diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-0.9.8ze-CVE-2015-0286.patch')
| -rw-r--r-- | dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-0.9.8ze-CVE-2015-0286.patch | 326 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 326 deletions
diff --git a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-0.9.8ze-CVE-2015-0286.patch b/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-0.9.8ze-CVE-2015-0286.patch deleted file mode 100644 index facb77d203a1..000000000000 --- a/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-0.9.8ze-CVE-2015-0286.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,326 +0,0 @@ ---- openssl-0.9.8ze/crypto/asn1/a_type.c -+++ openssl-0.9.8ze/crypto/asn1/a_type.c -@@ -121,6 +121,9 @@ - case V_ASN1_OBJECT: - result = OBJ_cmp(a->value.object, b->value.object); - break; -+ case V_ASN1_BOOLEAN: -+ result = a->value.boolean - b->value.boolean; -+ break; - case V_ASN1_NULL: - result = 0; /* They do not have content. */ - break; ---- openssl-0.9.8ze/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c -+++ openssl-0.9.8ze/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c -@@ -128,11 +128,17 @@ - { - ASN1_TLC c; - ASN1_VALUE *ptmpval = NULL; -- if (!pval) -- pval = &ptmpval; - c.valid = 0; -- if (ASN1_item_ex_d2i(pval, in, len, it, -1, 0, 0, &c) > 0) -- return *pval; -+ if (pval && *pval && it->itype == ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE) -+ ptmpval = *pval; -+ if (ASN1_item_ex_d2i(&ptmpval, in, len, it, -1, 0, 0, &c) > 0) { -+ if (pval && it->itype != ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE) { -+ if (*pval) -+ ASN1_item_free(*pval, it); -+ *pval = ptmpval; -+ } -+ return ptmpval; -+ } - return NULL; - } - -@@ -309,9 +315,16 @@ - if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it)) - goto auxerr; - -- /* Allocate structure */ -- if (!*pval && !ASN1_item_ex_new(pval, it)) -- { -+ if (*pval) { -+ /* Free up and zero CHOICE value if initialised */ -+ i = asn1_get_choice_selector(pval, it); -+ if ((i >= 0) && (i < it->tcount)) { -+ tt = it->templates + i; -+ pchptr = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, tt); -+ ASN1_template_free(pchptr, tt); -+ asn1_set_choice_selector(pval, -1, it); -+ } -+ } else if (!ASN1_item_ex_new(pval, it)) { - ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, - ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); - goto err; -@@ -405,6 +418,17 @@ - if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it)) - goto auxerr; - -+ /* Free up and zero any ADB found */ -+ for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) { -+ if (tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_ADB_MASK) { -+ const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt; -+ ASN1_VALUE **pseqval; -+ seqtt = asn1_do_adb(pval, tt, 1); -+ pseqval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, seqtt); -+ ASN1_template_free(pseqval, seqtt); -+ } -+ } -+ - /* Get each field entry */ - for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) - { ---- openssl-0.9.8ze/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c -+++ openssl-0.9.8ze/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c -@@ -151,6 +151,25 @@ - EVP_PKEY *pkey; - ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os=NULL; - -+ if (p7 == NULL) { -+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAINIT, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER); -+ return NULL; -+ } -+ /* -+ * The content field in the PKCS7 ContentInfo is optional, but that really -+ * only applies to inner content (precisely, detached signatures). -+ * -+ * When reading content, missing outer content is therefore treated as an -+ * error. -+ * -+ * When creating content, PKCS7_content_new() must be called before -+ * calling this method, so a NULL p7->d is always an error. -+ */ -+ if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) { -+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAINIT, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT); -+ return NULL; -+ } -+ - i=OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type); - p7->state=PKCS7_S_HEADER; - -@@ -344,6 +363,16 @@ - STACK_OF(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO) *rsk=NULL; - PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri=NULL; - -+ if (p7 == NULL) { -+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER); -+ return NULL; -+ } -+ -+ if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) { -+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT); -+ return NULL; -+ } -+ - i=OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type); - p7->state=PKCS7_S_HEADER; - -@@ -637,6 +666,16 @@ - STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *si_sk=NULL; - ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os=NULL; - -+ if (p7 == NULL) { -+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ -+ if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) { -+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ - EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp); - i=OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type); - p7->state=PKCS7_S_HEADER; -@@ -668,6 +707,7 @@ - /* If detached data then the content is excluded */ - if(PKCS7_type_is_data(p7->d.sign->contents) && p7->detached) { - M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os); -+ os = NULL; - p7->d.sign->contents->d.data = NULL; - } - break; -@@ -678,6 +718,7 @@ - if(PKCS7_type_is_data(p7->d.digest->contents) && p7->detached) - { - M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os); -+ os = NULL; - p7->d.digest->contents->d.data = NULL; - } - break; -@@ -815,6 +856,11 @@ - - if (!PKCS7_is_detached(p7)) - { -+ /* -+ * NOTE(emilia): I think we only reach os == NULL here because detached -+ */ -+ if (os == NULL) -+ goto err; - btmp=BIO_find_type(bio,BIO_TYPE_MEM); - if (btmp == NULL) - { -@@ -849,6 +895,16 @@ - STACK_OF(X509) *cert; - X509 *x509; - -+ if (p7 == NULL) { -+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAVERIFY, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ -+ if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) { -+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAVERIFY, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ - if (PKCS7_type_is_signed(p7)) - { - cert=p7->d.sign->cert; ---- openssl-0.9.8ze/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c -+++ openssl-0.9.8ze/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c -@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ - - switch (cmd) - { -+ /* NOTE(emilia): does not support detached digested data. */ - case PKCS7_OP_SET_DETACHED_SIGNATURE: - if (nid == NID_pkcs7_signed) - { -@@ -473,6 +474,8 @@ - - STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *PKCS7_get_signer_info(PKCS7 *p7) - { -+ if (p7 == NULL || p7->d.ptr == NULL) -+ return NULL; - if (PKCS7_type_is_signed(p7)) - { - return(p7->d.sign->signer_info); ---- openssl-0.9.8ze/doc/crypto/d2i_X509.pod -+++ openssl-0.9.8ze/doc/crypto/d2i_X509.pod -@@ -199,6 +199,12 @@ - persist if they are not present in the new one. As a result the use - of this "reuse" behaviour is strongly discouraged. - -+Current versions of OpenSSL will not modify B<*px> if an error occurs. -+If parsing succeeds then B<*px> is freed (if it is not NULL) and then -+set to the value of the newly decoded structure. As a result B<*px> -+B<must not> be allocated on the stack or an attempt will be made to -+free an invalid pointer. -+ - i2d_X509() will not return an error in many versions of OpenSSL, - if mandatory fields are not initialized due to a programming error - then the encoded structure may contain invalid data or omit the -@@ -210,7 +216,9 @@ - - d2i_X509(), d2i_X509_bio() and d2i_X509_fp() return a valid B<X509> structure - or B<NULL> if an error occurs. The error code that can be obtained by --L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. -+L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. If the "reuse" capability has been used -+with a valid X509 structure being passed in via B<px> then the object is not -+modified in the event of error. - - i2d_X509() returns the number of bytes successfully encoded or a negative - value if an error occurs. The error code can be obtained by ---- openssl-0.9.8ze/ssl/s2_lib.c -+++ openssl-0.9.8ze/ssl/s2_lib.c -@@ -410,7 +410,7 @@ - - OPENSSL_assert(s->session->master_key_length >= 0 - && s->session->master_key_length -- < (int)sizeof(s->session->master_key)); -+ <= (int)sizeof(s->session->master_key)); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,&c,1); - c++; ---- openssl-0.9.8ze/ssl/s2_srvr.c -+++ openssl-0.9.8ze/ssl/s2_srvr.c -@@ -446,10 +446,6 @@ - SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_NO_PRIVATEKEY); - return(-1); - } -- i=ssl_rsa_private_decrypt(s->cert,s->s2->tmp.enc, -- &(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]),&(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]), -- (s->s2->ssl2_rollback)?RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); -- - is_export=SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->session->cipher); - - if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session,&c,&md,NULL)) -@@ -467,21 +463,59 @@ - else - ek=5; - -+ /* -+ * The format of the CLIENT-MASTER-KEY message is -+ * 1 byte message type -+ * 3 bytes cipher -+ * 2-byte clear key length (stored in s->s2->tmp.clear) -+ * 2-byte encrypted key length (stored in s->s2->tmp.enc) -+ * 2-byte key args length (IV etc) -+ * clear key -+ * encrypted key -+ * key args -+ * -+ * If the cipher is an export cipher, then the encrypted key bytes -+ * are a fixed portion of the total key (5 or 8 bytes). The size of -+ * this portion is in |ek|. If the cipher is not an export cipher, -+ * then the entire key material is encrypted (i.e., clear key length -+ * must be zero). -+ */ -+ if ((!is_export && s->s2->tmp.clear != 0) || -+ (is_export && s->s2->tmp.clear + ek != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))) { -+ ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR); -+ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); -+ return -1; -+ } -+ /* -+ * The encrypted blob must decrypt to the encrypted portion of the key. -+ * Decryption can't be expanding, so if we don't have enough encrypted -+ * bytes to fit the key in the buffer, stop now. -+ */ -+ if ((is_export && s->s2->tmp.enc < ek) || -+ (!is_export && s->s2->tmp.enc < EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))) { -+ ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR); -+ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); -+ return -1; -+ } -+ -+ i = ssl_rsa_private_decrypt(s->cert, s->s2->tmp.enc, -+ &(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]), -+ &(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]), -+ (s->s2->ssl2_rollback) ? RSA_SSLV23_PADDING : -+ RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); -+ - /* bad decrypt */ - #if 1 - /* If a bad decrypt, continue with protocol but with a - * random master secret (Bleichenbacher attack) */ -- if ((i < 0) || -- ((!is_export && (i != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))) -- || (is_export && ((i != ek) || (s->s2->tmp.clear+(unsigned int)i != -- (unsigned int)EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))))) -- { -+ if ((i < 0) || ((!is_export && i != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)) -+ || (is_export && i != ek))) { - ERR_clear_error(); - if (is_export) - i=ek; - else - i=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); -- if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,i) <= 0) -+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(&p[s->s2->tmp.clear], i) <= 0) - return 0; - } - #else -@@ -505,7 +539,8 @@ - } - #endif - -- if (is_export) i+=s->s2->tmp.clear; -+ if (is_export) -+ i = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); - - if (i > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) - { |