           secret, hashlen)) {
++                           secret, hashlen, 1)) {
+         /* SSLfatal() already called */
+         goto err;
+     }
+@@ -517,7 +541,8 @@ int tls13_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
+                                    early_exporter_master_secret,
+                                    sizeof(early_exporter_master_secret) - 1,
+                                    hashval, hashlen,
+-                                   s->early_exporter_master_secret, hashlen)) {
++                                   s->early_exporter_master_secret, hashlen,
++                                   1)) {
+                 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                          SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                 goto err;
+@@ -604,7 +629,7 @@ int tls13_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
+                                resumption_master_secret,
+                                sizeof(resumption_master_secret) - 1,
+                                hashval, hashlen, s->resumption_master_secret,
+-                               hashlen)) {
++                               hashlen, 1)) {
+             /* SSLfatal() already called */
+             goto err;
+         }
+@@ -624,7 +649,7 @@ int tls13_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
+                                exporter_master_secret,
+                                sizeof(exporter_master_secret) - 1,
+                                hash, hashlen, s->exporter_master_secret,
+-                               hashlen)) {
++                               hashlen, 1)) {
+             /* SSLfatal() already called */
+             goto err;
+         }
+@@ -738,10 +763,10 @@ int tls13_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
+             || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, data, &datalen) <= 0
+             || !tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->exporter_master_secret,
+                                   (const unsigned char *)label, llen,
+-                                  data, datalen, exportsecret, hashsize)
++                                  data, datalen, exportsecret, hashsize, 0)
+             || !tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, exportsecret, exporterlabel,
+                                   sizeof(exporterlabel) - 1, hash, hashsize,
+-                                  out, olen))
++                                  out, olen, 0))
+         goto err;
+ 
+     ret = 1;
+@@ -797,10 +822,10 @@ int tls13_export_keying_material_early(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
+             || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, data, &datalen) <= 0
+             || !tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->early_exporter_master_secret,
+                                   (const unsigned char *)label, llen,
+-                                  data, datalen, exportsecret, hashsize)
++                                  data, datalen, exportsecret, hashsize, 0)
+             || !tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, exportsecret, exporterlabel,
+                                   sizeof(exporterlabel) - 1, hash, hashsize,
+-                                  out, olen))
++                                  out, olen, 0))
+         goto err;
+ 
+     ret = 1;
+diff --git a/test/sslapitest.c b/test/sslapitest.c
+index 108d57e4781..a4bbb4fead4 100644
+--- a/test/sslapitest.c
++++ b/test/sslapitest.c
+@@ -4028,20 +4028,25 @@ static int test_serverinfo(int tst)
+  * no test vectors so all we do is test that both sides of the communication
+  * produce the same results for different protocol versions.
+  */
++#define SMALL_LABEL_LEN 10
++#define LONG_LABEL_LEN  249
+ static int test_export_key_mat(int tst)
+ {
+     int testresult = 0;
+     SSL_CTX *cctx = NULL, *sctx = NULL, *sctx2 = NULL;
+     SSL *clientssl = NULL, *serverssl = NULL;
+-    const char label[] = "test label";
++    const char label[LONG_LABEL_LEN + 1] = "test label";
+     const unsigned char context[] = "context";
+     const unsigned char *emptycontext = NULL;
+     unsigned char ckeymat1[80], ckeymat2[80], ckeymat3[80];
+     unsigned char skeymat1[80], skeymat2[80], skeymat3[80];
++    size_t labellen;
+     const int protocols[] = {
+         TLS1_VERSION,
+         TLS1_1_VERSION,
+         TLS1_2_VERSION,
++        TLS1_3_VERSION,
++        TLS1_3_VERSION,
+         TLS1_3_VERSION
+     };
+ 
+@@ -4058,7 +4063,7 @@ static int test_export_key_mat(int tst)
+         return 1;
+ #endif
+ #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
+-    if (tst == 3)
++    if (tst >= 3)
+         return 1;
+ #endif
+     if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_ctx_pair(TLS_server_method(), TLS_client_method(),
+@@ -4076,33 +4081,52 @@ static int test_export_key_mat(int tst)
+                                                 SSL_ERROR_NONE)))
+         goto end;
+ 
++    if (tst == 5) {
++        /*
++         * TLSv1.3 imposes a maximum label len of 249 bytes. Check we fail if we
++         * go over that.
++         */
++        if (!TEST_int_le(SSL_export_keying_material(clientssl, ckeymat1,
++                                                    sizeof(ckeymat1), label,
++                                                    LONG_LABEL_LEN + 1, context,
++                                                    sizeof(context) - 1, 1), 0))
++            goto end;
++
++        testresult = 1;
++        goto end;
++    } else if (tst == 4) {
++        labellen = LONG_LABEL_LEN;
++    } else {
++        labellen = SMALL_LABEL_LEN;
++    }
++
+     if (!TEST_int_eq(SSL_export_keying_material(clientssl, ckeymat1,
+                                                 sizeof(ckeymat1), label,
+-                                                sizeof(label) - 1, context,
++                                                labellen, context,
+                                                 sizeof(context) - 1, 1), 1)
+             || !TEST_int_eq(SSL_export_keying_material(clientssl, ckeymat2,
+                                                        sizeof(ckeymat2), label,
+-                                                       sizeof(label) - 1,
++                                                       labellen,
+                                                        emptycontext,
+                                                        0, 1), 1)
+             || !TEST_int_eq(SSL_export_keying_material(clientssl, ckeymat3,
+                                                        sizeof(ckeymat3), label,
+-                                                       sizeof(label) - 1,
++                                                       labellen,
+                                                        NULL, 0, 0), 1)
+             || !TEST_int_eq(SSL_export_keying_material(serverssl, skeymat1,
+                                                        sizeof(skeymat1), label,
+-                                                       sizeof(label) - 1,
++                                                       labellen,
+                                                        context,
+                                                        sizeof(context) -1, 1),
+                             1)
+             || !TEST_int_eq(SSL_export_keying_material(serverssl, skeymat2,
+                                                        sizeof(skeymat2), label,
+-                                                       sizeof(label) - 1,
++                                                       labellen,
+                                                        emptycontext,
+                                                        0, 1), 1)
+             || !TEST_int_eq(SSL_export_keying_material(serverssl, skeymat3,
+                                                        sizeof(skeymat3), label,
+-                                                       sizeof(label) - 1,
++                                                       labellen,
+                                                        NULL, 0, 0), 1)
+                /*
+                 * Check that both sides created the same key material with the
+@@ -4131,10 +4155,10 @@ static int test_export_key_mat(int tst)
+      * Check that an empty context and no context produce different results in
+      * protocols less than TLSv1.3. In TLSv1.3 they should be the same.
+      */
+-    if ((tst != 3 && !TEST_mem_ne(ckeymat2, sizeof(ckeymat2), ckeymat3,
++    if ((tst < 3 && !TEST_mem_ne(ckeymat2, sizeof(ckeymat2), ckeymat3,
+                                   sizeof(ckeymat3)))
+-            || (tst ==3 && !TEST_mem_eq(ckeymat2, sizeof(ckeymat2), ckeymat3,
+-                                        sizeof(ckeymat3))))
++            || (tst >= 3 && !TEST_mem_eq(ckeymat2, sizeof(ckeymat2), ckeymat3,
++                                         sizeof(ckeymat3))))
+         goto end;
+ 
+     testresult = 1;
+@@ -5909,7 +5933,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
+     ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_custom_exts, 3);
+ #endif
+     ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_serverinfo, 8);
+-    ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_export_key_mat, 4);
++    ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_export_key_mat, 6);
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
+     ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_export_key_mat_early, 3);
+ #endif
+diff --git a/test/tls13secretstest.c b/test/tls13secretstest.c
+index 319df17bab0..de318df02b4 100644
+--- a/test/tls13secretstest.c
++++ b/test/tls13secretstest.c
+@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ static int test_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *prk,
+     }
+ 
+     if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, prk, label, labellen, hash, hashsize,
+-                           gensecret, hashsize)) {
++                           gensecret, hashsize, 1)) {
+         TEST_error("Secret generation failed");
+         return 0;
+     }
diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.1.1a-fix-wrong-return-value-in-ssl3_ctx_ctrl.patch b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.1.1a-fix-wrong-return-value-in-ssl3_ctx_ctrl.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..c2f8bb638b3a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.1.1a-fix-wrong-return-value-in-ssl3_ctx_ctrl.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+From 3ccccb91ae1c07a4310778b3d7ba74ff4ff787f0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com>
+Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2018 13:16:27 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix wrong return value in ssl3_ctx_ctrl
+
+This fixes issue #7677
+
+Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7678)
+---
+ ssl/s3_lib.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssl/s3_lib.c b/ssl/s3_lib.c
+index 866ca4dfa9b..99ae48199c2 100644
+--- a/ssl/s3_lib.c
++++ b/ssl/s3_lib.c
+@@ -3781,7 +3781,7 @@ long ssl3_ctx_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
+                                   EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdh), 0, pkdh)) {
+                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
+                 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
+-                return 1;
++                return 0;
+             }
+             EVP_PKEY_free(ctx->cert->dh_tmp);
+             ctx->cert->dh_tmp = pkdh;
diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.1.1a-make-sure-build_SYS_str_reasons_preserves_errno.patch b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.1.1a-make-sure-build_SYS_str_reasons_preserves_errno.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..cfa84c73a5bf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.1.1a-make-sure-build_SYS_str_reasons_preserves_errno.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+From 99992ad22019e752c7b103a45f860a48b6bc0972 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2018 11:44:42 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Make sure build_SYS_str_reasons() preserves errno
+
+This function can end up being called during ERR_get_error() if we are
+initialising. ERR_get_error() must preserve errno since it gets called via
+SSL_get_error(). If that function returns SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL then you are
+supposed to inspect errno.
+
+Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7680)
+
+(cherry picked from commit 71b1ceffc4c795f5db21861dd1016fbe23a53a53)
+---
+
+diff --git a/crypto/err/err.c b/crypto/err/err.c
+index 03cbd73..2eeeab2 100644
+--- a/crypto/err/err.c
++++ b/crypto/err/err.c
+@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
+ #include <openssl/bio.h>
+ #include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+ #include "internal/thread_once.h"
++#include "e_os.h"
+ 
+ static int err_load_strings(const ERR_STRING_DATA *str);
+ 
+@@ -201,6 +202,7 @@ static void build_SYS_str_reasons(void)
+     static char strerror_tab[NUM_SYS_STR_REASONS][LEN_SYS_STR_REASON];
+     static int init = 1;
+     int i;
++    int saveerrno = get_last_sys_error();
+ 
+     CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(err_string_lock);
+     if (!init) {
+@@ -229,6 +231,8 @@ static void build_SYS_str_reasons(void)
+     init = 0;
+ 
+     CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(err_string_lock);
++    /* openssl_strerror_r could change errno, but we want to preserve it */
++    set_sys_error(saveerrno);
+     err_load_strings(SYS_str_reasons);
+ }
+ #endif
+diff --git a/e_os.h b/e_os.h
+index 5340593..8e6efa9 100644
+--- a/e_os.h
++++ b/e_os.h
+@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@
+ 
+ # define get_last_sys_error()    errno
+ # define clear_sys_error()       errno=0
++# define set_sys_error(e)        errno=(e)
+ 
+ /********************************************************************
+  The Microsoft section
+@@ -66,8 +67,10 @@
+ # ifdef WIN32
+ #  undef get_last_sys_error
+ #  undef clear_sys_error
++#  undef set_sys_error
+ #  define get_last_sys_error()    GetLastError()
+ #  define clear_sys_error()       SetLastError(0)
++#  define set_sys_error(e)        SetLastError(e)
+ #  if !defined(WINNT)
+ #   define WIN_CONSOLE_BUG
+ #  endif
diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.1.1a-preserve-errno-on-dlopen.patch b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.1.1a-preserve-errno-on-dlopen.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ed8f2dd96be0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.1.1a-preserve-errno-on-dlopen.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+From ef97becf522fc4e2e9d98e6ae7bcb26651883d9a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2018 11:57:04 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Preserve errno on dlopen
+
+For the same reasons as in the previous commit we must preserve errno
+across dlopen calls. Some implementations (e.g. solaris) do not preserve
+errno even on a successful dlopen call.
+
+Fixes #6953
+
+Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7680)
+
+(cherry picked from commit 3cb4e7dc1cf92022f62b9bbdd59695885a1265ff)
+---
+ crypto/dso/dso_dlfcn.c | 7 +++++++
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/dso/dso_dlfcn.c b/crypto/dso/dso_dlfcn.c
+index ad8899c289a..4240f5f5e30 100644
+--- a/crypto/dso/dso_dlfcn.c
++++ b/crypto/dso/dso_dlfcn.c
+@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
+ #endif
+ 
+ #include "dso_locl.h"
++#include "e_os.h"
+ 
+ #ifdef DSO_DLFCN
+ 
+@@ -99,6 +100,7 @@ static int dlfcn_load(DSO *dso)
+     /* See applicable comments in dso_dl.c */
+     char *filename = DSO_convert_filename(dso, NULL);
+     int flags = DLOPEN_FLAG;
++    int saveerrno = get_last_sys_error();
+ 
+     if (filename == NULL) {
+         DSOerr(DSO_F_DLFCN_LOAD, DSO_R_NO_FILENAME);
+@@ -118,6 +120,11 @@ static int dlfcn_load(DSO *dso)
+         ERR_add_error_data(4, "filename(", filename, "): ", dlerror());
+         goto err;
+     }
++    /*
++     * Some dlopen() implementations (e.g. solaris) do no preserve errno, even
++     * on a successful call.
++     */
++    set_sys_error(saveerrno);
+     if (!sk_void_push(dso->meth_data, (char *)ptr)) {
+         DSOerr(DSO_F_DLFCN_LOAD, DSO_R_STACK_ERROR);
+         goto err;
diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.1.1a-preserve-system-error-number-in-a-few-more-places.patch b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.1.1a-preserve-system-error-number-in-a-few-more-places.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..84c43a3c3e04
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.1.1a-preserve-system-error-number-in-a-few-more-places.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+From 145419423e1a74ae54cdbd3aed8bb15cbd53c7cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
+Date: Fri, 14 Dec 2018 19:33:55 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] ERR: preserve system error number in a few more places
+
+It turns out that intialization may change the error number, so we
+need to preserve the system error number in functions where
+initialization is called for.
+These are ERR_get_state() and err_shelve_state()
+
+Fixes #7897
+
+Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7902)
+
+(cherry picked from commit 91c5473035aaf2c0d86e4039c2a29a5b70541905)
+---
+ crypto/err/err.c | 5 +++++
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/err/err.c b/crypto/err/err.c
+index 5cfb02d821b..aef2543d60b 100644
+--- a/crypto/err/err.c
++++ b/crypto/err/err.c
+@@ -697,6 +697,7 @@ DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(err_do_init)
+ ERR_STATE *ERR_get_state(void)
+ {
+     ERR_STATE *state;
++    int saveerrno = get_last_sys_error();
+ 
+     if (!OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_BASE_ONLY, NULL))
+         return NULL;
+@@ -728,6 +729,7 @@ ERR_STATE *ERR_get_state(void)
+         OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CRYPTO_STRINGS, NULL);
+     }
+ 
++    set_sys_error(saveerrno);
+     return state;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -737,6 +739,8 @@ ERR_STATE *ERR_get_state(void)
+  */
+ int err_shelve_state(void **state)
+ {
++    int saveerrno = get_last_sys_error();
++
+     if (!OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_BASE_ONLY, NULL))
+         return 0;
+ 
+@@ -747,6 +751,7 @@ int err_shelve_state(void **state)
+     if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&err_thread_local, (ERR_STATE*)-1))
+         return 0;
+ 
++    set_sys_error(saveerrno);
+     return 1;
+ }
+ 
diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.1.1a-revert-reduce-stack-usage-in-tls13_hkdf_expand.patch b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.1.1a-revert-reduce-stack-usage-in-tls13_hkdf_expand.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5ea4fb97bfce
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.1.1a-revert-reduce-stack-usage-in-tls13_hkdf_expand.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+From ed371b8cbac0d0349667558c061c1ae380cf75eb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Mon, 3 Dec 2018 18:14:57 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Revert "Reduce stack usage in tls13_hkdf_expand"
+
+This reverts commit ec0c5f5693e39c5a013f81e6dd9dfd09ec65162d.
+
+SSL_export_keying_material() may use longer label lengths.
+
+Fixes #7712
+
+Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7755)
+---
+ ssl/tls13_enc.c | 16 ++++------------
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssl/tls13_enc.c b/ssl/tls13_enc.c
+index b6825d20c2d..f7ab0fa4704 100644
+--- a/ssl/tls13_enc.c
++++ b/ssl/tls13_enc.c
+@@ -13,14 +13,7 @@
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/kdf.h>
+ 
+-/*
+- * RFC 8446, 7.1 Key Schedule, says:
+- * Note: With common hash functions, any label longer than 12 characters
+- * requires an additional iteration of the hash function to compute.
+- * The labels in this specification have all been chosen to fit within
+- * this limit.
+- */
+-#define TLS13_MAX_LABEL_LEN     12
++#define TLS13_MAX_LABEL_LEN     246
+ 
+ /* Always filled with zeros */
+ static const unsigned char default_zeros[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+@@ -36,15 +29,14 @@ int tls13_hkdf_expand(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *secret,
+                              const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
+                              unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
+ {
+-    static const unsigned char label_prefix[] = "tls13 ";
++    const unsigned char label_prefix[] = "tls13 ";
+     EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_HKDF, NULL);
+     int ret;
+     size_t hkdflabellen;
+     size_t hashlen;
+     /*
+-     * 2 bytes for length of derived secret + 1 byte for length of combined
+-     * prefix and label + bytes for the label itself + 1 byte length of hash
+-     * + bytes for the hash itself
++     * 2 bytes for length of whole HkdfLabel + 1 byte for length of combined
++     * prefix and label + bytes for the label itself + bytes for the hash
+      */
+     unsigned char hkdflabel[sizeof(uint16_t) + sizeof(uint8_t) +
+                             + sizeof(label_prefix) + TLS13_MAX_LABEL_LEN