diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.1.1-CVE-2018-0734.patch')
| -rw-r--r-- | dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.1.1-CVE-2018-0734.patch | 131 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 131 deletions
diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.1.1-CVE-2018-0734.patch b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.1.1-CVE-2018-0734.patch deleted file mode 100644 index dbc379c80d43..000000000000 --- a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.1.1-CVE-2018-0734.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,131 +0,0 @@ -CVE-2018-0734 -https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/f1b12b8713a739f27d74e6911580b2e70aea2fa4 -https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/8abfe72e8c1de1b95f50aa0d9134803b4d00070f - ---- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c -+++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c -@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ - - #include <stdio.h> - #include "internal/cryptlib.h" -+#include "internal/bn_int.h" - #include <openssl/bn.h> - #include <openssl/sha.h> - #include "dsa_locl.h" -@@ -23,6 +24,8 @@ static int dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, - DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa); - static int dsa_init(DSA *dsa); - static int dsa_finish(DSA *dsa); -+static BIGNUM *dsa_mod_inverse_fermat(const BIGNUM *k, const BIGNUM *q, -+ BN_CTX *ctx); - - static DSA_METHOD openssl_dsa_meth = { - "OpenSSL DSA method", -@@ -178,9 +181,9 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, - { - BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; - BIGNUM *k, *kinv = NULL, *r = *rp; -- BIGNUM *l, *m; -+ BIGNUM *l; - int ret = 0; -- int q_bits; -+ int q_bits, q_words; - - if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) { - DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS); -@@ -189,8 +192,7 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, - - k = BN_new(); - l = BN_new(); -- m = BN_new(); -- if (k == NULL || l == NULL || m == NULL) -+ if (k == NULL || l == NULL) - goto err; - - if (ctx_in == NULL) { -@@ -201,9 +203,9 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, - - /* Preallocate space */ - q_bits = BN_num_bits(dsa->q); -- if (!BN_set_bit(k, q_bits) -- || !BN_set_bit(l, q_bits) -- || !BN_set_bit(m, q_bits)) -+ q_words = bn_get_top(dsa->q); -+ if (!bn_wexpand(k, q_words + 2) -+ || !bn_wexpand(l, q_words + 2)) - goto err; - - /* Get random k */ -@@ -238,14 +240,17 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, - * small timing information leakage. We then choose the sum that is - * one bit longer than the modulus. - * -- * TODO: revisit the BN_copy aiming for a memory access agnostic -- * conditional copy. -+ * There are some concerns about the efficacy of doing this. More -+ * specificly refer to the discussion starting with: -+ * https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7486#discussion_r228323705 -+ * The fix is to rework BN so these gymnastics aren't required. - */ - if (!BN_add(l, k, dsa->q) -- || !BN_add(m, l, dsa->q) -- || !BN_copy(k, BN_num_bits(l) > q_bits ? l : m)) -+ || !BN_add(k, l, dsa->q)) - goto err; - -+ BN_consttime_swap(BN_is_bit_set(l, q_bits), k, l, q_words + 2); -+ - if ((dsa)->meth->bn_mod_exp != NULL) { - if (!dsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(dsa, r, dsa->g, k, dsa->p, ctx, - dsa->method_mont_p)) -@@ -258,8 +263,8 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, - if (!BN_mod(r, r, dsa->q, ctx)) - goto err; - -- /* Compute part of 's = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q' */ -- if ((kinv = BN_mod_inverse(NULL, k, dsa->q, ctx)) == NULL) -+ /* Compute part of 's = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q' */ -+ if ((kinv = dsa_mod_inverse_fermat(k, dsa->q, ctx)) == NULL) - goto err; - - BN_clear_free(*kinvp); -@@ -273,7 +278,6 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, - BN_CTX_free(ctx); - BN_clear_free(k); - BN_clear_free(l); -- BN_clear_free(m); - return ret; - } - -@@ -393,3 +397,31 @@ static int dsa_finish(DSA *dsa) - BN_MONT_CTX_free(dsa->method_mont_p); - return 1; - } -+ -+/* -+ * Compute the inverse of k modulo q. -+ * Since q is prime, Fermat's Little Theorem applies, which reduces this to -+ * mod-exp operation. Both the exponent and modulus are public information -+ * so a mod-exp that doesn't leak the base is sufficient. A newly allocated -+ * BIGNUM is returned which the caller must free. -+ */ -+static BIGNUM *dsa_mod_inverse_fermat(const BIGNUM *k, const BIGNUM *q, -+ BN_CTX *ctx) -+{ -+ BIGNUM *res = NULL; -+ BIGNUM *r, *e; -+ -+ if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL) -+ return NULL; -+ -+ BN_CTX_start(ctx); -+ if ((e = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) != NULL -+ && BN_set_word(r, 2) -+ && BN_sub(e, q, r) -+ && BN_mod_exp_mont(r, k, e, q, ctx, NULL)) -+ res = r; -+ else -+ BN_free(r); -+ BN_CTX_end(ctx); -+ return res; -+} |