app-emulation/qemu: drop old versions 2.7.0, 2.7.1

Package-Manager: Portage-2.3.3, Repoman-2.3.1

27 files changed, 0 insertions, 1042 deletions

diff --git a/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-6836.patch b/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-6836.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 56f7435df5b6..000000000000
--- a/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-6836.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-From: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
-
-In Vmxnet3 device emulator while processing transmit(tx) queue,
-when it reaches end of packet, it calls vmxnet3_complete_packet.
-In that local 'txcq_descr' object is not initialised, which could
-leak host memory bytes a guest.
-
-Reported-by: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
----
- hw/net/vmxnet3.c | 1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
-diff --git a/hw/net/vmxnet3.c b/hw/net/vmxnet3.c
-index 90f6943..92f6af9 100644
---- a/hw/net/vmxnet3.c
-+++ b/hw/net/vmxnet3.c
-@@ -531,6 +531,7 @@ static void vmxnet3_complete_packet(VMXNET3State *s, int qidx, uint32_t tx_ridx)
- 
-     VMXNET3_RING_DUMP(VMW_RIPRN, "TXC", qidx, &s->txq_descr[qidx].comp_ring);
- 
-+    memset(&txcq_descr, 0, sizeof(txcq_descr));
-     txcq_descr.txdIdx = tx_ridx;
-     txcq_descr.gen = vmxnet3_ring_curr_gen(&s->txq_descr[qidx].comp_ring);
- 
--- 
-2.5.5
diff --git a/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7155.patch b/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7155.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 495faf2f1cbe..000000000000
--- a/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7155.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,81 +0,0 @@
-From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
-
-Vmware Paravirtual SCSI emulation uses command descriptors to
-process SCSI commands. These descriptors come with their ring
-buffers. A guest could set the page count for these rings to
-an arbitrary value, leading to infinite loop or OOB access.
-Add check to avoid it.
-
-Reported-by: Tom Victor <address@hidden>
-Reported-by: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
----
- hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c | 21 ++++++++++-----------
- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
-
-Update per review
-  -> https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2016-09/msg00019.html
-
-diff --git a/hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c b/hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c
-index 5116f4a..4245c15 100644
---- a/hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c
-+++ b/hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c
-@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ pvscsi_log2(uint32_t input)
-     return log;
- }
- 
--static int
-+static void
- pvscsi_ring_init_data(PVSCSIRingInfo *m, PVSCSICmdDescSetupRings *ri)
- {
-     int i;
-@@ -160,10 +160,6 @@ pvscsi_ring_init_data(PVSCSIRingInfo *m, PVSCSICmdDescSetupRings *ri)
-     uint32_t req_ring_size, cmp_ring_size;
-     m->rs_pa = ri->ringsStatePPN << VMW_PAGE_SHIFT;
- 
--    if ((ri->reqRingNumPages > PVSCSI_SETUP_RINGS_MAX_NUM_PAGES)
--        || (ri->cmpRingNumPages > PVSCSI_SETUP_RINGS_MAX_NUM_PAGES)) {
--        return -1;
--    }
-     req_ring_size = ri->reqRingNumPages * PVSCSI_MAX_NUM_REQ_ENTRIES_PER_PAGE;
-     cmp_ring_size = ri->cmpRingNumPages * PVSCSI_MAX_NUM_CMP_ENTRIES_PER_PAGE;
-     txr_len_log2 = pvscsi_log2(req_ring_size - 1);
-@@ -195,8 +191,6 @@ pvscsi_ring_init_data(PVSCSIRingInfo *m, PVSCSICmdDescSetupRings *ri)
- 
-     /* Flush ring state page changes */
-     smp_wmb();
--
--    return 0;
- }
- 
- static int
-@@ -746,7 +740,7 @@ pvscsi_dbg_dump_tx_rings_config(PVSCSICmdDescSetupRings *rc)
- 
-     trace_pvscsi_tx_rings_num_pages("Confirm Ring", rc->cmpRingNumPages);
-     for (i = 0; i < rc->cmpRingNumPages; i++) {
--        trace_pvscsi_tx_rings_ppn("Confirm Ring", rc->reqRingPPNs[i]);
-+        trace_pvscsi_tx_rings_ppn("Confirm Ring", rc->cmpRingPPNs[i]);
-     }
- }
- 
-@@ -779,10 +773,15 @@ pvscsi_on_cmd_setup_rings(PVSCSIState *s)
- 
-     trace_pvscsi_on_cmd_arrived("PVSCSI_CMD_SETUP_RINGS");
- 
-+    if (!rc->reqRingNumPages
-+        || rc->reqRingNumPages > PVSCSI_SETUP_RINGS_MAX_NUM_PAGES
-+        || !rc->cmpRingNumPages
-+        || rc->cmpRingNumPages > PVSCSI_SETUP_RINGS_MAX_NUM_PAGES) {
-+        return PVSCSI_COMMAND_PROCESSING_FAILED;
-+    }
-+
-     pvscsi_dbg_dump_tx_rings_config(rc);
--    if (pvscsi_ring_init_data(&s->rings, rc) < 0) {
--        return PVSCSI_COMMAND_PROCESSING_FAILED;
--    }
-+    pvscsi_ring_init_data(&s->rings, rc);
- 
-     s->rings_info_valid = TRUE;
-     return PVSCSI_COMMAND_PROCESSING_SUCCEEDED;
--- 
-2.5.5
diff --git a/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7156.patch b/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7156.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 9c21a6759ad1..000000000000
--- a/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7156.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
-From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
-
-In PVSCSI paravirtual SCSI bus, pvscsi_convert_sglist can take a very
-long time or go into an infinite loop due to two different bugs:
-
-1) the request descriptor data length is defined to be 64 bit. While
-building SG list from a request descriptor, it gets truncated to 32bit
-in routine 'pvscsi_convert_sglist'. This could lead to an infinite loop
-situation for large 'dataLen' values, when data_length is cast to uint32_t
-and chunk_size becomes always zero.  Fix this by removing the incorrect
-cast.
-
-2) pvscsi_get_next_sg_elem can be called arbitrarily many times if the
-element has a zero length.  Get out of the loop early when this happens,
-by introducing an upper limit on the number of SG list elements.
-
-Reported-by: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
----
- hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c | 11 ++++++-----
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-Update as per:
-  -> https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2016-09/msg01172.html
-
-diff --git a/hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c b/hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c
-index 4245c15..babac5a 100644
---- a/hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c
-+++ b/hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c
-@@ -40,6 +40,8 @@
- #define PVSCSI_MAX_DEVS                   (64)
- #define PVSCSI_MSIX_NUM_VECTORS           (1)
- 
-+#define PVSCSI_MAX_SG_ELEM                2048
-+
- #define PVSCSI_MAX_CMD_DATA_WORDS \
-     (sizeof(PVSCSICmdDescSetupRings)/sizeof(uint32_t))
- 
-@@ -628,17 +630,16 @@ pvscsi_queue_pending_descriptor(PVSCSIState *s, SCSIDevice **d,
- static void
- pvscsi_convert_sglist(PVSCSIRequest *r)
- {
--    int chunk_size;
-+    uint32_t chunk_size, elmcnt = 0;
-     uint64_t data_length = r->req.dataLen;
-     PVSCSISGState sg = r->sg;
--    while (data_length) {
--        while (!sg.resid) {
-+    while (data_length && elmcnt < PVSCSI_MAX_SG_ELEM) {
-+        while (!sg.resid && elmcnt++ < PVSCSI_MAX_SG_ELEM) {
-             pvscsi_get_next_sg_elem(&sg);
-             trace_pvscsi_convert_sglist(r->req.context, r->sg.dataAddr,
-                                         r->sg.resid);
-         }
--        assert(data_length > 0);
--        chunk_size = MIN((unsigned) data_length, sg.resid);
-+        chunk_size = MIN(data_length, sg.resid);
-         if (chunk_size) {
-             qemu_sglist_add(&r->sgl, sg.dataAddr, chunk_size);
-         }
--- 
-2.5.5
diff --git a/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7157-1.patch b/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7157-1.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 480de308e0ac..000000000000
--- a/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7157-1.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
-
-When LSI SAS1068 Host Bus emulator builds configuration page
-headers, the format string used in 'mptsas_config_manufacturing_1'
-was wrong. It could lead to an invalid memory access.
-
-Reported-by: Tom Victor <address@hidden>
-Fix-suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <address@hidden>
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
----
- hw/scsi/mptconfig.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/scsi/mptconfig.c b/hw/scsi/mptconfig.c
-index 7071854..1ec895b 100644
---- a/hw/scsi/mptconfig.c
-+++ b/hw/scsi/mptconfig.c
-@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ size_t mptsas_config_manufacturing_1(MPTSASState *s, uint8_t **data, int address
- {
-     /* VPD - all zeros */
-     return MPTSAS_CONFIG_PACK(1, MPI_CONFIG_PAGETYPE_MANUFACTURING, 0x00,
--                              "s256");
-+                              "*s256");
- }
- 
- static
--- 
-2.5.5
diff --git a/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7157-2.patch b/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7157-2.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 5e796086ae08..000000000000
--- a/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7157-2.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
-
-When LSI SAS1068 Host Bus emulator builds configuration page
-headers, mptsas_config_pack() asserts to check returned size
-value is within limit of 256 bytes. Fix that assert expression.
-
-Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <address@hidden>
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
----
- hw/scsi/mptconfig.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/scsi/mptconfig.c b/hw/scsi/mptconfig.c
-index 1ec895b..531947f 100644
---- a/hw/scsi/mptconfig.c
-+++ b/hw/scsi/mptconfig.c
-@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ static size_t mptsas_config_pack(uint8_t **data, const char *fmt, ...)
-     va_end(ap);
- 
-     if (data) {
--        assert(ret < 256 && (ret % 4) == 0);
-+        assert(ret / 4 < 256);
-         stb_p(*data + 1, ret / 4);
-     }
-     return ret;
--- 
-2.5.5
diff --git a/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7170.patch b/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7170.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 7eb5f76dd133..000000000000
--- a/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7170.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
-
-When processing svga command DEFINE_CURSOR in vmsvga_fifo_run,
-the computed BITMAP and PIXMAP size are checked against the
-'cursor.mask[]' and 'cursor.image[]' array sizes in bytes.
-Correct these checks to avoid OOB memory access.
-
-Reported-by: Qinghao Tang <address@hidden>
-Reported-by: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
----
- hw/display/vmware_vga.c | 12 +++++++-----
- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/display/vmware_vga.c b/hw/display/vmware_vga.c
-index e51a05e..6599cf0 100644
---- a/hw/display/vmware_vga.c
-+++ b/hw/display/vmware_vga.c
-@@ -676,11 +676,13 @@ static void vmsvga_fifo_run(struct vmsvga_state_s *s)
-             cursor.bpp = vmsvga_fifo_read(s);
- 
-             args = SVGA_BITMAP_SIZE(x, y) + SVGA_PIXMAP_SIZE(x, y, cursor.bpp);
--            if (cursor.width > 256 ||
--                cursor.height > 256 ||
--                cursor.bpp > 32 ||
--                SVGA_BITMAP_SIZE(x, y) > sizeof cursor.mask ||
--                SVGA_PIXMAP_SIZE(x, y, cursor.bpp) > sizeof cursor.image) {
-+            if (cursor.width > 256
-+                || cursor.height > 256
-+                || cursor.bpp > 32
-+                || SVGA_BITMAP_SIZE(x, y)
-+                    > sizeof(cursor.mask) / sizeof(cursor.mask[0])
-+                || SVGA_PIXMAP_SIZE(x, y, cursor.bpp)
-+                    > sizeof(cursor.image) / sizeof(cursor.image[0])) {
-                     goto badcmd;
-             }
- 
--- 
-2.5.5
-
diff --git a/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7421.patch b/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7421.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index b9f354537a76..000000000000
--- a/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7421.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
-
-Vmware Paravirtual SCSI emulator while processing IO requests
-could run into an infinite loop if 'pvscsi_ring_pop_req_descr'
-always returned positive value. Limit IO loop to the ring size.
-
-Cc: address@hidden
-Reported-by: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
-Message-Id: <address@hidden>
-Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <address@hidden>
----
- hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c | 5 ++++-
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c b/hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c
-index babac5a..a5ce7de 100644
---- a/hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c
-+++ b/hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c
-@@ -247,8 +247,11 @@ static hwaddr
- pvscsi_ring_pop_req_descr(PVSCSIRingInfo *mgr)
- {
-     uint32_t ready_ptr = RS_GET_FIELD(mgr, reqProdIdx);
-+    uint32_t ring_size = PVSCSI_MAX_NUM_PAGES_REQ_RING
-+                            * PVSCSI_MAX_NUM_REQ_ENTRIES_PER_PAGE;
- 
--    if (ready_ptr != mgr->consumed_ptr) {
-+    if (ready_ptr != mgr->consumed_ptr
-+        && ready_ptr - mgr->consumed_ptr < ring_size) {
-         uint32_t next_ready_ptr =
-             mgr->consumed_ptr++ & mgr->txr_len_mask;
-         uint32_t next_ready_page =
--- 
-1.8.3.1
diff --git a/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7422.patch b/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7422.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index cc605810868c..000000000000
--- a/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7422.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-From 973e7170dddefb491a48df5cba33b2ae151013a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
-Date: Mon, 19 Sep 2016 23:55:45 +0530
-Subject: [PATCH] virtio: add check for descriptor's mapped address
-
-virtio back end uses set of buffers to facilitate I/O operations.
-If its size is too large, 'cpu_physical_memory_map' could return
-a null address. This would result in a null dereference while
-un-mapping descriptors. Add check to avoid it.
-
-Reported-by: Qinghao Tang <luodalongde@gmail.com>
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
-Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
-Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
-Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
----
- hw/virtio/virtio.c | 5 +++++
- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/hw/virtio/virtio.c b/hw/virtio/virtio.c
-index fcf3358d6c0d..bb656b1ccff0 100644
---- a/hw/virtio/virtio.c
-+++ b/hw/virtio/virtio.c
-@@ -495,6 +495,11 @@ static void virtqueue_map_desc(unsigned int *p_num_sg, hwaddr *addr, struct iove
-         }
- 
-         iov[num_sg].iov_base = cpu_physical_memory_map(pa, &len, is_write);
-+        if (!iov[num_sg].iov_base) {
-+            error_report("virtio: bogus descriptor or out of resources");
-+            exit(1);
-+        }
-+
-         iov[num_sg].iov_len = len;
-         addr[num_sg] = pa;
- 
--- 
-2.11.0
diff --git a/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7423.patch b/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7423.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index fdd871b16205..000000000000
--- a/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7423.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-From: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
-
-When processing IO request in mptsas, it uses g_new to allocate
-a 'req' object. If an error occurs before 'req->sreq' is
-allocated, It could lead to an OOB write in mptsas_free_request
-function. Use g_new0 to avoid it.
-
-Reported-by: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
-Message-Id: <address@hidden>
-Cc: address@hidden
-Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <address@hidden>
----
- hw/scsi/mptsas.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/scsi/mptsas.c b/hw/scsi/mptsas.c
-index 0e0a22f..eaae1bb 100644
---- a/hw/scsi/mptsas.c
-+++ b/hw/scsi/mptsas.c
-@@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ static int mptsas_process_scsi_io_request(MPTSASState *s,
-         goto bad;
-     }
- 
--    req = g_new(MPTSASRequest, 1);
-+    req = g_new0(MPTSASRequest, 1);
-     QTAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&s->pending, req, next);
-     req->scsi_io = *scsi_io;
-     req->dev = s;
--- 
-1.8.3.1
diff --git a/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7466.patch b/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7466.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index d5028bb168c7..000000000000
--- a/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7466.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-From: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
-
-If the xhci uses msix, it doesn't free the corresponding
-memory, thus leading a memory leak. This patch avoid this.
-
-Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
----
- hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c | 3 +--
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c b/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c
-index 188f954..281a2a5 100644
---- a/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c
-+++ b/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c
-@@ -3709,8 +3709,7 @@ static void usb_xhci_exit(PCIDevice *dev)
-     /* destroy msix memory region */
-     if (dev->msix_table && dev->msix_pba
-         && dev->msix_entry_used) {
--        memory_region_del_subregion(&xhci->mem, &dev->msix_table_mmio);
--        memory_region_del_subregion(&xhci->mem, &dev->msix_pba_mmio);
-+        msix_uninit(dev, &xhci->mem, &xhci->mem);
-     }
- 
-     usb_bus_release(&xhci->bus);
--- 
-1.8.3.1
diff --git a/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7907.patch b/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7907.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 34b095a51374..000000000000
--- a/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7907.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
-From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
-
-i.MX Fast Ethernet Controller uses buffer descriptors to manage
-data flow to/fro receive & transmit queues. While transmitting
-packets, it could continue to read buffer descriptors if a buffer
-descriptor has length of zero and has crafted values in bd.flags.
-Set an upper limit to number of buffer descriptors.
-
-Reported-by: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
----
- hw/net/imx_fec.c | 6 ++++--
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-Update per
-  -> https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2016-09/msg05284.html
-
-diff --git a/hw/net/imx_fec.c b/hw/net/imx_fec.c
-index 1c415ab..1d74827 100644
---- a/hw/net/imx_fec.c
-+++ b/hw/net/imx_fec.c
-@@ -220,6 +220,8 @@ static const VMStateDescription vmstate_imx_eth = {
- #define PHY_INT_PARFAULT            (1 << 2)
- #define PHY_INT_AUTONEG_PAGE        (1 << 1)
- 
-+#define IMX_MAX_DESC                1024
-+
- static void imx_eth_update(IMXFECState *s);
- 
- /*
-@@ -402,12 +404,12 @@ static void imx_eth_update(IMXFECState *s)
- 
- static void imx_fec_do_tx(IMXFECState *s)
- {
--    int frame_size = 0;
-+    int frame_size = 0, descnt = 0;
-     uint8_t frame[ENET_MAX_FRAME_SIZE];
-     uint8_t *ptr = frame;
-     uint32_t addr = s->tx_descriptor;
- 
--    while (1) {
-+    while (descnt++ < IMX_MAX_DESC) {
-         IMXFECBufDesc bd;
-         int len;
- 
diff --git a/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7908.patch b/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7908.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 16d072fe7928..000000000000
--- a/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7908.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
-From 070c4b92b8cd5390889716677a0b92444d6e087a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
-Date: Thu, 22 Sep 2016 16:02:37 +0530
-Subject: [PATCH] net: mcf: limit buffer descriptor count
-
-ColdFire Fast Ethernet Controller uses buffer descriptors to manage
-data flow to/fro receive & transmit queues. While transmitting
-packets, it could continue to read buffer descriptors if a buffer
-descriptor has length of zero and has crafted values in bd.flags.
-Set upper limit to number of buffer descriptors.
-
-Reported-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
-Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
----
- hw/net/mcf_fec.c |    5 +++--
- 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/net/mcf_fec.c b/hw/net/mcf_fec.c
-index 0ee8ad9..d31fea1 100644
---- a/hw/net/mcf_fec.c
-+++ b/hw/net/mcf_fec.c
-@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ do { printf("mcf_fec: " fmt , ## __VA_ARGS__); } while (0)
- #define DPRINTF(fmt, ...) do {} while(0)
- #endif
- 
-+#define FEC_MAX_DESC 1024
- #define FEC_MAX_FRAME_SIZE 2032
- 
- typedef struct {
-@@ -149,7 +150,7 @@ static void mcf_fec_do_tx(mcf_fec_state *s)
-     uint32_t addr;
-     mcf_fec_bd bd;
-     int frame_size;
--    int len;
-+    int len, descnt = 0;
-     uint8_t frame[FEC_MAX_FRAME_SIZE];
-     uint8_t *ptr;
- 
-@@ -157,7 +158,7 @@ static void mcf_fec_do_tx(mcf_fec_state *s)
-     ptr = frame;
-     frame_size = 0;
-     addr = s->tx_descriptor;
--    while (1) {
-+    while (descnt++ < FEC_MAX_DESC) {
-         mcf_fec_read_bd(&bd, addr);
-         DPRINTF("tx_bd %x flags %04x len %d data %08x\n",
-                 addr, bd.flags, bd.length, bd.data);
--- 
-1.7.0.4
-
diff --git a/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7909.patch b/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7909.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 8e6ecff8926c..000000000000
--- a/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7909.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
-
-The AMD PC-Net II emulator has set of control and status(CSR)
-registers. Of these, CSR76 and CSR78 hold receive and transmit
-descriptor ring length respectively. This ring length could range
-from 1 to 65535. Setting ring length to zero leads to an infinite
-loop in pcnet_rdra_addr. Add check to avoid it.
-
-Reported-by: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
----
- hw/net/pcnet.c | 3 +++
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/hw/net/pcnet.c b/hw/net/pcnet.c
-index 198a01f..3078de8 100644
---- a/hw/net/pcnet.c
-+++ b/hw/net/pcnet.c
-@@ -1429,8 +1429,11 @@ static void pcnet_csr_writew(PCNetState *s, uint32_t rap, uint32_t new_value)
-     case 47: /* POLLINT */
-     case 72:
-     case 74:
-+        break;
-     case 76: /* RCVRL */
-     case 78: /* XMTRL */
-+        val = (val > 0) ? val : 512;
-+        break;
-     case 112:
-        if (CSR_STOP(s) || CSR_SPND(s))
-            break;
--- 
-2.5.5
diff --git a/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7994-1.patch b/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7994-1.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 6fe77f367da5..000000000000
--- a/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7994-1.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
-From: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
-
-In virtio gpu resource create dispatch, if the pixman format is zero
-it doesn't free the resource object allocated previously. Thus leading
-a host memory leak issue. This patch avoid this.
-
-Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
----
- hw/display/virtio-gpu.c | 1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
-diff --git a/hw/display/virtio-gpu.c b/hw/display/virtio-gpu.c
-index 7fe6ed8..5b6d17b 100644
---- a/hw/display/virtio-gpu.c
-+++ b/hw/display/virtio-gpu.c
-@@ -333,6 +333,7 @@ static void virtio_gpu_resource_create_2d(VirtIOGPU *g,
-         qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
-                       "%s: host couldn't handle guest format %d\n",
-                       __func__, c2d.format);
-+        g_free(res);
-         cmd->error = VIRTIO_GPU_RESP_ERR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
-         return;
-     }
--- 
-1.8.3.1
diff --git a/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7994-2.patch b/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7994-2.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index dce1b2b2a326..000000000000
--- a/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-7994-2.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-From: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
-
-While processing isochronous transfer descriptors(iTD), if the page
-select(PG) field value is out of bands it will return. In this
-situation the ehci's sg list doesn't be freed thus leading a memory
-leak issue. This patch avoid this.
-
-Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
----
- hw/usb/hcd-ehci.c | 1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
-diff --git a/hw/usb/hcd-ehci.c b/hw/usb/hcd-ehci.c
-index b093db7..f4ece9a 100644
---- a/hw/usb/hcd-ehci.c
-+++ b/hw/usb/hcd-ehci.c
-@@ -1426,6 +1426,7 @@ static int ehci_process_itd(EHCIState *ehci,
-             if (off + len > 4096) {
-                 /* transfer crosses page border */
-                 if (pg == 6) {
-+                    qemu_sglist_destroy(&ehci->isgl);
-                     return -1;  /* avoid page pg + 1 */
-                 }
-                 ptr2 = (itd->bufptr[pg + 1] & ITD_BUFPTR_MASK);
--- 
-1.8.3.1
diff --git a/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-8576.patch b/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-8576.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 9617cd5dc880..000000000000
--- a/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-8576.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
-From 20009bdaf95d10bf748fa69b104672d3cfaceddf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Gerd Hoffmann <address@hidden>
-Date: Fri, 7 Oct 2016 10:15:29 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] xhci: limit the number of link trbs we are willing to process
-
-Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <address@hidden>
----
- hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c | 10 ++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c b/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c
-index 726435c..ee4fa48 100644
---- a/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c
-+++ b/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c
-@@ -54,6 +54,8 @@
-  * to the specs when it gets them */
- #define ER_FULL_HACK
- 
-+#define TRB_LINK_LIMIT  4
-+
- #define LEN_CAP         0x40
- #define LEN_OPER        (0x400 + 0x10 * MAXPORTS)
- #define LEN_RUNTIME     ((MAXINTRS + 1) * 0x20)
-@@ -1000,6 +1002,7 @@ static TRBType xhci_ring_fetch(XHCIState *xhci, XHCIRing *ring, XHCITRB *trb,
-                                dma_addr_t *addr)
- {
-     PCIDevice *pci_dev = PCI_DEVICE(xhci);
-+    uint32_t link_cnt = 0;
- 
-     while (1) {
-         TRBType type;
-@@ -1026,6 +1029,9 @@ static TRBType xhci_ring_fetch(XHCIState *xhci, XHCIRing *ring, XHCITRB *trb,
-             ring->dequeue += TRB_SIZE;
-             return type;
-         } else {
-+            if (++link_cnt > TRB_LINK_LIMIT) {
-+                return 0;
-+            }
-             ring->dequeue = xhci_mask64(trb->parameter);
-             if (trb->control & TRB_LK_TC) {
-                 ring->ccs = !ring->ccs;
-@@ -1043,6 +1049,7 @@ static int xhci_ring_chain_length(XHCIState *xhci, const XHCIRing *ring)
-     bool ccs = ring->ccs;
-     /* hack to bundle together the two/three TDs that make a setup transfer */
-     bool control_td_set = 0;
-+    uint32_t link_cnt = 0;
- 
-     while (1) {
-         TRBType type;
-@@ -1058,6 +1065,9 @@ static int xhci_ring_chain_length(XHCIState *xhci, const XHCIRing *ring)
-         type = TRB_TYPE(trb);
- 
-         if (type == TR_LINK) {
-+            if (++link_cnt > TRB_LINK_LIMIT) {
-+                return -length;
-+            }
-             dequeue = xhci_mask64(trb.parameter);
-             if (trb.control & TRB_LK_TC) {
-                 ccs = !ccs;
--- 
-1.8.3.1
diff --git a/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-8577.patch b/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-8577.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 8c295802c8ae..000000000000
--- a/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-8577.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-From: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
-
-In 9pfs read dispatch function, it doesn't free two QEMUIOVector
-object thus causing potential memory leak. This patch avoid this.
-
-Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
----
- hw/9pfs/9p.c | 5 +++--
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p.c b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
-index 119ee58..543a791 100644
---- a/hw/9pfs/9p.c
-+++ b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
-@@ -1826,14 +1826,15 @@ static void v9fs_read(void *opaque)
-             if (len < 0) {
-                 /* IO error return the error */
-                 err = len;
--                goto out;
-+                goto out_free_iovec;
-             }
-         } while (count < max_count && len > 0);
-         err = pdu_marshal(pdu, offset, "d", count);
-         if (err < 0) {
--            goto out;
-+            goto out_free_iovec;
-         }
-         err += offset + count;
-+out_free_iovec:
-         qemu_iovec_destroy(&qiov);
-         qemu_iovec_destroy(&qiov_full);
-     } else if (fidp->fid_type == P9_FID_XATTR) {
--- 
-1.8.3.1
diff --git a/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-8578.patch b/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-8578.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 74eee7e4d94d..000000000000
--- a/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-8578.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
-From ba42ebb863ab7d40adc79298422ed9596df8f73a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
-Date: Mon, 17 Oct 2016 14:13:58 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] 9pfs: allocate space for guest originated empty strings
-
-If a guest sends an empty string paramater to any 9P operation, the current
-code unmarshals it into a V9fsString equal to { .size = 0, .data = NULL }.
-
-This is unfortunate because it can cause NULL pointer dereference to happen
-at various locations in the 9pfs code. And we don't want to check str->data
-everywhere we pass it to strcmp() or any other function which expects a
-dereferenceable pointer.
-
-This patch enforces the allocation of genuine C empty strings instead, so
-callers don't have to bother.
-
-Out of all v9fs_iov_vunmarshal() users, only v9fs_xattrwalk() checks if
-the returned string is empty. It now uses v9fs_string_size() since
-name.data cannot be NULL anymore.
-
-Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
-[groug, rewritten title and changelog,
- fix empty string check in v9fs_xattrwalk()]
-Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
----
- fsdev/9p-iov-marshal.c | 2 +-
- hw/9pfs/9p.c           | 2 +-
- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/fsdev/9p-iov-marshal.c b/fsdev/9p-iov-marshal.c
-index 663cad5..1d16f8d 100644
---- a/fsdev/9p-iov-marshal.c
-+++ b/fsdev/9p-iov-marshal.c
-@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ ssize_t v9fs_iov_vunmarshal(struct iovec *out_sg, int out_num, size_t offset,
-                 str->data = g_malloc(str->size + 1);
-                 copied = v9fs_unpack(str->data, out_sg, out_num, offset,
-                                      str->size);
--                if (copied > 0) {
-+                if (copied >= 0) {
-                     str->data[str->size] = 0;
-                 } else {
-                     v9fs_string_free(str);
-diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p.c b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
-index 119ee58..39a7e1d 100644
---- a/hw/9pfs/9p.c
-+++ b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
-@@ -3174,7 +3174,7 @@ static void v9fs_xattrwalk(void *opaque)
-         goto out;
-     }
-     v9fs_path_copy(&xattr_fidp->path, &file_fidp->path);
--    if (name.data == NULL) {
-+    if (!v9fs_string_size(&name)) {
-         /*
-          * listxattr request. Get the size first
-          */
--- 
-2.7.3
-
diff --git a/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-8668.patch b/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-8668.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index a27d3a6fb196..000000000000
--- a/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-8668.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
-
-Rocker network switch emulator has test registers to help debug
-DMA operations. While testing host DMA access, a buffer address
-is written to register 'TEST_DMA_ADDR' and its size is written to
-register 'TEST_DMA_SIZE'. When performing TEST_DMA_CTRL_INVERT
-test, if DMA buffer size was greater than 'INT_MAX', it leads to
-an invalid buffer access. Limit the DMA buffer size to avoid it.
-
-Reported-by: Huawei PSIRT <address@hidden>
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
----
- hw/net/rocker/rocker.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/net/rocker/rocker.c b/hw/net/rocker/rocker.c
-index 30f2ce4..e9d215a 100644
---- a/hw/net/rocker/rocker.c
-+++ b/hw/net/rocker/rocker.c
-@@ -860,7 +860,7 @@ static void rocker_io_writel(void *opaque, hwaddr addr, uint32_t val)
-         rocker_msix_irq(r, val);
-         break;
-     case ROCKER_TEST_DMA_SIZE:
--        r->test_dma_size = val;
-+        r->test_dma_size = val & 0xFFFF;
-         break;
-     case ROCKER_TEST_DMA_ADDR + 4:
-         r->test_dma_addr = ((uint64_t)val) << 32 | r->lower32;
--- 
-2.5.5
diff --git a/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-8669-2.patch b/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-8669-2.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 23393b7d590d..000000000000
--- a/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-8669-2.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
-
-16550A UART device uses an oscillator to generate frequencies
-(baud base), which decide communication speed. This speed could
-be changed by dividing it by a divider. If the divider is
-greater than the baud base, speed is set to zero, leading to a
-divide by zero error. Add check to avoid it.
-
-Reported-by: Huawei PSIRT <address@hidden>
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
----
- hw/char/serial.c | 3 ++-
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-Update per
-  -> https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2016-10/msg02400.html
-
-diff --git a/hw/char/serial.c b/hw/char/serial.c
-index 3442f47..eec72b7 100644
---- a/hw/char/serial.c
-+++ b/hw/char/serial.c
-@@ -153,8 +153,9 @@ static void serial_update_parameters(SerialState *s)
-     int speed, parity, data_bits, stop_bits, frame_size;
-     QEMUSerialSetParams ssp;
- 
--    if (s->divider == 0)
-+    if (s->divider == 0 || s->divider > s->baudbase) {
-         return;
-+    }
- 
-     /* Start bit. */
-     frame_size = 1;
--- 
-2.5.5
diff --git a/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-8909.patch b/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-8909.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index ed6613f89660..000000000000
--- a/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-8909.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
-
-Intel HDA emulator uses stream of buffers during DMA data
-transfers. Each entry has buffer length and buffer pointer
-position, which are used to derive bytes to 'copy'. If this
-length and buffer pointer were to be same, 'copy' could be
-set to zero(0), leading to an infinite loop. Add check to
-avoid it.
-
-Reported-by: Huawei PSIRT <address@hidden>
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
----
- hw/audio/intel-hda.c | 3 ++-
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/audio/intel-hda.c b/hw/audio/intel-hda.c
-index cd95340..537face 100644
---- a/hw/audio/intel-hda.c
-+++ b/hw/audio/intel-hda.c
-@@ -416,7 +416,8 @@ static bool intel_hda_xfer(HDACodecDevice *dev, uint32_t stnr, bool output,
-     }
- 
-     left = len;
--    while (left > 0) {
-+    s = st->bentries;
-+    while (left > 0 && s-- > 0) {
-         copy = left;
-         if (copy > st->bsize - st->lpib)
-             copy = st->bsize - st->lpib;
--- 
-2.7.4
diff --git a/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-8910.patch b/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-8910.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index c93f79631fcb..000000000000
--- a/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-8910.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-From: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
-
-RTL8139 ethernet controller in C+ mode supports multiple
-descriptor rings, each with maximum of 64 descriptors. While
-processing transmit descriptor ring in 'rtl8139_cplus_transmit',
-it does not limit the descriptor count and runs forever. Add
-check to avoid it.
-
-Reported-by: Andrew Henderson <address@hidden>
-Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <address@hidden>
----
- hw/net/rtl8139.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/net/rtl8139.c b/hw/net/rtl8139.c
-index 3345bc6..f05e59c 100644
---- a/hw/net/rtl8139.c
-+++ b/hw/net/rtl8139.c
-@@ -2350,7 +2350,7 @@ static void rtl8139_cplus_transmit(RTL8139State *s)
- {
-     int txcount = 0;
- 
--    while (rtl8139_cplus_transmit_one(s))
-+    while (txcount < 64 && rtl8139_cplus_transmit_one(s))
-     {
-         ++txcount;
-     }
--- 
-2.7.4
diff --git a/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-9102.patch b/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-9102.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 963eca97f486..000000000000
--- a/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-9102.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-From: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
-
-The 'fs.xattr.value' field in V9fsFidState object doesn't consider the
-situation that this field has been allocated previously. Every time, it
-will be allocated directly. This leads a host memory leak issue. This
-patch fix this.
-
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p.c b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
-index 75ba5f1..a4c7109 100644
---- a/hw/9pfs/9p.c
-+++ b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
-@@ -3269,6 +3269,7 @@ static void v9fs_xattrcreate(void *opaque)
-     xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.flags = flags;
-     v9fs_string_init(&xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.name);
-     v9fs_string_copy(&xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.name, &name);
-+    g_free(xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.value);
-     xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.value = g_malloc(size);
-     err = offset;
-     put_fid(pdu, file_fidp);
diff --git a/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-9103.patch b/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-9103.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 7520863a7dd8..000000000000
--- a/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-9103.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-Author: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
-Date:   Mon Oct 17 14:13:58 2016 +0200
-
-    9pfs: fix information leak in xattr read
-    
-    9pfs uses g_malloc() to allocate the xattr memory space, if the guest
-    reads this memory before writing to it, this will leak host heap memory
-    to the guest. This patch avoid this.
-    
-    Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
-    Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
-    Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
-
-diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p.c b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
-index 26aa7d5..bf23b01 100644
---- a/hw/9pfs/9p.c
-+++ b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
-@@ -3269,8 +3269,8 @@ static void coroutine_fn v9fs_xattrcreate(void *opaque)
-     xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.flags = flags;
-     v9fs_string_init(&xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.name);
-     v9fs_string_copy(&xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.name, &name);
-     g_free(xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.value);
--    xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.value = g_malloc(size);
-+    xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.value = g_malloc0(size);
-     err = offset;
-     put_fid(pdu, file_fidp);
- out_nofid:
diff --git a/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-9104.patch b/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-9104.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index f1aec55c228b..000000000000
--- a/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-9104.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,92 +0,0 @@
-From 7e55d65c56a03dcd2c5d7c49d37c5a74b55d4bd6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
-Date: Tue, 1 Nov 2016 12:00:40 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] 9pfs: fix integer overflow issue in xattr read/write
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-The v9fs_xattr_read() and v9fs_xattr_write() are passed a guest
-originated offset: they must ensure this offset does not go beyond
-the size of the extended attribute that was set in v9fs_xattrcreate().
-Unfortunately, the current code implement these checks with unsafe
-calculations on 32 and 64 bit values, which may allow a malicious
-guest to cause OOB access anyway.
-
-Fix this by comparing the offset and the xattr size, which are
-both uint64_t, before trying to compute the effective number of bytes
-to read or write.
-
-Suggested-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
-Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
-Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
-Reviewed-By: Guido Günther <agx@sigxcpu.org>
-Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
----
- hw/9pfs/9p.c | 32 ++++++++++++--------------------
- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p.c b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
-index ab18ef2..7705ead 100644
---- a/hw/9pfs/9p.c
-+++ b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
-@@ -1637,20 +1637,17 @@ static int v9fs_xattr_read(V9fsState *s, V9fsPDU *pdu, V9fsFidState *fidp,
- {
-     ssize_t err;
-     size_t offset = 7;
--    int read_count;
--    int64_t xattr_len;
-+    uint64_t read_count;
-     V9fsVirtioState *v = container_of(s, V9fsVirtioState, state);
-     VirtQueueElement *elem = v->elems[pdu->idx];
- 
--    xattr_len = fidp->fs.xattr.len;
--    read_count = xattr_len - off;
-+    if (fidp->fs.xattr.len < off) {
-+        read_count = 0;
-+    } else {
-+        read_count = fidp->fs.xattr.len - off;
-+    }
-     if (read_count > max_count) {
-         read_count = max_count;
--    } else if (read_count < 0) {
--        /*
--         * read beyond XATTR value
--         */
--        read_count = 0;
-     }
-     err = pdu_marshal(pdu, offset, "d", read_count);
-     if (err < 0) {
-@@ -1979,23 +1976,18 @@ static int v9fs_xattr_write(V9fsState *s, V9fsPDU *pdu, V9fsFidState *fidp,
- {
-     int i, to_copy;
-     ssize_t err = 0;
--    int write_count;
--    int64_t xattr_len;
-+    uint64_t write_count;
-     size_t offset = 7;
- 
- 
--    xattr_len = fidp->fs.xattr.len;
--    write_count = xattr_len - off;
--    if (write_count > count) {
--        write_count = count;
--    } else if (write_count < 0) {
--        /*
--         * write beyond XATTR value len specified in
--         * xattrcreate
--         */
-+    if (fidp->fs.xattr.len < off) {
-         err = -ENOSPC;
-         goto out;
-     }
-+    write_count = fidp->fs.xattr.len - off;
-+    if (write_count > count) {
-+        write_count = count;
-+    }
-     err = pdu_marshal(pdu, offset, "d", write_count);
-     if (err < 0) {
-         return err;
--- 
-2.7.3
-
diff --git a/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-9105.patch b/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-9105.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index cddff97f7011..000000000000
--- a/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-9105.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
-From: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
-
-In v9fs_link dispatch function, it doesn't put the 'oldfidp'
-fid object, this will make the 'oldfidp->ref' never reach to 0,
-thus leading a memory leak issue. This patch fix this.
-
-Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <address@hidden>
----
- hw/9pfs/9p.c | 1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
-diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p.c b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
-index 8b50bfb..29f8b7a 100644
---- a/hw/9pfs/9p.c
-+++ b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
-@@ -2413,6 +2413,7 @@ static void v9fs_link(void *opaque)
-     if (!err) {
-         err = offset;
-     }
-+    put_fid(pdu, oldfidp);
- out:
-     put_fid(pdu, dfidp);
- out_nofid:
--- 
-1.8.3.1
diff --git a/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-9106.patch b/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-9106.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 137272d6b821..000000000000
--- a/app-emulation/qemu/files/qemu-2.7.0-CVE-2016-9106.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-Author: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
-Date:   Mon Oct 17 14:13:58 2016 +0200
-
-    9pfs: fix memory leak in v9fs_write
-    
-    If an error occurs when marshalling the transfer length to the guest, the
-    v9fs_write() function doesn't free an IO vector, thus leading to a memory
-    leak. This patch fixes the issue.
-    
-    Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
-    Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
-    [groug, rephrased the changelog]
-    Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
-
-diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p.c b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
-index d43a552..e88cf25 100644
---- a/hw/9pfs/9p.c
-+++ b/hw/9pfs/9p.c
-@@ -2090,7 +2090,7 @@ static void coroutine_fn v9fs_write(void *opaque)
-     offset = 7;
-     err = pdu_marshal(pdu, offset, "d", total);
-     if (err < 0) {
--        goto out;
-+        goto out_qiov;
-     }
-     err += offset;
-