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+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
+<!DOCTYPE glsa SYSTEM "http://www.gentoo.org/dtd/glsa.dtd">
+<glsa id="200312-01">
+  <title>rsync.gentoo.org: rotation server compromised</title>
+  <synopsis>
+    A server in the rsync.gentoo.org rotation was compromised.
+  </synopsis>
+  <product type="infrastructure">rsync mirror</product>
+  <announced>2003-12-02</announced>
+  <revised count="01">2003-12-02</revised>
+  <affected>
+    <service type="rsync" fixed="yes"/>
+  </affected>
+  <background>
+    <p>
+    The rsync.gentoo.org rotation of servers provides an up to date Portage
+    tree using the rsync file transfer protocol.
+    </p>
+  </background>
+  <description>
+    <p>
+    On December 2nd at approximately 03:45 UTC, one of the servers that makes up
+    the rsync.gentoo.org rotation was compromised via a remote exploit.  At this
+    point, we are still performing forensic analysis.  However, the compromised
+    system had both an IDS and a file integrity checker installed and we have a
+    very detailed forensic trail of what happened once the box was breached, so
+    we are reasonably confident that the portage tree stored on that box was
+    unaffected.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+    The attacker appears to have installed a rootkit and modified/deleted some
+    files to cover their tracks, but left the server otherwise untouched.  The
+    box was in a compromised state for approximately one hour before it was
+    discovered and shut down.  During this time, approximately 20 users
+    synchronized against the portage mirror stored on this box.  The method used
+    to gain access to the box remotely is still under investigation.  We will
+    release more details once we have ascertained the cause of the remote
+    exploit.
+    </p>
+    <p>
+    This box is not an official Gentoo infrastructure box and is instead donated
+    by a sponsor.  The box provides other services as well and the sponsor has
+    requested that we not publicly identify the box at this time.  Because the
+    Gentoo part of this box appears to be unaffected by this exploit, we are
+    currently honoring the sponsor's request.  That said, if at any point, we
+    determine that any file in the portage tree was modified in any way, we will
+    release full details about the compromised server.
+    </p>
+  </description>
+  <impact type="low">
+    <p>
+    There is no known impact at this time.
+    </p>
+  </impact>
+  <workaround>
+    <p>
+    There is no known workaround at this time.
+    </p>
+  </workaround>
+  <resolution>
+    <p>
+    Again, based on the forensic analysis done so far, we are reasonably
+    confident that no files within the Portage tree on the box were affected.
+    However, the server has been removed from all rsync.*.gentoo.org rotations
+    and will remain so until the forensic analysis has been completed and the
+    box has been wiped and rebuilt.  Thus, users preferring an extra level of
+    security may ensure that they have a correct and accurate portage tree by
+    running:
+    </p>
+    <code>
+    # emerge sync</code>
+    <p>
+    Which will perform a sync against another server and ensure that all files
+    are up to date.
+    </p>
+  </resolution>
+  <references/>
+</glsa>