diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.0.1l-CVE-2015-0286.patch')
-rw-r--r-- | dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.0.1l-CVE-2015-0286.patch | 356 |
1 files changed, 356 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.0.1l-CVE-2015-0286.patch b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.0.1l-CVE-2015-0286.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..811f573a1107 --- /dev/null +++ b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1.0.1l-CVE-2015-0286.patch @@ -0,0 +1,356 @@ +--- openssl-1.0.1l/crypto/asn1/a_type.c ++++ openssl-1.0.1l/crypto/asn1/a_type.c +@@ -124,6 +124,9 @@ + case V_ASN1_OBJECT: + result = OBJ_cmp(a->value.object, b->value.object); + break; ++ case V_ASN1_BOOLEAN: ++ result = a->value.boolean - b->value.boolean; ++ break; + case V_ASN1_NULL: + result = 0; /* They do not have content. */ + break; +--- openssl-1.0.1l/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c ++++ openssl-1.0.1l/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c +@@ -130,11 +130,17 @@ + { + ASN1_TLC c; + ASN1_VALUE *ptmpval = NULL; +- if (!pval) +- pval = &ptmpval; + asn1_tlc_clear_nc(&c); +- if (ASN1_item_ex_d2i(pval, in, len, it, -1, 0, 0, &c) > 0) +- return *pval; ++ if (pval && *pval && it->itype == ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE) ++ ptmpval = *pval; ++ if (ASN1_item_ex_d2i(&ptmpval, in, len, it, -1, 0, 0, &c) > 0) { ++ if (pval && it->itype != ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE) { ++ if (*pval) ++ ASN1_item_free(*pval, it); ++ *pval = ptmpval; ++ } ++ return ptmpval; ++ } + return NULL; + } + +@@ -311,9 +317,16 @@ + if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it, NULL)) + goto auxerr; + +- /* Allocate structure */ +- if (!*pval && !ASN1_item_ex_new(pval, it)) +- { ++ if (*pval) { ++ /* Free up and zero CHOICE value if initialised */ ++ i = asn1_get_choice_selector(pval, it); ++ if ((i >= 0) && (i < it->tcount)) { ++ tt = it->templates + i; ++ pchptr = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, tt); ++ ASN1_template_free(pchptr, tt); ++ asn1_set_choice_selector(pval, -1, it); ++ } ++ } else if (!ASN1_item_ex_new(pval, it)) { + ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, + ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); + goto err; +@@ -407,6 +420,17 @@ + if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it, NULL)) + goto auxerr; + ++ /* Free up and zero any ADB found */ ++ for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) { ++ if (tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_ADB_MASK) { ++ const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt; ++ ASN1_VALUE **pseqval; ++ seqtt = asn1_do_adb(pval, tt, 1); ++ pseqval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, seqtt); ++ ASN1_template_free(pseqval, seqtt); ++ } ++ } ++ + /* Get each field entry */ + for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) + { +--- openssl-1.0.1l/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c ++++ openssl-1.0.1l/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c +@@ -272,6 +272,25 @@ + PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri=NULL; + ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os=NULL; + ++ if (p7 == NULL) { ++ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAINIT, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ /* ++ * The content field in the PKCS7 ContentInfo is optional, but that really ++ * only applies to inner content (precisely, detached signatures). ++ * ++ * When reading content, missing outer content is therefore treated as an ++ * error. ++ * ++ * When creating content, PKCS7_content_new() must be called before ++ * calling this method, so a NULL p7->d is always an error. ++ */ ++ if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) { ++ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAINIT, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ + i=OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type); + p7->state=PKCS7_S_HEADER; + +@@ -433,6 +452,16 @@ + unsigned char *ek = NULL, *tkey = NULL; + int eklen = 0, tkeylen = 0; + ++ if (p7 == NULL) { ++ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ ++ if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) { ++ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ + i=OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type); + p7->state=PKCS7_S_HEADER; + +@@ -752,6 +781,16 @@ + STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *si_sk=NULL; + ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os=NULL; + ++ if (p7 == NULL) { ++ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) { ++ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ + EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp); + i=OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type); + p7->state=PKCS7_S_HEADER; +@@ -796,6 +835,7 @@ + /* If detached data then the content is excluded */ + if(PKCS7_type_is_data(p7->d.sign->contents) && p7->detached) { + M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os); ++ os = NULL; + p7->d.sign->contents->d.data = NULL; + } + break; +@@ -806,6 +846,7 @@ + if(PKCS7_type_is_data(p7->d.digest->contents) && p7->detached) + { + M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os); ++ os = NULL; + p7->d.digest->contents->d.data = NULL; + } + break; +@@ -878,24 +919,31 @@ + M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(p7->d.digest->digest, md_data, md_len); + } + +- if (!PKCS7_is_detached(p7) && !(os->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_NDEF)) +- { ++ if (!PKCS7_is_detached(p7)) { ++ /* ++ * NOTE(emilia): I think we only reach os == NULL here because detached ++ * digested data support is broken. ++ */ ++ if (os == NULL) ++ goto err; ++ if (!(os->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_NDEF)) { + char *cont; + long contlen; +- btmp=BIO_find_type(bio,BIO_TYPE_MEM); +- if (btmp == NULL) +- { +- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL,PKCS7_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_MEM_BIO); +- goto err; +- } ++ btmp = BIO_find_type(bio, BIO_TYPE_MEM); ++ if (btmp == NULL) { ++ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, PKCS7_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_MEM_BIO); ++ goto err; ++ } + contlen = BIO_get_mem_data(btmp, &cont); +- /* Mark the BIO read only then we can use its copy of the data ++ /* ++ * Mark the BIO read only then we can use its copy of the data + * instead of making an extra copy. + */ + BIO_set_flags(btmp, BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY); + BIO_set_mem_eof_return(btmp, 0); + ASN1_STRING_set0(os, (unsigned char *)cont, contlen); +- } ++ } ++ } + ret=1; + err: + EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_tmp); +@@ -971,6 +1019,16 @@ + STACK_OF(X509) *cert; + X509 *x509; + ++ if (p7 == NULL) { ++ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAVERIFY, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) { ++ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAVERIFY, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ + if (PKCS7_type_is_signed(p7)) + { + cert=p7->d.sign->cert; +--- openssl-1.0.1l/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c ++++ openssl-1.0.1l/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c +@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ + + switch (cmd) + { ++ /* NOTE(emilia): does not support detached digested data. */ + case PKCS7_OP_SET_DETACHED_SIGNATURE: + if (nid == NID_pkcs7_signed) + { +@@ -459,6 +460,8 @@ + + STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *PKCS7_get_signer_info(PKCS7 *p7) + { ++ if (p7 == NULL || p7->d.ptr == NULL) ++ return NULL; + if (PKCS7_type_is_signed(p7)) + { + return(p7->d.sign->signer_info); +--- openssl-1.0.1l/doc/crypto/d2i_X509.pod ++++ openssl-1.0.1l/doc/crypto/d2i_X509.pod +@@ -199,6 +199,12 @@ + persist if they are not present in the new one. As a result the use + of this "reuse" behaviour is strongly discouraged. + ++Current versions of OpenSSL will not modify B<*px> if an error occurs. ++If parsing succeeds then B<*px> is freed (if it is not NULL) and then ++set to the value of the newly decoded structure. As a result B<*px> ++B<must not> be allocated on the stack or an attempt will be made to ++free an invalid pointer. ++ + i2d_X509() will not return an error in many versions of OpenSSL, + if mandatory fields are not initialized due to a programming error + then the encoded structure may contain invalid data or omit the +@@ -210,7 +216,9 @@ + + d2i_X509(), d2i_X509_bio() and d2i_X509_fp() return a valid B<X509> structure + or B<NULL> if an error occurs. The error code that can be obtained by +-L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. ++L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. If the "reuse" capability has been used ++with a valid X509 structure being passed in via B<px> then the object is not ++modified in the event of error. + + i2d_X509() returns the number of bytes successfully encoded or a negative + value if an error occurs. The error code can be obtained by +--- openssl-1.0.1l/ssl/s2_lib.c ++++ openssl-1.0.1l/ssl/s2_lib.c +@@ -488,7 +488,7 @@ + + OPENSSL_assert(s->session->master_key_length >= 0 + && s->session->master_key_length +- < (int)sizeof(s->session->master_key)); ++ <= (int)sizeof(s->session->master_key)); + EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length); + EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,&c,1); + c++; +--- openssl-1.0.1l/ssl/s2_srvr.c ++++ openssl-1.0.1l/ssl/s2_srvr.c +@@ -454,10 +454,6 @@ + SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_NO_PRIVATEKEY); + return(-1); + } +- i=ssl_rsa_private_decrypt(s->cert,s->s2->tmp.enc, +- &(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]),&(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]), +- (s->s2->ssl2_rollback)?RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); +- + is_export=SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->session->cipher); + + if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session,&c,&md,NULL,NULL,NULL)) +@@ -475,21 +471,59 @@ + else + ek=5; + ++ /* ++ * The format of the CLIENT-MASTER-KEY message is ++ * 1 byte message type ++ * 3 bytes cipher ++ * 2-byte clear key length (stored in s->s2->tmp.clear) ++ * 2-byte encrypted key length (stored in s->s2->tmp.enc) ++ * 2-byte key args length (IV etc) ++ * clear key ++ * encrypted key ++ * key args ++ * ++ * If the cipher is an export cipher, then the encrypted key bytes ++ * are a fixed portion of the total key (5 or 8 bytes). The size of ++ * this portion is in |ek|. If the cipher is not an export cipher, ++ * then the entire key material is encrypted (i.e., clear key length ++ * must be zero). ++ */ ++ if ((!is_export && s->s2->tmp.clear != 0) || ++ (is_export && s->s2->tmp.clear + ek != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))) { ++ ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR); ++ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ /* ++ * The encrypted blob must decrypt to the encrypted portion of the key. ++ * Decryption can't be expanding, so if we don't have enough encrypted ++ * bytes to fit the key in the buffer, stop now. ++ */ ++ if ((is_export && s->s2->tmp.enc < ek) || ++ (!is_export && s->s2->tmp.enc < EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))) { ++ ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR); ++ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ ++ i = ssl_rsa_private_decrypt(s->cert, s->s2->tmp.enc, ++ &(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]), ++ &(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]), ++ (s->s2->ssl2_rollback) ? RSA_SSLV23_PADDING : ++ RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); ++ + /* bad decrypt */ + #if 1 + /* If a bad decrypt, continue with protocol but with a + * random master secret (Bleichenbacher attack) */ +- if ((i < 0) || +- ((!is_export && (i != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))) +- || (is_export && ((i != ek) || (s->s2->tmp.clear+(unsigned int)i != +- (unsigned int)EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))))) +- { ++ if ((i < 0) || ((!is_export && i != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)) ++ || (is_export && i != ek))) { + ERR_clear_error(); + if (is_export) + i=ek; + else + i=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); +- if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,i) <= 0) ++ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(&p[s->s2->tmp.clear], i) <= 0) + return 0; + } + #else +@@ -513,7 +547,8 @@ + } + #endif + +- if (is_export) i+=s->s2->tmp.clear; ++ if (is_export) ++ i = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); + + if (i > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) + { |