dev-libs/openssl: Revbumps to fix CVE-2018-0735

Signed-off-by: Lars Wendler <polynomial-c@gentoo.org>
Package-Manager: Portage-2.3.51, Repoman-2.3.11

2 files changed, 88 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.1.0i-CVE-2018-0735.patch b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.1.0i-CVE-2018-0735.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5762c04fa340
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.1.0i-CVE-2018-0735.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+From 56fb454d281a023b3f950d969693553d3f3ceea1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Pauli <paul.dale@oracle.com>
+Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2018 10:54:58 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] Timing vulnerability in ECDSA signature generation
+ (CVE-2018-0735)
+
+Preallocate an extra limb for some of the big numbers to avoid a reallocation
+that can potentially provide a side channel.
+
+Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7486)
+
+(cherry picked from commit 99540ec79491f59ed8b46b4edf130e17dc907f52)
+---
+ crypto/ec/ec_mult.c | 6 +++---
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c b/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c
+index 22bb30ffa1..ff882cce20 100644
+--- a/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c
++++ b/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c
+@@ -177,8 +177,8 @@ static int ec_mul_consttime(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
+      */
+     cardinality_bits = BN_num_bits(cardinality);
+     group_top = bn_get_top(cardinality);
+-    if ((bn_wexpand(k, group_top + 1) == NULL)
+-        || (bn_wexpand(lambda, group_top + 1) == NULL))
++    if ((bn_wexpand(k, group_top + 2) == NULL)
++        || (bn_wexpand(lambda, group_top + 2) == NULL))
+         goto err;
+ 
+     if (!BN_copy(k, scalar))
+@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ static int ec_mul_consttime(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
+      * k := scalar + 2*cardinality
+      */
+     kbit = BN_is_bit_set(lambda, cardinality_bits);
+-    BN_consttime_swap(kbit, k, lambda, group_top + 1);
++    BN_consttime_swap(kbit, k, lambda, group_top + 2);
+ 
+     group_top = bn_get_top(group->field);
+     if ((bn_wexpand(s->X, group_top) == NULL)
+-- 
+2.19.1
+
diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.1.1-CVE-2018-0735.patch b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.1.1-CVE-2018-0735.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..295f5dbe8d82
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.1.1-CVE-2018-0735.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+From b1d6d55ece1c26fa2829e2b819b038d7b6d692b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Pauli <paul.dale@oracle.com>
+Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2018 10:54:58 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] Timing vulnerability in ECDSA signature generation
+ (CVE-2018-0735)
+
+Preallocate an extra limb for some of the big numbers to avoid a reallocation
+that can potentially provide a side channel.
+
+Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7486)
+
+(cherry picked from commit 99540ec79491f59ed8b46b4edf130e17dc907f52)
+---
+ crypto/ec/ec_mult.c | 6 +++---
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c b/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c
+index 7e1b3650e7..0e0a5e1394 100644
+--- a/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c
++++ b/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c
+@@ -206,8 +206,8 @@ int ec_scalar_mul_ladder(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
+      */
+     cardinality_bits = BN_num_bits(cardinality);
+     group_top = bn_get_top(cardinality);
+-    if ((bn_wexpand(k, group_top + 1) == NULL)
+-        || (bn_wexpand(lambda, group_top + 1) == NULL)) {
++    if ((bn_wexpand(k, group_top + 2) == NULL)
++        || (bn_wexpand(lambda, group_top + 2) == NULL)) {
+         ECerr(EC_F_EC_SCALAR_MUL_LADDER, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+         goto err;
+     }
+@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ int ec_scalar_mul_ladder(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
+      * k := scalar + 2*cardinality
+      */
+     kbit = BN_is_bit_set(lambda, cardinality_bits);
+-    BN_consttime_swap(kbit, k, lambda, group_top + 1);
++    BN_consttime_swap(kbit, k, lambda, group_top + 2);
+ 
+     group_top = bn_get_top(group->field);
+     if ((bn_wexpand(s->X, group_top) == NULL)
+-- 
+2.19.1
+