net-misc/openssh: restrict --without-stackprotector to just i686

Package-Manager: Portage-2.3.5, Repoman-2.3.1

5 files changed, 760 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/Manifest b/net-misc/openssh/Manifest
index 858bae03..eb543f63 100644
--- a/net-misc/openssh/Manifest
+++ b/net-misc/openssh/Manifest
@@ -9,6 +9,9 @@ AUX openssh-7.3_p1-hpn-cipher-ctr-mt-no-deadlocks.patch 7005 SHA256 44ae73966a98
 AUX openssh-7.3_p1-hpn-x509-9.2-glue.patch 1611 SHA256 7d04d19e62e688c9c12c25fd479933dd2c707f838ac810263dd1dc79a5ff55f1 SHA512 3604f0f1ea6c74b8418ac158df47910dfb2d54c7ce77f78f1a6c072acd20dc5751e24156acd9dda02aecaac250f43c8d968382f2f4b15b4706e4c4bde8ebde9a WHIRLPOOL b327a94c5b37da296caaa925bf13adf81ab3a53dffe691b33010b89b07366445613e553b4f486bacab658e2dcec143971001b4158f493e9b7e5bd427f0e072fb
 AUX openssh-7.3_p1-sctp-x509-glue.patch 2447 SHA256 a6758b9bff99022b1aa1bc729fcdcc8e4e91d0a617c903d72964cc1fca1ea061 SHA512 f48c2bba7707542741e52f5d794aaafe4468d088e28bc02878c0eb9aa76d31b57dca69b85705f7a9a2d745272df3fdc39a1d13ba337cab34dd0e9d545cee7d41 WHIRLPOOL 77e2574065a78a0f7014213f5e5d64651d41f24c7652542589f1106a6a114cf27d9922ef2cddee9e62c0f0f118691d91ebe9dc4a0ae04654843f18bdd20e2cef
 AUX openssh-7.3_p1-x509-9.2-warnings.patch 3060 SHA256 e7963f4946db01390831ee07a49c3a2291518b06144e95cfc47326c7209fa2e3 SHA512 f029d6f922e1632b32ac6e7b627378854f78c9d9b828dde37273b1b1a09167273fc6934bcb0653209b9e5ffd06c95d564d1bf5f1ea745993e19b062a4532f1c0 WHIRLPOOL cd4eb68bf861a50e9452c453c903946b8d067fd00171d39c6bad797d20c07631cda2379d9e41246bc93b22252a8d1bd55186e13ba492c7b8cf94048910f3a8a9
+AUX openssh-7.5_p1-GSSAPI-dns.patch 11137 SHA256 e0b256646651edd7a4bf60ebe4cf2021d85a5f8f3d30393bd499655c0b0c64c1 SHA512 f84e1d3fdda7a534d9351884caaefc136be7599e735200f0393db0acad03a57abe6585f9402018b50e3454e6842c3281d630120d479ff819f591c4693252dd0e WHIRLPOOL 000276fe1e0cc9ac33da8974cc6e24803a69b3d63c20096a92d6d10206c6e27110bdcaa26c0dbd2e0d0feb501681a738d5adb9d57ae21c7c55f67396f8b26c0e
+AUX openssh-7.5_p1-cross-cache.patch 1220 SHA256 693c6e28d4c1da71c67b64ef25d286f0d5128f9aebb3450283fa9ce6887186a7 SHA512 03cf3b5556fcf43c7053d1550c8aa35189759a0a2274a67427b28176ba7938b8d0019992de25fb614dc556c5f45a67649bb5d2d82889ac2c37edd986fc632550 WHIRLPOOL f7a04e19816cadce138a0beec4f1ad5f975773a1802fd1db245846ce8d5d6ec5ddfdcfa099e391172457a29eedb30c416dfa7bf4a56e99cfe507be00d2e1e718
+AUX openssh-7.5_p1-x32-typo.patch 772 SHA256 17f2baad36e5b6d270d7377db4ebdf157f2eb3bc99d596c32a47d584a1040307 SHA512 20d19301873d4b8e908527f462f40c2f4a513d0bb89d4c7b885f9fc7eb5d483eea544eb108d87ff6aaa3d988d360c2029910c18f7125c96e8367485553f59a5e WHIRLPOOL 5141fd3a19575593f84890aaa84123373ffb81aa3e860cda2468c7578754acf0a5d8ce0ea9c5ab25a83574ad5b272b9240cdcb29724c3b7cbdc059518da8c609
 AUX sshd.confd 396 SHA256 29c6d57ac3ec6018cadc6ba6cd9b90c9ed46e20049b970fdcc68ee2481a2ee41 SHA512 b9ae816af54a55e134a9307e376f05367b815f1b3fd545c2a2c312d18aedcf907f413e8bad8db980cdd9aad4011a72a79e1e94594f69500939a9cb46287f2f81 WHIRLPOOL 69f43e6192e009a4663d130f7e40ee8b13c6eb9cc7d960b5e0e22f5d477649c88806a9d219efef211f4346582c2bb51e40d230a8191e5953dbe08bfff976ae53
 AUX sshd.pam_include.2 156 SHA256 166136e27d653e0bf481a6ca79fecb7d9fa2fc3d597d041f97df595f65a8193c SHA512 d3f7e6ca8c9f2b5060ebccb259316bb59c9a7e158e8ef9466765a20db263a4043a590811f1a3ab072b718dbd70898bc69b77e0b19603d7f394b5ac1bd0a4a56c WHIRLPOOL ba7a0a8c3bb39c5fda69de34b822a19696398e0a8789211ac1faae787ee34f9639eb35efe29c67f874b5f9fe674742503e570f441c005974f4a0c93468b8970b
 AUX sshd.rc6.4 2108 SHA256 43a483014bf177f9238e54a7b8210d5a76830beb67c18999409e543fd744c9e4 SHA512 fe58e950514743a72467233ff2f2a63112c50e5db843d61e141a5ca3dd8ef8f42a616cd9de7748ae582054c47c2cc38ce48b638e2d88be39c1387f77e79c83e1 WHIRLPOOL ef30b1e3a118b40617e3c1de6b4ebb360f466e90e18157a08d0ed50a4acb488eb7f6159120525e2b7e85393cd19b062c97188460ea51959467eb6ab52632d064
@@ -19,6 +22,12 @@ DIST openssh-7.3_p1-hpn-14.10-r1.patch.xz 20584 SHA256 0bbbfeb1f9f975ad591ed4ec7
 DIST openssh-7.3_p1-sctp.patch.xz 9968 SHA256 18c3db45ed1e5495db29626938d8432aee509e88057494f052cfc09d40824c7f SHA512 f249b76898af0c6f1f65f2a1cfb422648aa712818d0dc051b85a171f26bdddf7980fff5de7761161aa41c309e528b3801b4234f5cdd9f79f8eef173ae83f1e3c WHIRLPOOL 1d92b969154b77d8ce9e3a6d0302aa17ec95e2d5ea4de72c0fb5680a8ee12f518ee5b1c47f22ad5d1a923a74c43829ed36cf478fe75fe400de967ab48d93dc99
 DIST openssh-7.3p1+x509-9.2.diff.gz 588078 SHA256 45f054cbb2b77ac8cc7ab01439e34083382137d47b840ca274555b7e2cf7098b SHA512 fab0da148b0833a651e8a7c36f344aacecef6fa92f8f1cb6302272d98c1ab018831f5850dcaa8f54a39f9ada9b7d5b0a0ea01defc3c6f603bbe211f6bff6a841 WHIRLPOOL 53f63d879f563909c57d23ced273e23eda1eace2a2ddfd54edf5f2ef15218cc7e5d927e54714b6850db541f361c459de50d79b0a4516b43ce4cba8eb66b49485
 DIST openssh-7.3p1.tar.gz 1522617 SHA256 3ffb989a6dcaa69594c3b550d4855a5a2e1718ccdde7f5e36387b424220fbecc SHA512 7ba2d6140f38bd359ebf32ef17626e0ae1c00c3a38c01877b7c6b0317d030f10a8f82a0a51fc3b6273619de9ed73e24b8cf107b1e968f927053a3bedf97ff801 WHIRLPOOL f852026638d173d455f74e3fce16673fc4b10f32d954d5bb8c7c65df8d1ca7efd0938177dd9fb6e1f7354383f21c7bca8a2f01e89793e32f8ca68c30456a611c
+DIST openssh-7.4_p1-sctp.patch.xz 8220 SHA256 18fa77f79ccae8b9a76bc877e9602113d91953bd487b6cc8284bfd1217438a23 SHA512 0c199e3b26949482125aeaa88216b2458292589e3eac8908d9134d13a1cae891094fcb0f752ed3009b3126cc72277b460205f39140c251792eb1b545271c3bd4 WHIRLPOOL 0f0ea1d36523b35d3be33d22fb84daa05fd14c464d69c19695235f81d26326bc53d6804bf34d0cc0c2584f412bfdac361d2b018032447d1033a4ff4fd9458a09
+DIST openssh-7.5p1+x509-10.1.diff.gz 460721 SHA256 e7abe401e7f651779c680491cfefbfcf4f26743202641b2bda934f80bb4464d2 SHA512 d3b5a8f5e3a88eda7989b002236811867b7e2c39bf7cd29a6dbbce277fca3fbedbfdbeaf1fba7d8c19f3dea32a17790e90604765f18576bcc5627a9c1d39109c WHIRLPOOL 2d4f96b47bcde9eabd19cad2fdc4da01a3d207f6ad5f4f1ea5a7dbd708d61783ae6a53e4cb622feed838106f57dbe6a7ecd1b41426325870378caf44803ff9ef
+DIST openssh-7.5p1-hpnssh14v12.tar.xz 23068 SHA256 8a1ed99c121a4ad21d7a26cd32627a8dd51595fd3ee9f95dc70e6b50fe779ce2 SHA512 45c42090a212b9ce898fbaa8284ddf0f0d17236af13c4a780e00bf265b0c7a4286027e90a7ce9ad70066309db722709dd2f0a7914f57e5364ffbaf7c4859cdf9 WHIRLPOOL 6089ad8ae16c112a6f15d168c092e7f057b9e6d815724346b5a6a1cd0de932f779d5f410d48c904d935fcb3bad3f597fa4de075ab1f49cadc9842ce7bd8fdf42
+DIST openssh-7.5p1.tar.gz 1510857 SHA256 9846e3c5fab9f0547400b4d2c017992f914222b3fd1f8eee6c7dc6bc5e59f9f0 SHA512 58c542e8a110fb4316a68db94abb663fa1c810becd0638d45281df8aeca62c1f705090437a80e788e6c29121769b72a505feced537d3118c933fde01b5285c81 WHIRLPOOL 1a42c68d8e350bc4790dd4c1a98dd6571bfa353ad6871b1462c53b6412f752719daabd1a13bb4434d294de966a00428ac66334bab45f371420029b5e34a6914c
 DIST openssh-lpk-7.3p1-0.3.14.patch.xz 17800 SHA256 cf1f60235cb8b0e561cd36cbf9e4f437e16fd748c2616d3f511c128c02deb76c SHA512 e9a73c5f13e41f6e11c744fdbcdb2e399c394479f79249e901cb3c101efb06f23d51d3ba4869db872184fa034a5910fc93a730fe906266c8d7409e39ad5b1ecd WHIRLPOOL bbdeadbed8f901148713bd9e4a082a4be2992c3151f995febd8be89bbb85d91185e1f0413b5a94a9340f2f404d18c9cee2aa6e032adaee0306aa1c624f6cc09c
+DIST openssh-lpk-7.5p1-0.3.14.patch.xz 17040 SHA256 11060be996b291b8d78de698c68a92428430e4ff440553f5045c6de5c0e1dab3 SHA512 9ce5d7e5d831c972f0f866b686bf93a048a03979ab38627973f5491eeeaa45f9faab0520b3a7ed90a13a67213fdc9cd4cf11e423acad441ea91b71037c8b435b WHIRLPOOL 58526777475786bb5efa193f3a3ec0500c4d48b18fef67698f8b1999cb07f04fbca7b7d3ece469f3a1e1ceca5152cdd08d3dbe7cfa4e7494740dc2c233101b93
 EBUILD openssh-7.3_p1-r7.ebuild 11605 SHA256 9e0c2be8c1053141a64150e7254bec720d5100435ef56bcb6408346d80881285 SHA512 24719eaadbe2089cd7c58e878a5a8b4e3da2468ff4282d7278021408676cb549dcf993aa0f770076d1144adacc3d98e8264699680a3ab637e02cbc40057da6bd WHIRLPOOL 06e438e61d120e3274212a594881843866d32b8b5b2410d58557116eaed0f8be1b3d6dcfda9ad63fab4950427c8213e94a340e641693cc889b5d3e14027eba54
+EBUILD openssh-7.5_p1-r1.ebuild 11110 SHA256 c0d2f65e5c84dedc85fd3fb7380d2c7ca58956739a70b53d1610da570d5aab54 SHA512 36762d3840473ac618b33c3e3448f8ea9542c461141f2f3e09aff53696e2382ded01c84bcb149d16f3d819a35acb19bb4e0d6e22f204d2f92d6ec25414a923af WHIRLPOOL 65e08f3165655bd719d301efc3f9e901e4d409815d7631d9eb6110114a0f4b9028cdc2e5339de6fc452b698d5c34c191b4acebe4c3222d67a2d0022eb8b34d26
 MISC metadata.xml 2212 SHA256 50f6e3651c8aeb86cfe90d92cef6a2b55640c400584f5fdbb6418cef7ac16f25 SHA512 958845fbdfb4f1d267fdbc3a005c6338da54c6a0715180a1982416a841ab4865c536de5f10bb8493d07830e182786d0c3f2ac710c9168434b3d077a59ed2ddd5 WHIRLPOOL 6d1080bc5c3b10a63836b5286d0d66b925a9d27d35e9855c9f966445458c1d6a752854d019c1740420ea78aef6f60105bef4c771fe61a95aae898034cf100705
diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.5_p1-GSSAPI-dns.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.5_p1-GSSAPI-dns.patch
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..6b1e6dd3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.5_p1-GSSAPI-dns.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,351 @@
+http://bugs.gentoo.org/165444
+https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1008
+
+--- a/readconf.c
++++ b/readconf.c
+@@ -148,6 +148,7 @@
+ 	oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
+ 	oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
+ 	oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
++	oGssTrustDns,
+ 	oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
+ 	oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist,
+ 	oHashKnownHosts,
+@@ -194,9 +195,11 @@
+ #if defined(GSSAPI)
+ 	{ "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication },
+ 	{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds },
++	{ "gssapitrustdns", oGssTrustDns },
+ # else
+ 	{ "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported },
+ 	{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported },
++	{ "gssapitrustdns", oUnsupported },
+ #endif
+ #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+ 	{ "smartcarddevice", oPKCS11Provider },
+@@ -930,6 +933,10 @@
+ 		intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+ 
++	case oGssTrustDns:
++		intptr = &options->gss_trust_dns;
++		goto parse_flag;
++
+ 	case oBatchMode:
+ 		intptr = &options->batch_mode;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+@@ -1649,6 +1656,7 @@
+ 	options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->gss_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->gss_deleg_creds = -1;
++	options->gss_trust_dns = -1;
+ 	options->password_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
+ 	options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
+@@ -1779,6 +1787,8 @@
+ 		options->gss_authentication = 0;
+ 	if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1)
+ 		options->gss_deleg_creds = 0;
++	if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1)
++		options->gss_trust_dns = 0;
+ 	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
+ 		options->password_authentication = 1;
+ 	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
+--- a/readconf.h
++++ b/readconf.h
+@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@
+ 					/* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */
+ 	int     gss_authentication;	/* Try GSS authentication */
+ 	int     gss_deleg_creds;	/* Delegate GSS credentials */
++	int	gss_trust_dns;		/* Trust DNS for GSS canonicalization */
+ 	int     password_authentication;	/* Try password
+ 						 * authentication. */
+ 	int     kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
+--- a/ssh_config.5
++++ b/ssh_config.5
+@@ -830,6 +830,16 @@
+ Forward (delegate) credentials to the server.
+ The default is
+ .Cm no .
++Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
++.It Cm GSSAPITrustDns
++Set to
++.Dq yes to indicate that the DNS is trusted to securely canonicalize
++the name of the host being connected to. If
++.Dq no, the hostname entered on the
++command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library.
++The default is
++.Dq no .
++This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
+ .It Cm HashKnownHosts
+ Indicates that
+ .Xr ssh 1
+--- a/sshconnect2.c
++++ b/sshconnect2.c
+@@ -656,6 +656,13 @@
+ 	static u_int mech = 0;
+ 	OM_uint32 min;
+ 	int ok = 0;
++	const char *gss_host;
++
++	if (options.gss_trust_dns) {
++		extern const char *auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *ssh, int use_dns);
++		gss_host = auth_get_canonical_hostname(active_state, 1);
++	} else
++		gss_host = authctxt->host;
+ 
+ 	/* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at
+ 	 * once. */
+@@ -668,7 +674,7 @@
+ 		/* My DER encoding requires length<128 */
+ 		if (gss_supported->elements[mech].length < 128 &&
+ 		    ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt, 
+-		    &gss_supported->elements[mech], authctxt->host)) {
++		    &gss_supported->elements[mech], gss_host)) {
+ 			ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */
+ 		} else {
+ 			mech++;
+
+need to move these two funcs back to canohost so they're available to clients
+and the server.  auth.c is only used in the server.
+
+--- a/auth.c
++++ b/auth.c
+@@ -784,117 +784,3 @@ fakepw(void)
+ 
+ 	return (&fake);
+ }
+-
+-/*
+- * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not
+- * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is
+- * called.
+- * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some
+- * attacks on legacy rhosts-style authentication.
+- * XXX is RhostsRSAAuthentication vulnerable to these?
+- * XXX Can we remove these checks? (or if not, remove RhostsRSAAuthentication?)
+- */
+-
+-static char *
+-remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh)
+-{
+-	struct sockaddr_storage from;
+-	socklen_t fromlen;
+-	struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
+-	char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST];
+-	const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
+-
+-	/* Get IP address of client. */
+-	fromlen = sizeof(from);
+-	memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
+-	if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
+-	    (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
+-		debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+-		return strdup(ntop);
+-	}
+-
+-	ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen);
+-	if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6)
+-		fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
+-
+-	debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop);
+-	/* Map the IP address to a host name. */
+-	if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name),
+-	    NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) {
+-		/* Host name not found.  Use ip address. */
+-		return strdup(ntop);
+-	}
+-
+-	/*
+-	 * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname,
+-	 * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following:
+-	 *	1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa.	IN PTR	2.3.4.5
+-	 */
+-	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+-	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM;	/*dummy*/
+-	hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
+-	if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) {
+-		logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring",
+-		    name, ntop);
+-		freeaddrinfo(ai);
+-		return strdup(ntop);
+-	}
+-
+-	/* Names are stored in lowercase. */
+-	lowercase(name);
+-
+-	/*
+-	 * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given
+-	 * address actually is an address of this host.  This is
+-	 * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can
+-	 * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from
+-	 * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be
+-	 * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of
+-	 * the domain).
+-	 */
+-	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+-	hints.ai_family = from.ss_family;
+-	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+-	if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) {
+-		logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s "
+-		    "[%s] failed.", name, ntop);
+-		return strdup(ntop);
+-	}
+-	/* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */
+-	for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+-		if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2,
+-		    sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 &&
+-		    (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0))
+-				break;
+-	}
+-	freeaddrinfo(aitop);
+-	/* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */
+-	if (ai == NULL) {
+-		/* Address not found for the host name. */
+-		logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not "
+-		    "map back to the address.", ntop, name);
+-		return strdup(ntop);
+-	}
+-	return strdup(name);
+-}
+-
+-/*
+- * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current
+- * connection.  The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this
+- * several times.
+- */
+-
+-const char *
+-auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *ssh, int use_dns)
+-{
+-	static char *dnsname;
+-
+-	if (!use_dns)
+-		return ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
+-	else if (dnsname != NULL)
+-		return dnsname;
+-	else {
+-		dnsname = remote_hostname(ssh);
+-		return dnsname;
+-	}
+-}
+--- a/canohost.c
++++ b/canohost.c
+@@ -202,3 +202,117 @@ get_local_port(int sock)
+ {
+ 	return get_sock_port(sock, 1);
+ }
++
++/*
++ * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not
++ * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is
++ * called.
++ * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some
++ * attacks on legacy rhosts-style authentication.
++ * XXX is RhostsRSAAuthentication vulnerable to these?
++ * XXX Can we remove these checks? (or if not, remove RhostsRSAAuthentication?)
++ */
++
++static char *
++remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++	struct sockaddr_storage from;
++	socklen_t fromlen;
++	struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
++	char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST];
++	const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
++
++	/* Get IP address of client. */
++	fromlen = sizeof(from);
++	memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
++	if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
++	    (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
++		debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
++		return strdup(ntop);
++	}
++
++	ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen);
++	if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6)
++		fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
++
++	debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop);
++	/* Map the IP address to a host name. */
++	if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name),
++	    NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) {
++		/* Host name not found.  Use ip address. */
++		return strdup(ntop);
++	}
++
++	/*
++	 * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname,
++	 * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following:
++	 *	1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa.	IN PTR	2.3.4.5
++	 */
++	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
++	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM;	/*dummy*/
++	hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
++	if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) {
++		logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring",
++		    name, ntop);
++		freeaddrinfo(ai);
++		return strdup(ntop);
++	}
++
++	/* Names are stored in lowercase. */
++	lowercase(name);
++
++	/*
++	 * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given
++	 * address actually is an address of this host.  This is
++	 * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can
++	 * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from
++	 * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be
++	 * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of
++	 * the domain).
++	 */
++	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
++	hints.ai_family = from.ss_family;
++	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
++	if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) {
++		logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s "
++		    "[%s] failed.", name, ntop);
++		return strdup(ntop);
++	}
++	/* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */
++	for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
++		if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2,
++		    sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 &&
++		    (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0))
++				break;
++	}
++	freeaddrinfo(aitop);
++	/* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */
++	if (ai == NULL) {
++		/* Address not found for the host name. */
++		logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not "
++		    "map back to the address.", ntop, name);
++		return strdup(ntop);
++	}
++	return strdup(name);
++}
++
++/*
++ * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current
++ * connection.  The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this
++ * several times.
++ */
++
++const char *
++auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *ssh, int use_dns)
++{
++	static char *dnsname;
++
++	if (!use_dns)
++		return ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
++	else if (dnsname != NULL)
++		return dnsname;
++	else {
++		dnsname = remote_hostname(ssh);
++		return dnsname;
++	}
++}
diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.5_p1-cross-cache.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.5_p1-cross-cache.patch
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..1c2b7b8a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.5_p1-cross-cache.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+From d588d6f83e9a3d48286929b4a705b43e74414241 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mike Frysinger <vapier@chromium.org>
+Date: Wed, 24 May 2017 23:18:41 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] configure: actually set cache vars when cross-compiling
+
+The cross-compiling fallback message says it's assuming the test
+passed, but it didn't actually set the cache var which causes
+later tests to fail.
+---
+ configure.ac | 6 ++++--
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index 5cfea38c0a6c..895c5211ea93 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -3162,7 +3162,8 @@ AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+ 	 select_works_with_rlimit=yes],
+ 	[AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ 	 select_works_with_rlimit=no],
+-	[AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes])]
++	[AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes])
++	 select_works_with_rlimit=yes]
+ )
+ 
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE,{0,0}) works])
+@@ -3188,7 +3189,8 @@ AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+ 	 rlimit_nofile_zero_works=yes],
+ 	[AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ 	 rlimit_nofile_zero_works=no],
+-	[AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes])]
++	[AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes])
++	 rlimit_nofile_zero_works=yes]
+ )
+ 
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if setrlimit RLIMIT_FSIZE works])
+-- 
+2.12.0
+
diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.5_p1-x32-typo.patch b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.5_p1-x32-typo.patch
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..5dca1b0e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-misc/openssh/files/openssh-7.5_p1-x32-typo.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+From 596c432181e1c4a9da354388394f640afd29f44b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org>
+Date: Mon, 20 Mar 2017 14:57:40 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] seccomp sandbox: fix typo w/x32 check
+
+---
+ sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+index 3a1aedce72c2..a8d472a63ccb 100644
+--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
++++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
+ 	 * x86-64 syscall under some circumstances, e.g.
+ 	 * https://bugs.debian.org/849923
+ 	 */
+-	SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_gettime & ~__X32_SYSCALL_BIT);
++	SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_gettime & ~__X32_SYSCALL_BIT),
+ #endif
+ 
+ 	/* Default deny */
+-- 
+2.12.0
+
diff --git a/net-misc/openssh/openssh-7.5_p1-r1.ebuild b/net-misc/openssh/openssh-7.5_p1-r1.ebuild
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..f1194dcf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-misc/openssh/openssh-7.5_p1-r1.ebuild
@@ -0,0 +1,336 @@
+# Copyright 1999-2017 Gentoo Foundation
+# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
+
+EAPI="5"
+
+inherit eutils user flag-o-matic multilib autotools pam systemd versionator
+
+# Make it more portable between straight releases
+# and _p? releases.
+PARCH=${P/_}
+
+HPN_PATCH="${PARCH}-hpnssh14v12.tar.xz"
+SCTP_PATCH="${PN}-7.4_p1-sctp.patch.xz"
+LDAP_PATCH="${PN}-lpk-7.5p1-0.3.14.patch.xz"
+X509_VER="10.1" X509_PATCH="${PN}-${PV/_}+x509-${X509_VER}.diff.gz"
+
+DESCRIPTION="Port of OpenBSD's free SSH release"
+HOMEPAGE="http://www.openssh.org/"
+SRC_URI="mirror://openbsd/OpenSSH/portable/${PARCH}.tar.gz
+	${SCTP_PATCH:+mirror://gentoo/${SCTP_PATCH}}
+	${HPN_PATCH:+hpn? ( mirror://gentoo/${HPN_PATCH} )}
+	${LDAP_PATCH:+ldap? ( mirror://gentoo/${LDAP_PATCH} )}
+	${X509_PATCH:+X509? ( http://roumenpetrov.info/openssh/x509-${X509_VER}/${X509_PATCH} )}
+	"
+
+LICENSE="BSD GPL-2"
+SLOT="0"
+KEYWORDS="~alpha ~amd64 ~arm ~arm64 ~hppa ~ia64 ~m68k ~mips ~ppc ~ppc64 ~s390 ~sh ~sparc ~x86 ~ppc-aix ~x64-cygwin ~amd64-fbsd ~sparc-fbsd ~x86-fbsd ~amd64-linux ~arm-linux ~x86-linux ~ppc-macos ~x64-macos ~x86-macos ~m68k-mint ~sparc-solaris ~sparc64-solaris ~x64-solaris ~x86-solaris"
+# Probably want to drop ssl defaulting to on in a future version.
+IUSE="abi_mips_n32 audit bindist debug ${HPN_PATCH:++}hpn kerberos kernel_linux ldap ldns libedit libressl livecd pam +pie sctp selinux skey ssh1 +ssl static test X X509"
+REQUIRED_USE="ldns? ( ssl )
+	pie? ( !static )
+	ssh1? ( ssl )
+	static? ( !kerberos !pam )
+	X509? ( !ldap !sctp ssl )
+	test? ( ssl )"
+
+LIB_DEPEND="
+	audit? ( sys-process/audit[static-libs(+)] )
+	ldns? (
+		net-libs/ldns[static-libs(+)]
+		!bindist? ( net-libs/ldns[ecdsa,ssl] )
+		bindist? ( net-libs/ldns[-ecdsa,ssl] )
+	)
+	libedit? ( dev-libs/libedit:=[static-libs(+)] )
+	sctp? ( net-misc/lksctp-tools[static-libs(+)] )
+	selinux? ( >=sys-libs/libselinux-1.28[static-libs(+)] )
+	skey? ( >=sys-auth/skey-1.1.5-r1[static-libs(+)] )
+	ssl? (
+		!libressl? (
+			>=dev-libs/openssl-1.0.1:0=[bindist=]
+			dev-libs/openssl:0=[static-libs(+)]
+		)
+		libressl? ( dev-libs/libressl:0=[static-libs(+)] )
+	)
+	>=sys-libs/zlib-1.2.3:=[static-libs(+)]"
+RDEPEND="
+	!static? ( ${LIB_DEPEND//\[static-libs(+)]} )
+	pam? ( virtual/pam )
+	kerberos? ( virtual/krb5 )
+	ldap? ( net-nds/openldap )"
+DEPEND="${RDEPEND}
+	static? ( ${LIB_DEPEND} )
+	virtual/pkgconfig
+	virtual/os-headers
+	sys-devel/autoconf"
+RDEPEND="${RDEPEND}
+	pam? ( >=sys-auth/pambase-20081028 )
+	userland_GNU? ( virtual/shadow )
+	X? ( x11-apps/xauth )"
+
+S=${WORKDIR}/${PARCH}
+
+pkg_pretend() {
+	# this sucks, but i'd rather have people unable to `emerge -u openssh`
+	# than not be able to log in to their server any more
+	maybe_fail() { [[ -z ${!2} ]] && echo "$1" ; }
+	local fail="
+		$(use X509 && maybe_fail X509 X509_PATCH)
+		$(use ldap && maybe_fail ldap LDAP_PATCH)
+		$(use hpn && maybe_fail hpn HPN_PATCH)
+	"
+	fail=$(echo ${fail})
+	if [[ -n ${fail} ]] ; then
+		eerror "Sorry, but this version does not yet support features"
+		eerror "that you requested:	 ${fail}"
+		eerror "Please mask ${PF} for now and check back later:"
+		eerror " # echo '=${CATEGORY}/${PF}' >> /etc/portage/package.mask"
+		die "booooo"
+	fi
+
+	# Make sure people who are using tcp wrappers are notified of its removal. #531156
+	if grep -qs '^ *sshd *:' "${EROOT}"/etc/hosts.{allow,deny} ; then
+		ewarn "Sorry, but openssh no longer supports tcp-wrappers, and it seems like"
+		ewarn "you're trying to use it.  Update your ${EROOT}etc/hosts.{allow,deny} please."
+	fi
+}
+
+save_version() {
+	# version.h patch conflict avoidence
+	mv version.h version.h.$1
+	cp -f version.h.pristine version.h
+}
+
+src_prepare() {
+	sed -i \
+		-e "/_PATH_XAUTH/s:/usr/X11R6/bin/xauth:${EPREFIX}/usr/bin/xauth:" \
+		pathnames.h || die
+	# keep this as we need it to avoid the conflict between LPK and HPN changing
+	# this file.
+	cp version.h version.h.pristine
+
+	# don't break .ssh/authorized_keys2 for fun
+	sed -i '/^AuthorizedKeysFile/s:^:#:' sshd_config || die
+
+	if use X509 ; then
+		if use hpn ; then
+			pushd "${WORKDIR}"/${HPN_PATCH%.*.*} >/dev/null
+			epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${P}-hpn-x509-${X509_VER}-glue.patch
+			popd >/dev/null
+		fi
+		save_version X509
+		epatch "${WORKDIR}"/${X509_PATCH%.*}
+		use libressl && epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-7.5p1-x509-libressl.patch
+	fi
+
+	if use ldap ; then
+		epatch "${WORKDIR}"/${LDAP_PATCH%.*}
+		save_version LPK
+	fi
+
+	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-7.5_p1-GSSAPI-dns.patch #165444 integrated into gsskex
+	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-6.7_p1-openssl-ignore-status.patch
+	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-7.5_p1-cross-cache.patch
+	use X509 || epatch "${WORKDIR}"/${SCTP_PATCH%.*}
+	use X509 || epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-7.5_p1-x32-typo.patch
+	use abi_mips_n32 && epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-7.3-mips-seccomp-n32.patch
+
+	if use hpn ; then
+		EPATCH_FORCE="yes" EPATCH_SUFFIX="patch" \
+			EPATCH_MULTI_MSG="Applying HPN patchset ..." \
+			epatch "${WORKDIR}"/${HPN_PATCH%.*.*}
+		save_version HPN
+	fi
+
+	tc-export PKG_CONFIG
+	local sed_args=(
+		-e "s:-lcrypto:$(${PKG_CONFIG} --libs openssl):"
+		# Disable PATH reset, trust what portage gives us #254615
+		-e 's:^PATH=/:#PATH=/:'
+		# Disable fortify flags ... our gcc does this for us
+		-e 's:-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2::'
+	)
+	# The -ftrapv flag ICEs on hppa #505182
+	use hppa && sed_args+=(
+		-e '/CFLAGS/s:-ftrapv:-fdisable-this-test:'
+		-e '/OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_LINK.*-ftrapv/d'
+	)
+	# _XOPEN_SOURCE causes header conflicts on Solaris
+	[[ ${CHOST} == *-solaris* ]] && sed_args+=(
+		-e 's/-D_XOPEN_SOURCE//'
+	)
+	sed -i "${sed_args[@]}" configure{.ac,} || die
+
+	epatch_user #473004
+
+	# Now we can build a sane merged version.h
+	(
+		sed '/^#define SSH_RELEASE/d' version.h.* | sort -u
+		macros=()
+		for p in HPN LPK X509 ; do [[ -e version.h.${p} ]] && macros+=( SSH_${p} ) ; done
+		printf '#define SSH_RELEASE SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE %s\n' "${macros}"
+	) > version.h
+
+	eautoreconf
+}
+
+src_configure() {
+	addwrite /dev/ptmx
+
+	use debug && append-cppflags -DSANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG
+	use static && append-ldflags -static
+
+	local myconf=(
+		--with-ldflags="${LDFLAGS}"
+		--disable-strip
+		--with-pid-dir="${EPREFIX}"$(usex kernel_linux '' '/var')/run
+		--sysconfdir="${EPREFIX}"/etc/ssh
+		--libexecdir="${EPREFIX}"/usr/$(get_libdir)/misc
+		--datadir="${EPREFIX}"/usr/share/openssh
+		--with-privsep-path="${EPREFIX}"/var/empty
+		--with-privsep-user=sshd
+		$(use_with audit audit linux)
+		$(use_with kerberos kerberos5 "${EPREFIX}"/usr)
+		# We apply the ldap patch conditionally, so can't pass --without-ldap
+		# unconditionally else we get unknown flag warnings.
+		$(use ldap && use_with ldap)
+		$(use_with ldns)
+		$(use_with libedit)
+		$(use_with pam)
+		$(use_with pie)
+		$(use X509 || use_with sctp)
+		$(use_with selinux)
+		$(use_with skey)
+		$(use_with ssh1)
+		$(use_with ssl openssl)
+		$(use_with ssl md5-passwords)
+		$(use_with ssl ssl-engine)
+	)
+
+	if [[ $(tc-arch) == x86 ]]; then
+		myconf+=( --without-stackprotect)
+	fi
+
+	# The seccomp sandbox is broken on x32, so use the older method for now. #553748
+	use amd64 && [[ ${ABI} == "x32" ]] && myconf+=( --with-sandbox=rlimit )
+
+	econf "${myconf[@]}"
+}
+
+src_install() {
+	emake install-nokeys DESTDIR="${D}"
+	fperms 600 /etc/ssh/sshd_config
+	dobin contrib/ssh-copy-id
+	newinitd "${FILESDIR}"/sshd.rc6.4 sshd
+	newconfd "${FILESDIR}"/sshd.confd sshd
+
+	newpamd "${FILESDIR}"/sshd.pam_include.2 sshd
+	if use pam ; then
+		sed -i \
+			-e "/^#UsePAM /s:.*:UsePAM yes:" \
+			-e "/^#PasswordAuthentication /s:.*:PasswordAuthentication no:" \
+			-e "/^#PrintMotd /s:.*:PrintMotd no:" \
+			-e "/^#PrintLastLog /s:.*:PrintLastLog no:" \
+			"${ED}"/etc/ssh/sshd_config || die
+	fi
+
+	# Gentoo tweaks to default config files
+	cat <<-EOF >> "${ED}"/etc/ssh/sshd_config
+
+	# Allow client to pass locale environment variables #367017
+	AcceptEnv LANG LC_*
+	EOF
+	cat <<-EOF >> "${ED}"/etc/ssh/ssh_config
+
+	# Send locale environment variables #367017
+	SendEnv LANG LC_*
+	EOF
+
+	if use livecd ; then
+		sed -i \
+			-e '/^#PermitRootLogin/c# Allow root login with password on livecds.\nPermitRootLogin Yes' \
+			"${ED}"/etc/ssh/sshd_config || die
+	fi
+
+	if ! use X509 && [[ -n ${LDAP_PATCH} ]] && use ldap ; then
+		insinto /etc/openldap/schema/
+		newins openssh-lpk_openldap.schema openssh-lpk.schema
+	fi
+
+	doman contrib/ssh-copy-id.1
+	dodoc CREDITS OVERVIEW README* TODO sshd_config
+	use X509 || dodoc ChangeLog
+
+	diropts -m 0700
+	dodir /etc/skel/.ssh
+
+	systemd_dounit "${FILESDIR}"/sshd.{service,socket}
+	systemd_newunit "${FILESDIR}"/sshd_at.service 'sshd@.service'
+}
+
+src_test() {
+	local t skipped=() failed=() passed=()
+	local tests=( interop-tests compat-tests )
+
+	local shell=$(egetshell "${UID}")
+	if [[ ${shell} == */nologin ]] || [[ ${shell} == */false ]] ; then
+		elog "Running the full OpenSSH testsuite requires a usable shell for the 'portage'"
+		elog "user, so we will run a subset only."
+		skipped+=( tests )
+	else
+		tests+=( tests )
+	fi
+
+	# It will also attempt to write to the homedir .ssh.
+	local sshhome=${T}/homedir
+	mkdir -p "${sshhome}"/.ssh
+	for t in "${tests[@]}" ; do
+		# Some tests read from stdin ...
+		HOMEDIR="${sshhome}" HOME="${sshhome}" \
+		emake -k -j1 ${t} </dev/null \
+			&& passed+=( "${t}" ) \
+			|| failed+=( "${t}" )
+	done
+
+	einfo "Passed tests: ${passed[*]}"
+	[[ ${#skipped[@]} -gt 0 ]] && ewarn "Skipped tests: ${skipped[*]}"
+	[[ ${#failed[@]}  -gt 0 ]] && die "Some tests failed: ${failed[*]}"
+}
+
+pkg_preinst() {
+	enewgroup sshd 22
+	enewuser sshd 22 -1 /var/empty sshd
+}
+
+pkg_postinst() {
+	if has_version "<${CATEGORY}/${PN}-5.8_p1" ; then
+		elog "Starting with openssh-5.8p1, the server will default to a newer key"
+		elog "algorithm (ECDSA).  You are encouraged to manually update your stored"
+		elog "keys list as servers update theirs.  See ssh-keyscan(1) for more info."
+	fi
+	if has_version "<${CATEGORY}/${PN}-6.9_p1" ; then
+		elog "Starting with openssh-6.9p1, ssh1 support is disabled by default."
+	fi
+	if has_version "<${CATEGORY}/${PN}-7.0_p1" ; then
+		elog "Starting with openssh-6.7, support for USE=tcpd has been dropped by upstream."
+		elog "Make sure to update any configs that you might have.  Note that xinetd might"
+		elog "be an alternative for you as it supports USE=tcpd."
+	fi
+	if has_version "<${CATEGORY}/${PN}-7.1_p1" ; then #557388 #555518
+		elog "Starting with openssh-7.0, support for ssh-dss keys were disabled due to their"
+		elog "weak sizes.  If you rely on these key types, you can re-enable the key types by"
+		elog "adding to your sshd_config or ~/.ssh/config files:"
+		elog "	PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes=+ssh-dss"
+		elog "You should however generate new keys using rsa or ed25519."
+
+		elog "Starting with openssh-7.0, the default for PermitRootLogin changed from 'yes'"
+		elog "to 'prohibit-password'.  That means password auth for root users no longer works"
+		elog "out of the box.  If you need this, please update your sshd_config explicitly."
+	fi
+	if ! use ssl && has_version "${CATEGORY}/${PN}[ssl]" ; then
+		elog "Be aware that by disabling openssl support in openssh, the server and clients"
+		elog "no longer support dss/rsa/ecdsa keys.  You will need to generate ed25519 keys"
+		elog "and update all clients/servers that utilize them."
+	fi
+}