summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
blob: ae25b6df6eb4cf9f2583992b98a084312e69b920 (plain)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE glsa SYSTEM "http://www.gentoo.org/dtd/glsa.dtd">
<glsa id="200312-01">
  <title>rsync.gentoo.org: rotation server compromised</title>
  <synopsis>
    A server in the rsync.gentoo.org rotation was compromised.
  </synopsis>
  <product type="infrastructure">rsync mirror</product>
  <announced>2003-12-02</announced>
  <revised count="01">2003-12-02</revised>
  <affected>
    <service type="rsync" fixed="yes"/>
  </affected>
  <background>
    <p>
    The rsync.gentoo.org rotation of servers provides an up to date Portage
    tree using the rsync file transfer protocol.
    </p>
  </background>
  <description>
    <p>
    On December 2nd at approximately 03:45 UTC, one of the servers that makes up
    the rsync.gentoo.org rotation was compromised via a remote exploit.  At this
    point, we are still performing forensic analysis.  However, the compromised
    system had both an IDS and a file integrity checker installed and we have a
    very detailed forensic trail of what happened once the box was breached, so
    we are reasonably confident that the portage tree stored on that box was
    unaffected.
    </p>
    <p>
    The attacker appears to have installed a rootkit and modified/deleted some
    files to cover their tracks, but left the server otherwise untouched.  The
    box was in a compromised state for approximately one hour before it was
    discovered and shut down.  During this time, approximately 20 users
    synchronized against the portage mirror stored on this box.  The method used
    to gain access to the box remotely is still under investigation.  We will
    release more details once we have ascertained the cause of the remote
    exploit.
    </p>
    <p>
    This box is not an official Gentoo infrastructure box and is instead donated
    by a sponsor.  The box provides other services as well and the sponsor has
    requested that we not publicly identify the box at this time.  Because the
    Gentoo part of this box appears to be unaffected by this exploit, we are
    currently honoring the sponsor's request.  That said, if at any point, we
    determine that any file in the portage tree was modified in any way, we will
    release full details about the compromised server.
    </p>
  </description>
  <impact type="low">
    <p>
    There is no known impact at this time.
    </p>
  </impact>
  <workaround>
    <p>
    There is no known workaround at this time.
    </p>
  </workaround>
  <resolution>
    <p>
    Again, based on the forensic analysis done so far, we are reasonably
    confident that no files within the Portage tree on the box were affected.
    However, the server has been removed from all rsync.*.gentoo.org rotations
    and will remain so until the forensic analysis has been completed and the
    box has been wiped and rebuilt.  Thus, users preferring an extra level of
    security may ensure that they have a correct and accurate portage tree by
    running:
    </p>
    <code>
    # emerge sync</code>
    <p>
    Which will perform a sync against another server and ensure that all files
    are up to date.
    </p>
  </resolution>
  <references/>
</glsa>